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Abstract
This thesis aims to explore the evolution of multiple defences. Single defences have received
considerable attention due to their specific effects in protecting organisms, but the research
about multiple defences is relatively limited. Specifically, this thesis focuses on how the
connection between defences is related to evolution (not the specific effect of protection
in each defence). Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the connection between earlier and later
defences using mathematical models. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the connection between
two synergistically acting defences, and their relationship with diversification rates using
phylogenetics.
In Chapter 2, I explore the evolutionary reason for multiple defences and the trade-off
between earlier and later defences. I find the conditions for multiple defences versus single
defences and also found that, typically, the investment is more in earlier than later defences.
In Chapter 3, I explore the defence phenotype variances in earlier and later defences in
mutation-selection balance. I find that, typically, the earlier defence variance evolves to be
less than the later defence variances, and I also find some factors that can influence the
equilibrium variances. Both Chapter 2 and 3 show the relative importance of earlier defence
to the later defences, due to their chances to use the defences. In Chapter 4, I study the
coevolution between two synergistically acting defences, aposematism and group-living,
and find that the root ancestor state is possibly group-living, which is slightly against
intuition, as most previous research thinks otherwise. I also find the possible evolutionary
dynamics of the four binary states from the ancestor till now and into the future, and the
probability equilibrium values of the four states. In Chapter 5, I have extended the study
of defences into a macroevolution point of view and study the association between defences
and diversification rates. Here I have obtained further evidence to “escape and radiate”
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hypothesis regarding the association between aposematism and faster diversification rates.
I also find that group-living is positively associated with diversification rates, which is new
in this area to my knowledge. The previous research about chemical defences in this topic
is not consistent, which might be because chemical defences are usually deployed later,
therefore, are less important for protection and can be more variable, as I have proposed
in Chapter 2 and 3.
In all, the findings here imply that the connection between defences plays an important
role in the evolution of multiple defences. This can help us to further understand the
evolutionary reasons and patterns of multiple defences and their application in certain
practical areas.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General background
Biological organisms need defences to protect themselves from different enemies in nature,
such as predators, pathogens, and parasites. Many organisms are observed to have mul-
tiple defences (e.g. morphological, physical, chemical, behavioural, physiological defences)
rather than only one defence. For example, some organisms have both constitutive (always
present) and induced defences (produced in specific circumstances) [1]. Both constitutive
and induced defences can take multiple forms as well. Examples of constitutive defences
include cryptic appearance, thick epidermises, thorns, and toxins. Induced defences can
be secreted sap (when some tissues are broken), closure of parts of the body (e.g. plant’s
leaf stoma) or chemicals.
Research on multiple defences is mainly focused on the following areas:
(1) The evolutionary reasons for multiple defences [2, 3], the trade-off between defences for
multiple defences [2, 4, 5, 6].
(2) The different functions of multiple defences working against different enemies [7], or in
different circumstances [5, 6, 8, 9, 10].
(3) The sequential deployment of multiple defences [2, 11].
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(4) Synergistic effects between defences [3, 12, 13, 14].
(5) The applied use of multiple defences in non-biological areas [11].
In this introduction, I will first introduce (1)-(4) in order. I will also mention (1) in different
deployed ways in multiple defences (2)(3)(4).
In the thesis, the second chapter will explore the evolutionary reasons for sequentially de-
ployed defences and the trade-off between earlier and later defences(points 1 and 3 above).
The third chapter will analyse the evolution of variances in earlier and later defences (points
1 and 3). The fourth chapter focuses on the synergistic effects and evolutionary mecha-
nisms of two contrasting defences in the Macrolepidoptera Order (points 1 and 4). The fifth
chapter will test the effect of defences on diversification rates of species (which is usually
analysed in relation to one defence in the previous research [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21], so I
will analyse the question with two defences in order to offer more evidence to the question
on this phenomenon).
1.2 The evolution of multiple defences
Nature usually selects the phenotypes that are most adaptive [22], and this principle ap-
plies to defence phenotypes as it does to other phenotypes. Through adaptive evolution,
defences are assumed to evolve to be well “designed” and perform efficiently. For exam-
ple, panther chameleons Furcifer pardalis can change their colour quickly and perfectly as
their background changes [23]; some animals can even be transparent (e.g. glass squid –
Bathothauma lyromma [24], glasswing butterfly – Greta oto [25]), and so appear invisible
to certain predators.
Since multiple defences are so commonly observed in nature, an important question is why
they are selected and preserved i.e. what are their benefits, compared to investing in a single
“super-defence”? The general reasons for the evolution of multiple, rather than single,
defences have been analysed in mathematical models [2, 3, 26, 27]. Two important aspects
are usually included in the analyses in these models, namely fitness-related investment and
damage costs.
(A) Fitness related investment: how effectively does the investment convert fitness re-
sources into defences.
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Investment in defences is regarded to have“allocation costs” that diminish the fitness re-
sources, which could otherwise be applied to other fitness-enhancing activities [28]. The
reason for investment in defences is that defences can protect organisms against enemy at-
tack (predators, parasites, etc) [28]. The effectiveness of investment in defences is usually
reflected in the probabilities that the invested defences can successfully hold to prevent
enemies (instead of being breached by enemies) [2, 3, 26]. When investing in multiple
defences, once one of the defences is breached, there is a chance that the other defences
will hold up and the organism will be able to survive, compared to investing in only one
defence. Therefore, the spread of investment in multiple, rather than single, defences might
help to increase the chance of survival.
(B) Damage costs: the damage costs to victims during or after enemy attack.
The exposure or the failure of each defence to the enemies is considered to have a cost
to the victims [28]. If there is only one defence, then the full damage costs will be to
the victim (e.g. death) when this single defence is breached. However, when there exist
several defences, the full damage cost can be spread into several parts, and there is a cost
on each part when the corresponding defence is breached, so the cost could be less when
only parts of the multiple defences are breached – the organism survives but some tissues
are destroyed.
The existing models in the current literature usually combine the effects of both “fitness-
related investment” and “damage costs”, so as to analyse both the benefits and costs of
defences. Different defence strategies can be compared using the models. For example, the
models can be used to compare the strategies of multiple defences vs one single defence
[2, 26, 27], or the trade-off between different defences [2, 3]. The use of“fitness-related
investment” and “damage costs” in the analysis of the evolutionary reason for multiple
defences will be mentioned in the later sections about the three ways in which multiple
defences are deployed.
1.3 The ways in which multiple defences act
Multiple defences can be deployed in different ways, and three ways are often observed.
First, multiple defences act individually in different circumstances (parallel-deployed). Sec-
ond, multiple defences act individually in an order (sequentially-deployed). Third, multiple
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defences act synergistically together (either parallel or sequentially). Here I will discuss
three different ways that multiple defences are deployed. The evolutionary reason for mul-
tiple defences in each of these three deployed ways will also be shown using “fitness-related
investment” and “damage costs”.
1.3.1 Defences acting individually in different circumstances
Individually deployed defences
Multiple defences are usually used in different circumstances [29], for example, (a) towards
different enemies [3, 30], (b) in different environments [8], or (c) in different stages in their
lives.
(a) Prey can be targeted by more than one species of predator. At the same time, they
might also suffer attacks from pathogens and parasites. Therefore, in the face of different
enemies, multiple defences can be useful in protecting the victims from different alternative
kinds of enemies.
(b) Some species use multiple defences in different environments (in different places they
live, or seasons of the year, etc). For example, animals need to protect themselves in the
environmental surroundings they inhabit, and their surroundings can be disparate in time
or place, so they might need corresponding camouflage defences as the environment sur-
rounding them changes. Countershading [10] is found in many animals (e.g. fish, birds,
reptiles and mammals). Darker-coloured backs but paler-coloured underside protect them
from observation by predators both under their body and above their body in the back-
ground of both the sky and the land respectively. Also, it can help to make them appear
less solid and conspicuous, as normal (i.e. uniformly coloured) three-dimensional objects
usually appear lighter on the top and darker on the bottom. The fur of the snowshoe hare
(Lepus americanus) can adapt to turn white in winter and brown in summer, so as to hide
against both the snowy background in winter and the soil brown background in summer [9].
Rana pirica tadpoles can develop predator-specific morphologies towards different types of
predators and the survival rates are higher when the tadpoles’ morphologies can adapt to
specific types of predators [31].
(c) Some species use multiple defences in different stages of their lives, especially for those
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metamorphosis species, or those species that change their living places in different life-
times. For example, Phigalia titea caterpillars mimic wood sticks; adults are cryptic in the
tree trunks or on the rocks and can fly away when discovered by predators [32]. Cicada
nymphs(e.g. Magicicada tredecassini) dig holes to hide underground, and their adults live
above grounds and have wings and camouflage colours as protection [33].
The evolution of individually deployed defences
Multiple defences evolve individually in their own respective circumstances and do not
necessarily function in circumstances when other defences may be required. Organisms
can, therefore, find themselves in danger when their defences are not specifically evolved
to defend against a different type of enemy attack. Speed et al. [27] have used a model
to explore the evolutionary reason for this type of multiple defences. The model, which
includes “fitness-related investment”, analyses the effect of coevolution between multiple
toxicity defence traits in plants and multiple corresponding resistance traits in insects. It
shows that plants are less likely to go extinct as the number of defence traits increases.
Moreover, it shows that there is a trade-off among defences, which is also found empirically
in direct defences (the release of hydrogen cyanide) and indirect defences (the emission of
volatile organic compounds), and the amounts of investment are negatively related with
each other [4].
1.3.2 Defences acting sequentially
Sequentially deployed defences
Sequential defences are also used independently, but they are carried out in order, one
after another. The earliest defence in the sequence is first initiated when the victims are
attacked by enemies, with the later defences inactive; however, when the earliest defences
are breached by the enemies, the subsequent defences start to get work one by one to defend
against further attacks. For example, constitutive defences usually function as the first line
of defence, and induced defences usually function later as the second line of defence after
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the constitutive defences have failed [1]. In the human immune system, physical defences
(e.g. skin, hair) usually function first to prevent pathogens (e.g. bacteria and viruses) from
entering the human body. Once these physical defences have been breached, the innate
immune defences will respond immediately and generally against the invading pathogens
[34]. If the innate immune defences cannot kill the pathogens, the subsequent adaptive
immune defences will then be activated, so the specific memory cells (B cell and T cell)
will respond and eliminate the specific kinds of pathogens [35, 36].
The evolution of sequentially deployed defences
One reason for the evolution of sequential defences is that attacks from predators can
be sequential [37]. For example, predators can show a series of predation behaviours —
detection, identification, approach, subjugation, consumption. Prey defences may have
separate evolutionary trajectories towards the corresponding attacks at each phase [38].
Since the overall resources for the organisms’ fitness and defences are limited, increasing
investment in one defence may cause decreasing investment in the other defences (trade-off
between defences) [22, 38]. For example, in the reed warbler Acrocephalus scirpaceus, the
egg-rejection defence is observed to block the later defence of chick-rejection against the
common cuckoo Cuculus canorus, but the same does not happen in the superb fairy-wren
Malurus cyaneus, which chooses the chick-rejection strategy rather than the egg-rejection
strategy [39].
Broom et al. [2] used a model to examine the evolutionary reason for sequential defences,
and the trade-off between the earlier and later defences. The model included the consider-
ation of both “fitness-related investment” and “damage costs”, and two levels of defences.
The model shows that, when the investment costs are very high, and the benefits in in-
vesting in both defences are very low (the defences have low efficacy for protection, attacks
are rare, and the exposure time of prey to predators is short), then the optimal choice is
not to invest in either of the two defences. When the cost/benefit ratio of the first defence
is much higher compared to the second defence, then the investment will be concentrated
in the second defence; and vice versa for the other defence. When the ratio cost/benefit is
similar and not very high for both defences, then the investment will be in both defences.
Therefore, there is a trade-off between the first and second defence, and the evolution will
choose the more effective defence over the less effective one. Also, if both defences are
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similarly effective and not very costly, then evolution will choose both defences.
The investment in earlier and later defences might also be influenced by the environments
that the victim inhabits. For example, the investment allocation of constitutive defences
and induced defence in pines is found to be different in different environments [1]. Con-
stitutive defences increase at higher latitudes and elevation, and colder temperature areas
where growth rate decreases, whereas induced defences increase in the opposite environ-
mental areas. Therefore, there is not only trade-off between the investment in earlier and
later defences, and the investment (“fitness-related investment”) in both defences are asso-
ciated with the growth rates, but also some external factors, e.g. the living environment.
In the second chapter, I will use a mathematical model to explore the investment defence
allocation strategy. I will answer the question of when organisms invest in multiple defences
rather than single defences. I will also find out whether more will be invested in earlier or
later defences. This model has two extensions, in comparison to Broom et al. [2]. First,
the model will include n levels of defences rather than only two because some organisms in
nature have more than two levels of sequential defences, so the model can also be applied to
explore the defences investment allocation strategies in those organisms. Second, a general
form rather than a linear form of “fitness-related investment” function will be used, since
the form of function might influence the results.
The variances of sequential defences
One defence can be variable among individuals in the population. Speed et al. [40] showed
that plants’ chemical defences can be variable both in quantities of toxins and in the
chemical constituents. Other non-chemical defences such as the length of thorns and
camouflage colours can also be variable in plants. Defence behaviours in animals can also
be variable. For example, the ability to run away from predators cannot be exactly the
same between individuals, since there might be some differences in the physical structures
in their bodies.
Although better defences are found to have better protective effects for victims, variations
in defence still persist. Higher concentrations of glucosinolates and larger density of tri-
chomes can reduce herbivore by beetles in Arabidopsis thaliana [41], but variations of both
glucosinolates and trichomes are still found to be a heritable trait [42]. The question is:
8 Lingzi Wang
why does variation persist and evolve across generations?
The term “mutation-selection balance” is sometimes used to describe the equilibrium when
the rate at which the deleterious alleles are initiated by mutation equals the rate at which
the deleterious alleles are eliminated by selection [43, 44, 45]. Similarly, the mutation-
selection balance can also be applied to mutation-selection competition in defence phe-
notypes. The variance of defence phenotypes in the population will decrease when the
selection force pushes the defence phenotypes towards the ideal phenotype for the organ-
isms. At the same time, all of the phenotypes in the population have some chance to mutate
to be different (more beneficial or more deleterious) in the offspring, so the variance in-
creases. Therefore, both the force of selection that accumulates the phenotypes, together
towards the ideal phenotype and the force of mutation that spreads the phenotypes away,
determine the variation of the phenotypes. The variance reaches an equilibrium when both
forces balance out.
In the third chapter of this thesis, the variance equilibria in the mutation-selection bal-
ance will be explored. Previous research about mutation-selection usually focuses on the
equilibrium of the ratio between beneficial and deleterious alleles [43, 44, 45] or on the
distribution in mutation-selection balance in discrete trait population (quasispecies model
[46]), but the distribution (variances) in mutation-selection balance in a continuous trait
population have rarely been explored. Using a mathematical model, I will explore the
evolution of variances across generations, and how the evolution of variance reaches the
mutation-selection balance (equilibrium).
In the sequential defence scenario, the mutation-selection balance may have different equi-
librium value according to the position of the defence in the sequence. Studies in plant
defences show that variations in earlier defences (physical, morphological defence) are
better at predicting the damage by herbivores than later defence (toxic secondary metabo-
lites, [47, 48]). It means that the earlier defences are less tolerant of the deviation from
the most adaptive defence than the later defences. It also shows the possible imbalance
in the variances in earlier and later defences. Using the same mathematical model, the
relation between the variances in the earlier and later defences during evolution and in the
equilibrium will also be explored in the third chapter.
Chapter 1. Introduction 9
1.3.3 Defences acting synergistically
Synergistically-acting Defences
Some defences can work synergistically together to achieve a better effect than if each
worked independently. For example, the defence aposematism is usually considered to be
synergistically working with chemical defences [12, 13, 14, 49]. The aposematic colours
will attract the predators’ attention, thereby making the victims more conspicuous (and
possibly more dangerous) than cryptic colours. The chemical defences themselves have the
effect of defence, but the aposematic colours constitute further visual signals of the unseen
defences, that can help to warn predators to stay away without testing and damaging the
victims. Also, aposematic colours are found to assist learning to avoid the defences [50].
So predator attack is reduced when victims can show aposematic colours as signals of their
chemical defences.
The evolution of synergistically-acting defences
Synergistically-acting defences enhance the effect of each other. Gilman et al. [3] use a
model to explore the reason for the evolutionary reason for this kind of multiple defences.
The model explores the effect of both the number of defences and the correlation between
traits in evolution. The model also includes the consideration of both “fitness-related
investment” and “damage costs”. It shows that the increasing number of defences and the
strength of correlation between traits would both increase the probability that victims can
survive from enemy attack. The number of defences matters because there is an unequal
relationship between the victims and predator– the victims can survive only if one defence
holds, however, all of the defences need to be breached for the enemies to succeed [3]. The
synergistic act matters because it can strengthen the effect of each of the defences by the
interaction and therefore increase escape rates.
The evolutionary order of two synergistically-acting defences
Since the evolution of new defences is usually instantaneous compared to the persistence
of existing defences, the simultaneous evolution of two new defences is unlikely to happen.
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Therefore an interesting question is which of the two synergistic defences evolves first.
For example, the spikes on the shells of turtles (e.g. Macrochelys temminckii) are likely
to be a later evolved defence on turtles’ shell defence itself, because most turtles do not
have spikes. Aposematic defences usually function as signals of chemical defences [12, 49,
13, 14]. Since the aposematic organisms are usually found also to have toxins, but the
organisms with toxins can be cryptic, not aposematic species, it is usually assumed that
chemical defences evolve earlier than the corresponding aposematic defences [14]. Also, the
aposematic species without toxins are regarded to mimic some other aposematic organisms
with toxin [51].
In comparison to the order in which aposematic and chemical defences evolved, the order
in which aposematism and group-living evolved is less obvious. It could be the case either
that solitary aposematic species evolved to live in groups, or that species that live in
groups evolved aposematic colouration. This is a particularly interesting question as both
the evolution of group living and aposematism increase the conspicuous effect of the other.
Therefore, on the one hand, aposematism could evolve in the group-living species, due to
kin selection [52, 53, 54, 55, 56];on the other hand, it is also possible that living in groups
can enhance the effect of aposematism that shows the chemical defences in the organisms,
so group-living evolves later than aposematism [57, 58, 59, 60, 61]. In the fourth chapter,
this question is examined by exploring all of the possible pathways between combinations
of colour traits (aposematism vs crypsis) and group traits (group-living and solitary-living)
using phylogenetic comparative methods. The evolution from aposematism to crypsis and
the evolution from group-living to solitary-living are also included in consideration as these
possibilities cannot be excluded, although previous research assumes that evolution occurs
in the opposite direction.
The aposematism & group-living defences and diversification in caterpillars
Defences can not only influence the survival of that population or species (microevolution)
as mentioned above, they are also expected to have a positive influence on diversifica-
tion rates, which means anet increase in the number of species within a certain lineage
(macroevolution). The idea comes from Ehrlich and Raven’s “escape and radiate” theory
[62, 63]. The theory predicted that defences help the organisms enter into a new adaptive
zone, which increases the chances to characterise new families.
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Defences are predicted to increase the diversification rates in two ways. First, effective
defences can help to protect the population. On the one hand, they increase the population
size, so increasing the chances of mutation and recombination, which might help to generate
new species [64]. On the other hand, an increased population size decreases the chance
of the species’ extinction. Both of these can increase diversification rates. Second, with
an effective defence, the populations are able to live in either more variable ecological
environments or in a wider range of living areas. So more interactions with the new and
wider environment and the new capacity for populations’ living can increase the chance of
the formation of new species [65]. Finally, species diversity itself was found eventually to
form the basis for new species [66].
Some studies have tried to explore the relationship between defences and diversification
rates [15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 67] but the evidence remains limited. Defences, such as apose-
matism, gained more consistent positive evidence [20, 21, 67] than some other defences,
such as chemical defences, which produced some ambiguous results regarding their influ-
ence on the diversification rates (e.g. chemical defence might increase diversification rates
[18, 62], decrease diversification rates [15, 67], or have no influence [21]). The fifth chapter
is designed to test whether aposematic defences and group-living defences can influence
the diversification rates in Macrolepidoptera caterpillars, which aims to bring some new
evidence to the “escape and radiate” theory.
1.4 The outline and aims of the following thesis
This thesis will focus mainly on the connections between defences. Multiple defences are
usually shown to respond towards the different circumstances (e.g. enemies, environments,
living stages), that the victims face (section 1.3.1). However, research about the connec-
tions between defences is relatively limited (section 1.3.2, 1.3.3). In this thesis, the connec-
tion between earlier and later defences deployed sequentially, and the connection between
two synergistically deployed defences will be mainly analysed. I will show the evolutionary
reason for multiple defences, the investment trade-off among defences, the evolution of
distribution variances across generations, the mutation-selection balance in multiple de-
fences, the coevolution between different defences, and the relationship between defences
and species diversification.
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The second chapter uses mathematical models to explore the evolution of sequential de-
fences. Compared to Broom et al [2], a general investment function rather than the linear
investment functions is used. Since the forms of investment functions can influence the
results (as it will be shown), the generalised function can let us get the results without
worrying about whether the investment function is the same as what happens in nature,
which we might never know. Also, I generalise the number of defences to n, compared to
only two in Broom et al [2], as more than two levels of defences are frequently observed
in reality. In the chapter, the evolutionary reason for multiple defences (why multiple de-
fences are selected compared to only one “super-defence”) and the trade-off between earlier
and later defences will be studied.
In the third chapter, the evolution of variances of the earlier and later defences will be
explored. Current literature about the variances of defences is quite limited, so the aim is
to help fill this gap in the research. A mathematical model that considers both selection
force and mutation force to show how the distribution of defence phenotypes in the earlier
and later defences evolves across time will be developed. This chapter also compares the
equilibrium variances of the distributions for earlier and later defences in the mutation-
selection balance, and also see how different factors influence the variances.
In the fourth chapter, the dynamic coevolution of colour defence traits (aposematism and
crypsis) and the group defence traits (group-living and solitary-living) in caterpillars are
explored. Compared to the previous research, that is only focused on the evolution from
crypsis to aposematism and from solitary-living to group-living, I also include the possi-
bility of the reverse being the case. The dynamics of the combination of the two traits
is a more comprehensive approach to studying the problem, and the results show a new
understanding of the coevolution of the two traits.
In the fifth chapter, whether both defences (aposematism and group-living defences) can
influence the diversification rates is explored. The results will add further evidence to the
currently limited research about Ehrlich and Raven’s “escape and radiate” theory [62, 63].
Bibliography
[1] Moreira, X., Mooney, K. A., Rasmann, S., Petry, W. K., Carrillo-Gavila´n, A., Zas,
R., & Sampedro, L. (2014). Trade-offs between constitutive and induced defences drive
Bibliography 13
geographical and climatic clines in pine chemical defences. Ecology letters, 17(5), 537-
546.
[2] Broom, M., Higginson, A. D., & Ruxton, G. D. (2010). Optimal investment across
different aspects of anti-predator defences. Journal of theoretical biology, 263(4), 579-
586.
[3] Gilman, R. T., Nuismer, S. L., & Jhwueng, D. C. (2012). Coevolution in multidi-
mensional trait space favours escape from parasites and pathogens. Nature, 483(7389),
328-330.
[4] Ballhorn, D. J., Kautz, S., Lion, U., & Heil, M. (2008). Trade-offs between direct and
indirect defences of lima bean (Phaseolus lunatus). Journal of Ecology, 96(5), 971-980.
[5] Eikenaar, C., Isaksson, C., & Hegemann, A. (2018). A hidden cost of migration? Innate
immune function versus antioxidant defense. Ecology and evolution, 8(5), 2721-2728.
[6] Hoverman, J. T., & Relyea, R. A. (2009). Survival trade-offs associated with inducible
defences in snails: The roles of multiple predators and developmental plasticity. Func-
tional Ecology, 23(6), 1179-1188.
[7] Poitrineau, K., Brown, S. P., & Hochberg, M. E. (2003). Defence against multiple
enemies. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 16(6), 1319-1327.
[8] Caro, T., Sherratt, T. N., & Stevens, M. (2016). The ecology of multiple colour defences.
Evolutionary ecology, 30(5), 797-809.
[9] Nagorsen, D. W. (1983). Winter pelage colour in snowshoe hares (Lepus americanus)
from the Pacific Northwest. Canadian Journal of Zoology, 61(10), 2313-2318.
[10] Poulton, E. B. (1890). The colours of animals: their meaning and use, especially
considered in the case of insects. D. Appleton.
[11] Wilkening, D. A. (2000). A simple model for calculating ballistic missile defense effec-
tiveness. Science & Global Security, 8(2), 183-215.
[12] Bowers, M. D. (1993). Aposematic caterpillars: life-styles of the warningly colored
and unpalatable. Pages 331–371 in N. E. Stamp And T. M. Casey, editors. Caterpillars:
ecological and evolutionary constraints on foraging. New York: Chapman & Hall.
14 Lingzi Wang
[13] Maan, M. E., & Cummings, M. E. (2012). Poison frog colors are honest signals of
toxicity, particularly for bird predators. The American Naturalist, 179(1), E1-E14.
[14] Santos, J. C., Coloma, L. A., & Cannatella, D. C. (2003). Multiple, recurring origins
of aposematism and diet specialization in poison frogs. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 100(22), 12792-12797.
[15] Agrawal, A. A., Fishbein, M., Halitschke, R., Hastings, A. P., Rabosky, D. L., &
Rasmann, S. (2009). Evidence for adaptive radiation from a phylogenetic study of plant
defenses. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(43), 18067-18072.
[16] Arbuckle, K., & Speed, M. P. (2015). Antipredator defenses predict diversification
rates. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(44), 13597-13602.
[17] Armbruster, W. S., Lee, J., & Baldwin, B. G. (2009). Macroevolutionary patterns of
defense and pollination in Dalechampia vines: adaptation, exaptation, and evolutionary
novelty. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(43), 18085-18090.
[18] Berenbaum, M. (1983). Coumarins and caterpillars: a case for coevolution. Evolution,
37(1), 163-179.
[19] Farrell, B. D., Dussourd, D. E., & Mitter, C. (1991). Escalation of plant defense: do
latex and resin canals spur plant diversification? The American Naturalist, 138(4),
881-900.
[20] Przeczek, K., Mueller, C., & Vamosi, S. M. (2008). The evolution of aposematism is
accompanied by increased diversification. Integrative zoology, 3(3), 149-156.
[21] Santos, J. C., Baquero, M., Barrio-Amoro´s, C., Coloma, L. A., Erdtmann, L. K., Lima,
A. P., & Cannatella, D. C. (2014). Aposematism increases acoustic diversification and
speciation in poison frogs. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
281(1796), 20141761.
[22] Darwin, C. (2004). On the origin of species, 1859. Routledge.
[23] Andreone, F., Guarino, F. M., & Randrianirina, J. E. (2005). Life history traits, age
profile, and conservation of the panther chameleon, Furcifer pardalis (Cuvier 1829), at
Nosy Be, NW Madagascar. Tropical Zoology, 18(2), 209-225.
Bibliography 15
[24] Young, R. E., & Mangold, K. M. (1922-2003). Tree of Life Project.
http://tolweb.org/Bathothauma lyromma/19549
[25] Henderson, C. L. (2002). Field guide to the wildlife of Costa Rica (Vol. 51). University
of Texas Press.
[26] Sasaki, A. (2000). Host-parasite coevolution in a multilocus gene-for-gene system.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 267(1458),
2183-2188.
[27] Speed, M. P., Fenton, A., Jones, M. G., Ruxton, G. D., & Brockhurst, M. A. (2015).
Coevolution can explain defensive secondary metabolite diversity in plants. New Phy-
tologist, 208(4), 1251-1263.
[28] Ruxton, G. D., Allen, W. L., Sherratt, T. N., & Speed, M. P. (2019). Avoiding at-
tack: the evolutionary ecology of crypsis, aposematism, and mimicry. Oxford University
Press.
[29] Pearson, D. L. (1989). What is the adaptive significance of multicomponent defensive
repertoires?. Oikos, 251-253.
[30] Poitrineau, K., Brown, S. P., & Hochberg, M. E. (2003). Defence against multiple
enemies. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 16(6), 1319-1327.
[31] Kishida, O., & Nishimura, K. (2005). Multiple inducible defences against multiple
predators in the anuran tadpole, Rana pirica. Evolutionary Ecology Research, 7(4),
619-631.
[32] Lotts, K., & Naberhaus, T. (2017). ”Spiny Looper Phigalia
titea (Cramer, 1782)”. Butterflies and Moths of North America.
https://www.butterfliesandmoths.org/species/Phigalia-titea. Retrieved 7 July, 2019.
[33] Williams, K. S., & Simon, C. (1995). The ecology, behavior, and evolution of periodical
cicadas. Annual review of entomology, 40(1), 269-295.
[34] Litman, G. W., Cannon, J. P., & Dishaw, L. J. (2005). Reconstructing immune phy-
logeny: new perspectives. Nature Reviews Immunology, 5(11), 866-879.
16 Lingzi Wang
[35] Pancer, Z., & Cooper, M. D. (2006). The evolution of adaptive immunity. Annu. Rev.
Immunol., 24, 497-518.
[36] Vitetta, E. S., Berton, M. T., Burger, C., Kepron, M., Lee, W. T., & Yin, X. M.
(1991). Memory B and T cells. Annual review of immunology, 9(1), 193-217.
[37] Endler, J. A. (1986). Defence against predators. In Predator-prey relationships, ed. M
Feder, G Lauder, pp. 109-34. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press.
[38] Low, C. (2012). Variable Risk and the Evolution of the Defense Repertoire of the
Tupelo Leafminer. In Evolutionary Biology: Mechanisms and Trends (pp. 155-168).
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
[39] Britton, N. F., Planque´, R., & Franks, N. R. (2007). Evolution of defence portfolios
in exploiter–victim systems. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 69(3), 957-988.
[40] Speed, M. P., Ruxton, G. D., Mappes, J., & Sherratt, T. N. (2012). Why are defensive
toxins so variable? An evolutionary perspective. Biological Reviews, 87(4), 874-884.
[41] Mauricio, R. (1998). Costs of resistance to natural enemies in field populations of the
annual plant Arabidopsis thaliana. The American Naturalist, 151(1), 20-28.
[42] Mauricio, R., & Rausher, M. D. (1997). Experimental manipulation of putative selec-
tive agents provides evidence for the role of natural enemies in the evolution of plant
defense. Evolution, 51(5), 1435-1444.
[43] Desai, M. M., & Fisher, D. S. (2007). Beneficial mutation–selection balance and the
effect of linkage on positive selection. Genetics, 176(3), 1759-1798.
[44] Goyal, S., Balick, D. J., Jerison, E. R., Neher, R. A., Shraiman, B. I., & Desai, M.
M. (2012). Dynamic mutation–selection balance as an evolutionary attractor. Genetics,
191(4), 1309-1319.
[45] Crow, J. F., & Kimura, M. (1970). An introduction to population genetics theory.
Harper and Row, New York.
[46] Eigen, M., McCaskill, J., & Schuster, P. (1988). Molecular quasi-species. The Journal
of Physical Chemistry, 92(24), 6881-6891.
Bibliography 17
[47] Carmona, D., Lajeunesse, M. J., & Johnson, M. T. (2011). Plant traits that predict
resistance to herbivores. Functional Ecology, 25(2), 358-367.
[48] Cardenas, R. E., Valencia, R., Kraft, N. J., Argoti, A., & Dangles, O. (2014). Plant
traits predict inter-and intraspecific variation in susceptibility to herbivory in a hyper-
diverse Neotropical rain forest tree community. Journal of Ecology, 102(4), 939-952.
[49] Gohli, J., & Ho¨gstedt, G. (2009). Explaining the evolution of warning coloration:
Secreted secondary defence chemicals may facilitate the evolution of visual aposematic
signals. PLoS One, 4(6).
[50] Roper, T. J., & Redston, S. (1987). Conspicuousness of distasteful prey affects the
strength and durability of one-trial avoidance learning. Animal Behaviour, 35(3), 739-
747.
[51] Pfennig, D. W., Harcombe, W. R., & Pfennig, K. S. (2001). Frequency-dependent
Batesian mimicry. Nature, 410(6826), 323-323.
[52] Alatalo, R. V., & Mappes, J. (1996). Tracking the evolution of warning signals. Nature,
382(6593), 708-710.
[53] Fisher, R. A. (1930). The genetical theory of natural selection. Oxford: Clarendon
[54] Guilford, T. (1985). Is kin selection involved in the evolution of warning coloration?
Oikos, 31-36.
[55] Harvey, P. H., Bull, J. J., Pemberton, M., & Paxton, R. J. (1982). The evolution of
aposematic coloration in distasteful prey: a family model. The American Naturalist,
119(5), 710-719.
[56] Riipi, M., Alatalo, R. V., LindstroE`m, L., & Mappes, J. (2001). Multiple benefits of
gregariousness cover detectability costs in aposematic aggregations. Nature, 413(6855),
512-514.
[57] Cott., H. B. (1940). Adaptive coloration in animals. London: Methuen.
[58] Sille´n-Tullberg, B. (1988). Evolution of gregariousness in aposematic butterfly larvae:
a phylogenetic analysis. Evolution, 42(2), 293-305.
18 Lingzi Wang
[59] Stamp, N. E. (1980). Egg deposition patterns in butterflies: why do some species
cluster their eggs rather than deposit them singly?. The American Naturalist, 115(3),
367-380.
[60] Tullberg, B. S., & Hunter, A. F. (1996). Evolution of larval gregariousness in relation
to repellent defences and warning coloration in tree-feeding Macrolepidoptera: a phy-
logenetic analysis based on independent contrasts. Biological Journal of the Linnean
Society, 57(3), 253-276.
[61] Tullberg, B. S., Leimar, O., & Gamberale-Stille, G. (2000). Did aggregation favour
the initial evolution of warning coloration? A novel world revisited. Animal Behaviour,
59(2), 281-287.
[62] Ehrlich, P. R., & Raven, P. H. (1964). Butterflies and plants: a study in coevolution.
Evolution, 18(4), 586-608.
[63] Thompson, J. N. (1989). Concepts of coevolution. Trends in Ecology & Evolution,
4(6), 179-183.
[64] Dieckmann, U., & Doebeli, M. (1999). On the origin of species by sympatric speciation.
Nature, 400(6742), 354-357.
[65] Vamosi, J. C., & Vamosi, S. M. (2011). Factors influencing diversification in an-
giosperms: at the crossroads of intrinsic and extrinsic traits. American Journal of
Botany, 98(3), 460-471.
[66] Emerson, B. C., & Kolm, N. (2005). Species diversity can drive speciation. Nature,
434(7036), 1015-1017.
[67] Arbuckle, K., & Speed, M. P. (2015). Antipredator defenses predict diversification
rates. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(44), 13597-13602.
Chapter 2
A theory for investment across
defences triggered at different
stages of a predator-prey
encounter
2.1 Introduction
All organisms face threats from enemies, be they predators attacking animal prey, herbi-
vores eating plant tissue, or pathogens and parasites feeding on host tissues. The coevo-
lution between such enemies is a major driving force in evolution, which has contributed
substantially to the diversification of defensive mechanisms deployed by organisms, and
indeed of life’s forms [1]. A major and important general biological question here is why
organisms often invest in several defensive mechanisms, rather than putting all their defen-
sive resources into one highly effective “superdefence”. Why, for example, do most animals
and plants not merely invest in toxins, but often invest additionally in physical and be-
havioural defences? One answer is that the components of multiple defence suites each
target alternative types of enemy, in which case we could expect a positive association
between the number of defences deployed and the number of different classes of enemy.
A second answer is that multiple defences act simultaneously and perhaps synergistically,
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so that a greater total level of protection is achieved per unit invested when an enemy
is assaulted by e.g. physical and chemical defences together. Alternatively defences may
act one after another, presenting predators with a sequence of barriers that enemies must
cross to gain the resources presented to them by the victim. Here we focus on this third
explanation, and consider the evolution of multiple, sequentially acting defences.
A good reason for assuming that many defences act sequentially - and hence the focus of
this chapter - is that interactions between victims and enemies can often be split into a
number of stages at which one or more defences can be deployed. Although a variety of
different descriptions of this process have been suggested (see ref. [2] for a review), the
most commonly used in the context of animal defence is that given by Endler [3] who splits
the process up into six sequential stages: (i) spatial and temporal proximity of predator
and prey, (ii) detection of prey by predator, (iii) identification of prey by predator, (iv)
chase or stalking by the predator to close the distance to the prey, (v) subjugation of the
prey, and (vi) final consumption. Attack by herbivores on plants can be similarly described
in a sequence of stages, though here without the behaviour of chase by the predator.
Defensive traits extend across all phases of attacks. For example, prey can reduce the risks:
of spatial and temporal proximity by avoiding habitats where predators are more common;
of detection, through lack of movement and cryptic appearance; of identification, through
mimicry or masquerade; of predators closing in, through fleeing; of subjugation, through
struggle, spines or production of slippery secretions; and finally, prey can prevent the risk
of consumption, through chemical toxins. Hence it is possible for prey to employ defences
at all stages of the predation sequence in order to curtail attack.
Defences are often thought costly [2, 4] and investment in defence acting at one stage in the
sequence might reduce the benefit of investment in defences that act at later stages. Hence,
it seems logical that investment should be biased towards earlier stages, as was argued by
Endler [3]. However, it is clear that in the natural world sometimes there is investment
in later-acting defences. Here we ask whether there could be a general framework for
understanding investment in defences that act in sequence (as highlighted by [2]). Our aim
in this chapter is to introduce a simple but general theoretical description of a combination
of defences acting at different stages in the predatory sequence in order to make predictions
about how prey should best allocate investment across different defensive stages. The model
can, in our view, provide a flexible and predictive framework for understanding strategies
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of investment in multiply defensive systems in many biological contexts, including animal
prey. We also explore its application to the evolution of sequentially acting plant defences,
proposing a new explanation for the otherwise puzzling lack of effects on herbivory for
variation in plant chemical defences [5].
2.2 The Sequential Defences Model
We assume that the prey can invest in at most n stages of defence, which the predator
experiences sequentially. We denote each defence stage by the order i (i = 1, . . . , n) in
which it is encountered (so i = 1 is the first defence encountered, and i = n the last).
We define si (0 ≤ si < 1) as the success probability of the prey’s i-th defence, i.e. the
probability that, if the predator reaches defence i, then it fails to overcome that defence.
The effectiveness of each defence depends upon the level of investment in it. We define Ii
as the (non-negative) investment made in defense i, so
Ii = Ii(si) (2.1)
is a non-decreasing function (I ′i(.) ≥ 0), so a defence with a higher probability of success
requires higher investment by the prey. We also assume that, if the prey invests nothing
in a defence, then the success probability of that defence will be 0: Ii(0) = 0. It would
arguably be more natural to consider the investments Ii as the fundamental variables of
the model, and survival si as being a function of Ii, but our approach is formally identical
(provided Ii(·) is monotonic, so there is a 1-to-1 relationship between Ii and si) and turns
out to be more convenient to analyse.
Note that while predation pressure does not explicitly appear in the model, it is present
implicitly because it affects the survival probabilities (or, more precisely, the relationship
between I and s). The optimal strategy might be quite different among different popu-
lations, facing different environments and predation pressures. We are interested in the
evolutionary defence strategy for a certain population. It is quite often observed that many
individuals in a certain colony have the similar kind of defence strategies (e.g. similar level
of aposematism or camouflage). We think of this as the optimised defence strategy aver-
aged across generations and across populations. The form of the model is consistent with
a single attack, but could also be though to represent a number of attacks. The latter
are particularly appropriate for plants mounting defences against herbivores, where there
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could be many attackers, each of which only does a small amount of damage. In that case
we still can still think of defences being “breached” with a certain probability, even though
there are many individual attack events. Here, predation pressure affects the probability
that a defence is breached as well as the “tested costs” (because it affects the average
number of times a defence is tested).
We assume that the prey has a total amount of resource, IT , available for all defences. We
define IA as the investment in all the defences, so
IA =
n∑
i=1
Ii(si) ≤ IT (2.2)
We define C(IA) as the fitness cost of making investments across the various defences, in
whatever division, so that this total investment amount is IA. We assume that C(0) = 0
(when there is no investment in defence, the investment cost is zero). The residual amount
of resources left after investment across all the defences, IT − IA, can effectively then
be used as additional investment in non-defensive fitness-enhancing activities. Thus we
assume C(.) is an increasing function of IA (i.e. C
′(.) > 0).
We further assume that, if defence i is tested by the predator, then (even if the defence
holds) there is a cost ci (≥ 0), henceforth referred to as ”tested cost”, that can be considered
as the injury risk of being exposed to the predators after defence i− 1 is breached. (Note
that ci can be 0, which means that the tested cost is zero; e.g the tested cost of crypsis in
a nocturnal moth might be zero.) In this assumption, since there is no defence before the
first defence, we think that the first defence is always exposed and tested by the predators
(although the tested cost for the first defence can be zero, c1 = 0). Alternatively, ci can be
thought of as the costs incurred when a predator triggers the defences at stage i. These
need not be solely risk of injury, but might additionally or alternatively be time, energy or
other resource spent in the deployment of the defence. Like the model from Wilkening [6]
discussing layered defences in military use, we calculate the probability that each defence
is tested and holds (i.e. is not breached); and we also calculate the corresponding fitness
when that defence is tested and holds. Multiplying them together, we get the expected
fitness contribution from the eventuality where that defence is tested and holds. The overall
fitness which we care about is the sum of all these terms. Here, fitness means the average
number of viable offspring that an individual produces, and by assuming that this number
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decreases as successive defences are tested and/or breached we are able to represent many
different possible reproductive life histories (continuous reproduction, semelparity, etc.).
We consider two particular scenarios: (A) the prey has positive residual fitness (e.g. still
alive and can reproduce) when all defences are breached; (B) the prey has zero residual
fitness (e.g. dies before reproducing) when all defences are breached. We wish to find the
defence strategy that maximises R.
For scenario (A), when the prey still has positive residual fitness when all the defences are
breached, the expression of the overall fitness R of the prey for a given investment strategy
S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is as follows.
R(s1, s2, . . . , sn)
= s1(1− C(IA)− c1)
(the fitness when the first defence is tested, but not breached)
+(1− s1)s2(1− C(IA)− c1 − c2)
(the fitness when the second defence is tested, but not breached)
+...
+(1− s1)(1− s2)...(1− sn−1)sn(1− C(IA)− c1 − c2 − ...− cn)
(the fitness when the (n− 1)th defence is tested, but not breached)
+(1− s1)(1− s2)...(1− sn) · (1− C(IA)− c1 − c2 − ...− cn)
(the fitness when all the defences are breached)
= 1− C(
n∑
i=1
Ii(si))− c1 −
n∑
j=2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk) (2.3)
Note that we have assumed that the fitness when all the defences are breached is the same
as the fitness when the (n−1)th defence is tested, but not breached, since no further tested
costs are incurred after the nth defence is breached.
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In many cases in the real world, the prey dies or effectively dies with 0 fitness left to
reproduce when all the defences are breached. We therefore consider an alternative scenario
(B) where the fitness when all the defences are breached is 0 instead of (1− C(IA)− c1 −
c2 − ...− cn). Then the fitness function is as follows.
R(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = (1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))
(
1− C(
n∑
i=1
Ii(si))
)
− c1 −
n∑
j=2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk) + (
n∑
j=1
cj)
n∏
j=1
(1− sj)
(2.4)
These two scenarios represent the two extreme possibilities for the fitness that ensues
when all defences are breached: fitness is not decreased further by the nth defence failing
in scenario (A), whereas all fitness is lost in scenario (B) if the nth defence fails. We expect
that the results for an intermediate scenario will lie between those for these two extreme
scenarios.
If the organism invests less than the maximum available resources in defences, then those
resources are available for reproduction and other fitness-enhancing activities. This is
represented in the model by the term −C(∑ni=1 Ii(si)) in both equations (2.3) and (2.4)),
which tends to increase fitness if IA =
∑n
i=1 Ii(si) is decreased. However, due to the other
terms in si it is not clear without analysis whether IA is less than or equal to IT in the
optimal strategy.
2.2.1 When testing defences are costly, later defences receive lower in-
vestment
If the investment function is the same for all defences, Ii(·) = I(·), we can show that
the optimal solution S = (s1, s2, ..., sn) maximising the fitness function R in (2.3) and
(2.4) always satisfies the following relation when the tested costs ci are strictly positive
(ci > 0 ∀i).
s1 ≥ s2 ≥ ... ≥ sn. (2.5)
This is because, for any i such that si < si+1, we can always make R larger by switching
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the value of si and si+1, which will only change the term −ci+1
∏i
k=1(1− sk) (in the term
−∑nj=2 cj∏j−1k=1(1−sk) in R) to −ci+1∏i−1k=1(1−sk)·(1−si+1) (larger than −ci+1∏ik=1(1−
sk)), with the other terms in R unchanged.
Since the investment function I(si) is increasing, the relation that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ ... ≥ sn means
that
I(s1) ≥ I(s2) ≥ ... ≥ I(sn). (2.6)
This shows that investment in earlier defences should never be less than than investment
in later defences.
Note that, if ci+1 = 0, the above argument does not show that si ≥ si+1, but rather than
the fitness R is unchanged by switching the values of si and si+1. This means that, when
one of the tested costs is zero, either (i) there is a unique optimal strategy, where si = si+1;
or (ii) the optimal strategy is not unique, but the optimal strategy in which sj ≥ sj+1, for
all j has equal fitness to the best strategy where sj+1 > sj for some j. In any biologically
realistic situation there will always be a cost — however small — to having a defence
tested, but this case is still interesting because it shows what might evolve when the tested
costs are very small.
2.2.2 Investing in multiple defences or in a single defence?
The best strategy for the organism might be to invest in multiple defences, with (according
to the above result) higher investment in earlier than later defences. On the other hand,
the best strategy might be to invest in a single defence, which the above argument shows
should be the first one. As we will see later, either of these outcomes can occur, depending
on the details of the investment function I. To show this, first we find conditions that the
optimal solution must satisfy. To find the maximised R constrained by variable boundaries
0 ≤ si < 1 , and resource boundary
∑n
i=1 I(si) ≤ IT , we write a Lagrange function for the
overall fitness function (2.3) and (2.4).
L(s1, s2, . . . , sn;λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) = R(s1, s2, . . . , sn) +
n∑
i=1
λi(1− si) + h(IT −
n∑
i=1
I(si))
(2.7)
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The necessary condition to get the maximised value R is given by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) condition coming from the above Lagrange function,
∂L
∂si
=
∂R
∂si
− λi − hI ′(si) ≤ 0, si ≥ 0, si ∂L
∂si
= 0 i = 1, ..., n (2.8)
∂L
∂λi
= 1− si ≥ 0, λi ≥ 0, λi ∂L
∂λi
= 0 i = 1, ..., n (2.9)
∂L
∂h
= IT −
n∑
i=1
I(si) ≥ 0, h ≥ 0, h∂L
∂h
= 0 i = 1, ..., n (2.10)
The second necessary condition (2.9) combined with 1− si > 0, is equivalent to
λi = 0 (2.11)
The first necessary condition (2.8) is equivalent to
∂L
∂si
=
∂R
∂si
− hI ′(si) ≤ 0, si ≥ 0, si ∂L
∂si
= 0 i = 1, ..., n (2.12)
(a)When si > 0: we have that
∂L
∂si
= ∂R∂si − hI ′(si) = 0.
(b)When si = 0: we have that
∂L
∂si
= ∂R∂si − hI ′(si) ≤ 0.
For the third necessary condition (2.10),
(a)When IT −
∑n
i=1 I(si) > 0: we have that
∂L
∂h = IT −
∑n
i=1 I(si) > 0, so h = 0 since
h∂L∂h = 0.
(b)When IT −
∑n
i=1 I(si) = 0: we have that
∂L
∂h = IT −
∑n
i=1 I(si) = 0; so we still have
h ≥ 0.
To put them together, the necessary condition is equivalent to the following:
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(I) When 0 < si < 1,
∂R
∂si
− hI ′(si) = 0, h ≥ 0, (2.13)
(and h = 0, when inside the resource boundary IT −
n∑
i=1
I(si) > 0)
(II) When si = 0,
∂R
∂si
− hI ′(si) ≤ 0, h ≥ 0 (2.14)
(h = 0, when inside the resource boundary IT −
n∑
i=1
I(si) > 0)
So far, the analysis has been the same whether we assume that the fitness after all defences
are breached is zero (Scenario (B), equation (2.4)) or not (Scenario (A), equation (2.3)).
For the following calculation, we assume scenario (B) only; the calculation for scenario
(A) follows along similar lines, and has the same conclusion, and is presented in Appendix
2.6.2. Given the fitness function R in (2.4), the necessary condition for R is as follows,
(I) When 0 < si < 1,
∂R
∂si
− hI ′(si)
=
1
1− si
n∏
j=1
(1− sj)
(
1− C(IA)−
n∑
j=1
cj
)− (1− n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si
+
1
1− si
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)
− hI ′(si)
= 0 ( with h ≥ 0) (2.15)
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(II) When si = 0,
∂R
∂si
− hI ′(si)
=
1
1− si
n∏
j=1
(1− sj)
(
1− C(IA)−
n∑
j=1
cj
)− (1− n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si
+
1
1− si
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)
− hI ′(si)
≤ 0 ( with h ≥ 0) (2.16)
Now we have the necessary condition to maximise R— (2.15) and (2.16). Next, we are
going to explore whether investment can happen in multiple defences or only in one defence.
Since the investment functions are the same for all the defences (Ii(·) = I(·)), we have that
investment in earlier defences is always larger than investment in later defences (equation
(2.5), (2.6)), so for some j(< n),
1 > s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sj > sj+1 = . . . = sn = 0, (2.17)
or
1 > s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1 ≥ sn > 0. (2.18)
Note that when j = 1,
1 > s1 > s2 = . . . = sn = 0, (2.19)
then the investment is concentrated only in the first defence.
We will now find the conditions that determine whether investment is concentrated only
in the first defence, or in multiple defences.
Let us first assume that there are multiple defences (2 ≤ j ≤ n), then for some i ∈
{1, 2, ..., j− 1}, we will have si ≥ si+1 > 0. Then from equation (2.15), we have (2.20) and
(2.21).
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∂R
∂si
· (1− si)− h(1− si)I ′(si)
=
n∏
j=1
(1− sj)
(
1− C(IA)−
n∑
j=1
cj
)− (1− si)(1− n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si
+
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)
− h(1− si)I ′(si)
= 0, (2.20)
∂R
∂si+1
· (1− si+1)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
=
n∏
j=1
(1− sj)
(
1− C(IA)−
n∑
j=1
cj
)− (1− si+1)(1− n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si+1
+
n∑
j=i+2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)
− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
= 0 (2.21)
The term
∏n
j=1(1−sj)
(
1−C(IA)−
∑n
j=1 cj
)
in both (2.20) and (2.21) is the same, so that
we have
− (1− si+1)(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si+1
+
n∑
j=i+2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
= −(1− si)(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si
+
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si)I ′(si). (2.22)
Since IA =
∑n
i=1 I(si), the above is equivalent to
− (1− si+1)(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))C ′(IA)I ′(si+1)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
= −(1− si)(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))C ′(IA)I ′(si) + ci+1
i∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si)I ′(si). (2.23)
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⇒
− (1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
(
(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))C ′(IA) + h
)
= −(1− si)I ′(si)
(
(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))C ′(IA) + h
)
+ ci+1
i∏
k=1
(1− sk). (2.24)
Since C ′(IA) > 0 and also 1−
∏n
j=1(1− sj) > 0 and h ≥ 0, we have that
(
(1−∏nj=1(1−
sj))C
′(IA) + h
)
> 0 , so that equation (2.24) is equivalent to
−(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) = −(1− si)I ′(si) + ci+1
∏i
k=1(1− sk)(
(1−∏nj=1(1− sj))C ′(IA) + h) . (2.25)
The last term in the right-hand side ci+1
∏i
k=1(1−sk)(
(1−∏nj=1(1−sj))C′(IA)+h) is positive when ci+1 > 0,
therefore
−(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) > −(1− si)I ′(si). (2.26)
which is the same to,
(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) < (1− si)I ′(si). (2.27)
The analyses for the fitness function (2.3) (in Appendix 2.6.2) are similar to the analysis
for the fitness function (2.4) (from equation 2.15 to 2.27). As the relation between si and
si+1 for the fitness function (2.3) (equation B.11) is the same as the relation (2.27) for the
fitness function (2.4), the following analyses hold for both (2.3) and (2.4).
If (1−s)I ′(s) is a monotonic decreasing function of s, (2.27) is inconsistent with si ≥ si+1 >
0, so we conclude that si+1 = 0. That is, investment can not be in multiple defences but
only in the first defence (example see in Figure 2.3),
1 > s1 > s2 = . . . = sn = 0. (2.28)
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However, multiple defence can occur when the function (1−s)I ′(s) is an increasing function,
at least for some range of values of s, in which case si ≥ si+1 > 0 (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., j − 1}) is
consistent with (2.27) (we give examples in Figure 2.1). Note that multiple defences are
impossible if (1− s)I ′(s) is a decreasing function, but that (1− s)I ′(s) being an increasing
function does not guarantee that the optimal solution has investment in multiple defences
(see Figure 2.1).
Note that, if ci+1 = 0, as mentioned before in the section ”When testing defences are costly,
later defences receive lower investment”, the optimal solution either (i) has the relation
si = si+1 or (ii) is not unique, with one optimal solution having si > si+1 and the other
being obtained by swapping the values of si and si+1. When the function (1 − s)I ′(s) is
an increasing function, we can prove that only si = si+1 occurs (Appendix 2.6.1 (i); for
an example see in Figure 2.2). Similarly, when ci+1 = ci+2 = 0, the optimal solution will
have the relation that si = si+1 = si+2. In biologically realistic situations, tested costs will
usually be nonzero, so since the fitness function R is continuous in ci+1, we will have si
being slightly larger than si+1.
When the function (1 − s)I ′(s) is a decreasing function, we can prove that only c2 = 0
changes the relation (2.28), and that si = si+1 is not possible in the optimal solution, and
that the same amount investment will be concentrated only in the first or only in the second
defence (1 > s1 > s2 = s3 = s4 = ... = sn = 0 or 1 > s2 > s1 = s3 = s4 = ... = sn = 0)
(Appendix 2.6.1 (ii)(iii)). Similarly, when c2 = c3 = 0, investment will only be in one of
the first three defences. However, a small tested cost will drive the investment to be only
in the first defence (For example see in Figure 2.3, 2.4).
2.3 Examples of investment in defences
We will give numerical examples for the cases when (1) investment happens in multiple
defences, (2) only in one defences, and also (3) the investment functions are different, so
that the investment in earlier defences can be either higher or lower than in later defences.
The investment functions for all the three cases are given in the examples below. To show
a numerical result of the optimal defence strategy, we further specify the expression for
the cost function C(IA) as follows,
C(IA) = IA
a, a ≥ 1 (2.29)
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We assume that a ≥ 1, since we expect that the marginal investment cost in defences is
non-decreasing in respect to the defence investment (no less additional investment cost for
additional amount of investment when the total amount of investment becomes larger). For
simplicity, we consider scenario (B) (where the fitness is zero if all defences are breached),
and assume that IT is large enough that, in the optimal strategy, the organism does not
need to invest all of its resources in defences (IA < IT ), so that we do not need to consider
IT when maximising the fitness function (2.4).
We use a heuristic search algorithm to find the optimal investment strategy. The search
starts at an initial point S0 = (s10, s20, s30, s40). First, we calculate the value of R at this
point, and then search whether there exists higher value of R in the positive direction of
the first axis, through calculating the value of R at (s10 +δ0, s20, s30, s40), where δ0 is initial
search step. If the value is higher, then we double the search step value and and do the
search again, and repeat it until we find the maximum value of R and the corresponding
value S1 = (s11, s20, s30, s40); If however the value is not higher, we do the same procedure
in the negative direction of the first axis to find the the maximum value of R and the
corresponding value (s11, s20, s30, s40). We then do the same process in all the axes, and
after that we get the corresponding value S1 = (s11, s21, s31, s41). Second, we do the same
as the first to find S2 = (s12, s22, s32, s42) except that we shorten the initial search step to
be δu (where u > 1). Third, we let the initial search step to be
δ
u2
and do the same. We
repeat this process until (e.g. at the n-th time, we find Sn = (s1n, s2n, s3n, s4n)) the initial
search step is less than a threshold 1 and the distance between the last two corresponding
points d(Sn−1, Sn) is less than a threshold 2, then stop.
Note that the above process might only find a local, rather than global, maximum. To solve
this problem, we divide each of the interval (0, 1] (note that each probability si ∈ (0, 1]) in
each axis into m equal subintervals, and since we have four levels of defences, altogether,
we have m4 subareas. Then we do the same process as above to find all the m4 local
maxima. Theoretically, if m were large enough, we would have the global maximum in one
of our searched results, and the largest local maximum is the global maximum. Due to
computational limitations, we only devide into 34 = 81 subareas. However, in all cases we
found that, the 80 out of 81 subregions did not hold the largest local maximum, because
those local maxima were on the boundaries of the subregions. This suggests that R does
not have multiple stationary values, and that the largest local maximum we found is indeed
the global maximum.
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In our example specifically, the initial start point S0 is given by s1i = 0.3, 0.6, 0.9 in the
three subintervals respectively (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) (34 = 81 start points for the 81 subareas in
total), and δ0 = 0.35, u = 1.5, 1 = 2 = 0.0001.
2.3.1 Example of investment in multiple defences
As described above, when (1− s)I ′(s) is an increasing function, investment could happen
in multiple defences. As an example for this relation, we use the investment function of
the form
I(s) = k(
1
1− s − 1)
b, i = 1, ..., n, k > 0, b > 1. (2.30)
For this function, (1 − s)I ′(s) = kb( 11−s − 1)b−1 11−s , which can easily be shown to be an
increasing function, when k > 0, b > 1.
Specifically we let a = 2, b = 2, k = 0.2, and the total number of defences be four.
Figure 2.1 gives that the optimal investment is concentrated in the only the first defence/
the first two defences/ the first three defences/ in all the four defences.
Figure 2.2 gives that for a specific i (i = 1, 2..., N − 1), if ci+1 = 0, then the investments
in the i-th and (i+ 1)-th defence are the same (si = si+1).
2.3.2 Example of investment only in the first defence
As described above, if (1 − s)I ′(s) is a decreasing function, then investment only happen
in the first defence (when c2 > 0). As an example for this relation, we use the investment
function
I(s) = −k(ln(1− s) + ds k > 0, d > 0. (2.31)
For this function, (1 − s)I ′(s) = k + d(1 − s), which is a decreasing function. Then we
set the parameter values a = 2 to do the simulations as in the above example. Figure
2.3 shows that the optimal investment is concentrated only in the first defence. Figure
2.4 shows that, when c2 = 0, there are two optimal solutions with one optimal solution
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Figure 2.1: For investment functions I where (1−s)I ′(s) is an increasing function, prey can
invest in multiple defences but always invest more in earlier defences. Here, the investment
function is given in (2.30) and the cost function is given in (2.29). The vertical axis is s,
the probability that a defence is not breached when tested, and is zero when investment
in that defence is zero. Depending on the tested costs, the prey can invest in: all defences
(ci = 0.2∀i, green rhombus); the first three defences only (ci = 0.3∀i, red cross); the first
two defences only (ci = 0.4∀i, yellow triangle); or only the first defence (ci = 0.5∀i, black
cross). Other parameter values: number of defences=4; a = 2, b = 2, k = 0.2.
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Figure 2.2: For investment functions I where (1 − s)I ′(s) is an increasing function, prey
can invest the same amount in two successive defences if the later defence has tested cost
zero. Here, the investment function is given in (2.30) and the cost function is given in
(2.29), and the tested costs are ci = 0.2 for all values of i except one. Optimal strategy is
to invest the same in: first and second defences when c2 = 0 (red circles); second and third
defences when c3 = 0 (orange triangles); third and fourth defences when c4 = 0 (green
diamonds). Other parameters: number of defences=4; a = 2, b = 2, k = 0.2.
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Figure 2.3: For investment functions I where (1 − s)I ′(s) is a decreasing function, the
optimal strategy is to invest in one defence only; this will be the first defence when the
second defence has nonzero tested cost, c2 6= 0. Here, the investment function is given in
(2.31), the cost function is given in (2.29), and the tested costs are ci = 0.2∀i. Different
symbols correspond to different values of parameters d and k: (d, k) = (0.1, 0.1) (green
rhombus); (d, k) = (0.2, 0.1) (red cross); (d, k) = (0.1, 0.2) (black cross); (d, k) = (0.2, 0.2)
(yellow triangle). Other parameters: number of defences=4; a = 2.
having s1 > s2 = s3 = s4 = 0 (investment concenrated only in the first defence), and the
other being the swapped values of s1 and s2 (investment concenrated only in the second
defence).
2.3.3 Example of different investment functions among defences
When the investment functions are different among defences (e.g. the value of k might be
different in the investment function (2.30), which correponding to the efficiency to make
Chapter 2. A theory for investment across defences triggered at different stages of a
predator-prey encounter 37
first defence second defence third defence fourth defence
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
th
at
 a
 d
ef
en
ce
 h
ol
ds
Figure 2.4: For investment functions I where (1 − s)I ′(s) is a decreasing function, the
optimal strategy is to invest in one defence only, but is degenerate when the second defence
has tested cost zero (c2 = 0): the fitness is the same whether the prey invests in the first
defence only, or invests the same resources in the second defence only. Here, the investment
function is given in (2.31), the cost function is given in (2.29), and tested costs are c2 = 0,
ci = 0.2 for i 6= 2. Different colours correspond to different different values of parameters
d and k: d = k = 0.1 (red); d = k = 0.2 (green). Different symbols distinguish the two
optimal solutions: investment in first defence (red circle and green diamond); investment
in second defence only (red cross and green cross). Other parameter values: number of
defences=4, a = 2.
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resources into defences might be different among defences),
Ii(s) = ki(
1
1− s − 1)
b, i = 1, ..., n, k > 0, b > 1, (2.32)
it is possible that investment in the later defences are higher than in the earlier defences.
When the investment is more efficient to make resources into defences, in the later defences
than in the earlier defences (ki > ki+1), the investment in later defences might or might
not be higher than in the earlier defences (see the black cross or the red cross in Figure
2.5). However, when the investment in earlier defences is more efficient or equally efficient
to make resources into defences than in the later defences (ki < ki+1), investment will be
higher in the earlier than in the later defences (see the yellow triangle or the green rhombus
in Figure 2.5).
2.4 Discussion
Endler [3] argued that prey should generally invest preferentially in defences that act early
in the predation sequence, in part because defences met earlier in a sequence will on average
be deployed more frequently and in part because he expects late acting defences to be less
efficient (higher ki values in (2.32)). We have shown however that the skew will occur when
the investment function is the same for all the defences (so the efficiency ki is equal across
defences) provided there is a risk-of-injury (ci) and other cost (C(IA)) associated with
implementing each in a set of sequentially organised defences. Also, we found that under
some conditions defence investment will concentrated only in the first defence, while, under
other conditions, investment can be distributed in several defences with more investment
in earlier than in later defences. We suspect such costs will be common. We also suspect
that Endler’s assumption [3] that later-acting defences will be inherently more expensive
for a given level of effectiveness (ki increases with i) might hold generally (though it needs
to be demonstrated), and this would more likely to further exaggerate the skew towards
earlier-acting defences (yellow triangle in Figure 2.5). However, if the effectiveness of
later defences is much higher, investment in later defences could be higher than in earlier
defences. Our general theory and predictions allow us to synthesize previous more system-
specific work on multi-component defences, and we now consider its application in specific
biological and theoretical contexts, starting with plant defence against insect herbivores.
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Figure 2.5: The optimum strategy might be to invest more in later defences, if the different
defences do not have the same investment functions. Here, the investment function is
given in (2.30) and the cost function is given in (2.29). The prey should invest more in
earlier defences when defences have the same cost functions (ki = 0.2∀i, green rhombus)
or when later defences are more costly ((k1, k2, k3, k4) = (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8), yellow triangle).
However, when later defences are less costly, the optimal strategy might be to invest more
in earlier defences ((k1, k2, k3, k4) = (1.6, 1.4, 1.2, 1.0), red cross) or more in later defences
((k1, k2, k3, k4) = (0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2), black cross). Other parameters: number of defences=4;
a = 2, b = 2, ci = 0.2∀i.
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2.4.1 Application to Plant Defences
It is common, when a victim is an animal prey, that it is killed and eaten (so has zero
fitness, if it has not already reproduced) if the predator overcomes all of its defences
(scenario (B)). Our model can also apply to many plant-herbivore interactions in which a
small insect damages, but does not kill, the plant on which it is feeding (Speed et al. [7]
also described a related model for these). In scenario (A), breaching the final defence does
not cause further fitness cost on the prey, so the fitness keeps the same between when the
final defence is tested but not breached and when the final defence is breached. We have
done the analyses for both this extreme case and the the other extreme case –scenario (B),
when all the remaining fitness are gone when the final defence is breached. The results are
the same for these two extreme cases, so can be extended to the other intermediate cases
when the prey still can reproduce (positive remaining fitness) but the remaining fitness is
diminished when the final defence is breached.
If plant defences do offer sequential barriers to herbivores, what can our model tell us
about variation in investment in these defences? Some insight is possible here from the
notable meta-analysis of studies in herbivore damage reported by Carmona et al. [5].
They report that variation in concentrations of plant secondary metabolites is a poor
predictor of herbivore damage overall. In contrast, variation in physical defences, such
as hairs and spines, provided better overall prediction of damage. The most consistent
predictor of herbivore damage was however in life history traits, such as varied phenology
which allow growth and flowering at times that enemies are rare - effectively hiding in
time. One interpretation of these results is that it supports the sequential nature of plant
defences, with the earlier acting defences (hiding, then physical defences) having much
stronger influence on vulnerability than the last line of defence, of plant tissues by toxic
secondary metabolites. If this interpretation has general validity, then it suggests that our
framework can have widespread application in plant-animal interactions. Several items
need to be measured for parameterised evaluation of the model’s predictions including;
costs of generating and deploying defences, survival benefits of each defence. In principle
however, the model is open to empirical testing, and in the right systems may even be
open to testing through experimental evolution. Key predictions could then be tested, for
example that chemical defences never have more investment than earlier acting physical
defences. We note the complexity of ontogenetic choice by plants makes the area all the
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more interesting (see ref. [8]), and suggests developments of our approach to incorporate
developmental plasticity.
2.4.2 Relation to Other Theoretical Work on Sequential Defences
We present here a general model to predict the optimal investment in sequential defences.
We now consider our model’s relevance to other, often more specialised models of defence.
Our work here can be seen as a generalisation of the work of Broom et al. [9], who presented
a simple model of investment across two sequentially encountered anti-predatory defences.
A predator must overcome both defences to capture the prey, and probability of overcoming
a defence declines linearly with increasing investment in defences. However there are costs
every time a defence is used and these increase linearly with investment in a particular
defence. On top of that there is an initial outlay in the construction of a defence, with the
fecundity of the prey being a decreasing decelerating function of investment across both
defences.
Broom et al. [9] provide predictions for circumstances where there is investment in only
one defence or investment spread across both defences. When the ratio of the constitutive
costs to the effectiveness of defences is generally similar and low for both defences, then
investment across both defences can be optimal. Increasing rate of attack also increases the
likelihood of investment across both defences. However investment in both defences was
only predicted for relatively narrow combinations of circumstances, where investing heavily
to produce one very effective defence was prohibitively expensive and the best solution was
to offer two modestly effective defences that must be overcome. Our model further solves
the problem where there are more than two defences, and gives the conditions under which
investment are applied in multiple defences or only one defences, and the relation between
investment in the sequential defences.
Strategy Blocking
The host reed warbler Acrocephalus scirpaceus is often found to have an egg-rejection
defence strategy but not a chick-rejection defence strategy against the parasite cuckoo
Cuculus canorus. Britton et al. [10] uses a concept called “strategy blocking” to explain
this phenomenon. Strategy blocking describes the situation in which a strategy which
would be adaptive in isolation ceases to be adaptive in the presence of a second strategy.
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Strategy blocking explains this phenomenon in terms of the different pay-offs for each
defence, but it is not framed as a sequential defences scenario, so it does not explain the
effect of the sequence on defence strategy. Our sequential defences model provides an
alternative explanation for why the reed warblers are found more likely to have defences
in the earlier stage (rejecting the eggs) than in the later stage (rejecting the chicks). We
particularly consider the condition under which the investment will be concentrated only
in the first defence (egg-rejection). The rate that the warblers fail or succeed in rejecting
the cuckoos’ eggs (which corresponds to s1 in our model) is dependant on the investment
in the egg-rejection defence, which could explain why warblers are sometimes found not to
reject eggs.
Although the concept of strategy blocking is raised in a population dynamics model [10],
its idea that one defence will often reduce the benefits of a second defence can be explained
otherwise through probabilities. Let us assume that if a predator encounters a prey then it
is repelled with probability a if defence A only is expressed by the prey, with probability b
if defence B only is expressed and with probability 1− (1− a)(1− b) if both are expressed.
This implies that the two defences work independently and the predator must overcome all
defences expressed in order to be successful. The benefit of defence B is the increase in the
probability of an predator being repelled when defence B is expressed relative to when B is
not expressed. This is a function of a, the higher the value of a (the more predators would
have been repelled without B being expressed by defence A), the less often investing in B
makes a difference to the prey and so the less the benefit of investment in B. This was a
situation where the two defences worked independently, but it may also be the case that
expression of one defence reduces the effectiveness of another, in our case that increasing
a causes a decrease in b. As an example, if an animal invests in a heavy armoured shell,
then its ability to outrun predators is compromised. The work of Britton et al. [10]
can be seen as a more general examination of earlier modelling by Brodie et al. [11] that
reached essentially similar conclusions in a more restricted setting.
In contrast Kilner and Langmore [12] introduce the concept of strategy-facilitation as the
complement to the concept of strategy-blocking. Here they imagine that the evolution of
one defence makes the evolution of another defence easier. As an example of this they cite
the modelling work of Svennungsen and Holen [13] who demonstrated that in avian brood
parasite systems it can sometimes be advantageous for hosts to reject a randomly-selected
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egg if they know that they have been parasitised but are unable to identify the parasitic egg.
Kilner and Langmore [12] argue that if the strategy of such random rejection evolves then
this will allow subsequent evolution of egg recognition to facilitate non-random targeting
of the alien egg. As well as facilitating cognitive changes in the host it could trigger
physiological change in egg appearance to improve such recognition.
This means that sometimes an inefficient defence is worth employing/investing in; in our
model example (equation (2.32)) this is a defence with a high value of ki. Given this defence
is invested in, its cost has an effect on the fitness function R, which if it was not invested
in (si = 0) would be absent. There is thus evolutionary pressure to improve the efficiency
(lower ki) if this were possible, which there would not be in the absence of investment.
Kilner and Langmore [12] also argue that defences can operate at levels of organisation
greater than the individual that are often overlooked. They give as an example workers
of the ant genus Temnothorax that can be enslaved by the species Protomognathus amer-
icanus, but which selectively destroy the slave-making pupae in their care. As a result P.
americanus colonies are unusually small for a slavemaker and are less effective at conduct-
ing slave raids on neighbouring Temnothorax colonies. Since Temnothorax populations
are highly kin-structured then there is a kin-selected benefit to this defence. Kilner and
Langmore [12] speculate that as a generality kin-structuring in a host population will select
for a more extensive portfolio of defences. They also predict that a high parasitic virulence
will also select for more extensive portfolios. The last of their predictions is that where a
parasite exploits more than one host, competition between the hosts to shift their parasite’s
attention toward the others should again select for complexity of defensive portfolio.
Coevolutionary Considerations in Sequential Defence Suites
Jongepier et al. [14] argue that for sequential lines of defence, later lines will be more
expensive. Thus arms races between prey and predators would have started with the prey
using a cheap defence acting early in the predation sequence, but as the predator evolved
to overcome this defence there would then have been selection pressure for investment in
later-acting more costly defences. Thus over evolutionary time there will have been a shift
towards investment in more costly defence that act later in the sequence of the interac-
tion between prey and predator. To put this a different way, the temporal order in which
defences are employed will reflect the order in which they evolved. Gilman et al. [15] ar-
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gue theoretically that there are co-evolutionary advantages to a multi-dimensional defence
against any type of antagonist (parasite, predator or pathogen). Using a modelling frame-
work, they argue that a prey is more likely to evolve a way to neutralise the predator as the
number of defences increases or as the correlation between values across traits increases.
Essentially each additional trait provides the prey with an additional opportunity to evolve
an effective escape mechanism. A key point here is that sequential layering of defences is
not necessary for these general conclusions, rather it is the use of multiple defences per se
that matters. This is illustrated in Gilman et al.’s [15] model itself, and in a subsequent
extension modelling plant toxicity by Speed and Ruxton [16]. Sasaki [17] considers the
multiplicative interaction among the effect of defence genes, and finds that the cost of
resistance and virulence values can influence the coexistence of multiple defences in static
equilibria or coevolutionary cycle.
In contrast, Beatman et al. [18] introduce population dynamics into the discussion of in-
vestment across defences. They use a two-prey, one-predator Rosenzweig-McArthur model
of predator-prey interaction. Prey can invest in each of two defences, one of which acts be-
fore the other in the predation sequence, and defences have costs as well as anti-predatory
benefits. The system is allowed to come to equilibrium with only a single prey before
a different prey with a different investment strategy across defences is introduced at low
population density. Beatman et al. [18] then explore whether this second prey increases in
population size. They conclude that the invasion of a given defence strategy is dependent
on the fine detail of traits of the predator and the existing prey type, and the nature of the
costs and benefits of the different defences; and so general conclusions are difficult to draw.
However they do conclude that on the basis of their simulations “there exists no exclusive
ecological or evolutionary advantage to defending early in the predation sequence”. The
word “exclusive” seems important here they mean there is nothing fundamentally benefi-
cial about easy disruption of attacks per se from a population dynamic perspective. We
agree with this, but there are mechanisms (like risk of injury or time lost to other beneficial
activities) that may be correlated with early disruption, are not considered in their model,
and bring benefits.
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2.5 Conclusions
In our view the sequential organisation of defences has received relatively little rigorous
examination in the literature. This is explained in part by expertise focusing on the
mechanisms of individual defensive types (e.g. camouflage or chemical defence), rather
than their integration into suites of defences. A valuable predictive aspect of our model, is
to make a general argument that explains why earlier defences may gain higher investment
than later acting defences. Suppose that a victim could biologically generate a suite of ten
equally effective sequential defences, but it is optimal to only invest in five, then which
five should it invest in, and how much in each? Our model predicts that the solution is
to concentrate in earliest five defences rather than in the other five defences. Moreover,
regarding the trade-off of the investments among each defence, a victim will invest no
less in earlier defences than later defences, given that the investment functions among
defences are the same (e.g. converting resources into defences is equally efficient across
the sequential defences). In our Discussion section, we have shown that the model can
be applied to animal, plant and other defensive systems. Our model can replicate and
add quantitative rigor to the question of strategy-blocking, in which the effectiveness of
early-acting defences makes the deployment of later acting defences redundant. In relating
it to other theoretical works in the field, we note that coevolutionary approaches to the
general question we examine here would add predictive sophistication.
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2.6 Appendices
2.6.1 Appendix A
The relation between si and si+1 when ci+1 = 0
(i) We will prove that when ci+1 = 0, and when (1− s)I ′(s) is an increasing function, only
si = si+1 can happen.
(a) When both si > 0 and si+1 > 0, and from (2.25) and ci+1 = 0 we would have
(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) = (1− si)I ′(si) and so si = si+1.
(b) and when both si = 0 and si+1 = 0, we have si = si+1.
(c) If si > si+1 = 0, from the necessary condition (2.15) and (2.16), we have
∂R
∂si
· (1− si)− h(1− si)I ′(si)
=
n∏
j=1
(1− sj)
(
1− C(IA)−
n∑
j=1
cj
)− (1− si)(1− n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si
+
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)
− h(1− si)I ′(si)
= 0, (A.1)
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∂R
∂si+1
· (1− si+1)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
=
n∏
j=1
(1− sj)
(
1− C(IA)−
n∑
j=1
cj
)− (1− si+1)(1− n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si+1
+
n∑
j=i+2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)
− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
≤ 0 (A.2)
Then following are the similar deduction as (2.22)-(2.27), we have
− (1− si+1)(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si+1
+
n∑
j=i+2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
≤ −(1− si)(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))∂C(IA)
∂si
+
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si)I ′(si). (A.3)
Since IA =
∑n
i=1 I(si), the above is equivalent to
− (1− si+1)(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))C ′(IA)I ′(si+1)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
≤ −(1− si)(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))C ′(IA)I ′(si) + ci+1
i∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si)I ′(si). (A.4)
⇒
− (1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
(
(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))C ′(IA) + h
)
≤ −(1− si)I ′(si)
(
(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− sj))C ′(IA) + h
)
+ ci+1
i∏
k=1
(1− sk). (A.5)
Since C ′(IA) > 0 and also 1−
∏n
j=1(1− sj) > 0 and h ≥ 0, we have that
(
(1−∏nj=1(1−
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sj))C
′(IA) + h
)
> 0 , so that equation (2.24) is equivalent to
−(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) ≤ −(1− si)I ′(si) + ci+1
∏i
k=1 sk(
(1−∏nj=1(1− sj))C ′(IA) + h) . (A.6)
The last term in the right-hand side ci+1
∏i
k=1 sk(
(1−∏nj=1(1−sj))C′(IA)+h) is positive when ci+1 > 0,
therefore
−(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) ≤ −(1− si)I ′(si). (A.7)
which is the same to,
(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) ≥ (1− si)I ′(si). (A.8)
(35) together with that the function (1 − s)I ′(s) is increasing violate that si > si+1 = 0.
So si > si+1 = 0 is not possible.
(d) si+1 > si = 0 is not possible either for the same reason as (c).
Therefore, when ci+1 = 0 and when (1−s)I ′(s) is an increasing function, we have si = si+1
(Example see in Figure 2.2).
(ii) We will prove that when c2 = 0, and when (1 − s)I ′(s) is a decreasing function, only
s1 > s2 = 0 or s2 > s1 = 0 can happen.
(a) When both s1 > 0 and s2 > 0, and when c2 = 0, from (2.25),
(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) = (1− si)I ′(si). (A.9)
so we have si = si+1.
However, when s1 = s2 = 1 − m, for some specific m ∈ (0, 1), we can always increase
the value of R by decreasing the value of s1 and increasing the value of s2, given that
(1 − s1)(1 − s2) = m2 and the values of the other sj (j > 2) fixed (e.g. let s1 = 1 −m 12
50 Lingzi Wang
and s2 = 1−m 32 ). This is because, the solution that s1 = s2 = 1−m < 1 is the maximum
solution of I(s1) + I(s2) given that (1 − s1)(1 − s2) = m2 and therefore the minimum
solution of R (see in (2.4)) given that (1− s1)(1− s2) = m2 and the values of the other sj
(j > 2) fixed.
To prove this, we only need to see the necessary and sufficient condition for the question
Max I(s1) + I(s2) s.t.(1− s1)(1− s2) = m2 (A.10)
that is
Max F (s1) = I(s1) + I(1− m
2
1− s1 ), (A.11)
where m2 is a constant value.
The necessary condition (the first derivative of F (s1) equals 0) is that
F ′(s1) = I ′(s1) + I ′(1− m
2
1− s1 )(−
m2
(1− s1)2 )
= I ′(s1) + I ′(s2)(−1− s2
1− s1 )
= 0 (A.12)
which is equilalent to
(1− s1)I(s1) = (1− s2)I(s2), (A.13)
so when (1− s)I ′(s) is decreasing,
s1 = s2 (A.14)
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The sufficient condition (the second derivative of F (s1) larger than 0) is that
F ′′(s1) = I ′′(s1) + I ′′(1− m
2
1− s1 )
m4
(1− s1)4 − 2I
′(1− m
2
1− s1 )
m2
(1− s1)3
=
1
(1− s1)2
(
(1− s1)2I ′′(s1) + (1− s2)2I ′′(s2)− 2(1− s2)I ′(s2)
)
=
1
(1− s1)2
(
2(1− s2)2I ′′(s2)− 2(1− s2)I ′(s2)
)
(since s1 = s2)
< 0 (since (1− s)I ′(s) is decreasing function) (A.15)
So s1 = s2 > 0 is the local maximum solution of I(s1) + I(s2) and therefore the local
minimum solution of R.
(b) When both s1 = 0 and s2 = 0, we can follow the proof below in (iii)(b)(c), and then
all rest si = 0 (i > 2), which is not the optimal solution for R.
Therefore, when c2 = 0, and when (1 − s)I ′(s) is a decreasing function, only s1 > s2 = 0
or s2 > s1 = 0 can be the optimal (Example see in Figure 2.4).
(iii) We will prove that when (1− s)I ′(s) is a decreasing function, for any i 6= 2, ci = 0 but
c2 > 0 does not change the relation 1 > s1 > s2 = ... = sn = 0 (equation (2.28)).
(a) c1 = 0 does not change the relation in (2.25), therefore the relation (2.28) still holds.
(b) If c3 = 0 but c2 > 0, we would have s1 > 0 and s2 = 0 since c2 > 0. If however
s3 = m > 0, since the symmetric relation between s2 and s3 in R when c3 = 0, we would
have s2 = m > 0 and s3 = 0 to be another optimal solution, which violates the fact that
s2 = 0. So s3 can only be 0.
If c3 > 0, s3 can still only be 0 due to the asymmetric relation between s2 and s3 in the R
function and that we can only have s2 ≥ s3.
Therefore, no matter c3 > 0 or c3 = 0, we can only have s3 = 0
(c) For the same reason, no matter c4 > 0 or c4 = 0, we can only have s4 = 0; and so is
for any ci = 0 (i > 2).
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Therefore when for any i 6= 2, ci = 0 but c2 > 0 and when (1 − s)I ′(s) is a decreasing
function, the relation (2.28) still holds.
2.6.2 Appendix B
When the residual fitness when all the defences are breached is positive (scenario (A)), the
fitness function is (2.3) as follows.
R(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = 1− C(
n∑
i=1
Ii(si))− c1 −
n∑
j=2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk). (B.1)
The analysis for (2.3) is similar to when the fitness function is (2.4) (scenario (B)– when
the residual fitness is zero when all the defences are breached). The necessary conditions
to maximise R– (2.15) and (2.16) in this case can be written as follows,
(I) When 0 < si < 1,
∂R
∂si
− hI ′(si) = −∂C(IA)
∂si
+
1
1− si
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− hI ′(si) = 0
(with h ≥ 0) (B.2)
(II) When si = 1,
∂R
∂si
− hI ′(si) = −∂C(IA)
∂si
− 1
1− si
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− hI ′(si) ≤ 0
(with h ≥ 0) (B.3)
Now (B.2) and (B.3) together is the necessary condition. The following analyses are similar
to the scenario (B). Similar to the equations (2.20) and (2.21),
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∂R
∂si
· (1− si)− h(1− si)I ′(si) = −(1− si)∂C(IA)
∂si
+
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si)I ′(si) = 0,
(B.4)
∂R
∂si+1
· (1− si+1)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) = −(1− si+1)∂C(IA)
∂si+1
+
n∑
j=i+2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)
−h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) = 0
(B.5)
Then we have
−(1− si+1)∂C(IA)
∂si+1
+
n∑
j=i+2
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) = −(1− si)∂C(IA)
∂si
+
n∑
j=i+1
cj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si)I ′(si).
(B.6)
Since IA =
∑n
i=1 I(si), the above is equivalent to
−(1− si+1)C ′(IA)I ′(si+1)− h(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) = −(1− si)C ′(IA)I ′(si)
+ci+1
i∏
k=1
(1− sk)− h(1− si)I ′(si). (B.7)
⇒
−(1− si+1)I ′(si+1)
(
C ′(IA) + h
)
= −(1− si)I ′(si)
(
C ′(IA) + h
)
+ ci+1
i∏
k=1
(1− sk).
(B.8)
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Since C ′(IA) > 0, we have that
(
C ′(IA) + h
)
> 0 , so that equation (B.8) is equivalent to
−(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) = −(1− si)I ′(si) + ci+1
∏i
k=1(1− sk)(
C ′(IA) + h
) . (B.9)
The last term in the right-hand side ci+1
∏i
k=1(1−sk)(
C′(IA)+h
) is negative since ci+1 > 0, C ′(IA) > 0
and h ≥ 0, therefore
−(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) > −(1− si)I ′(si). (B.10)
which is equivalent to,
(1− si+1)I ′(si+1) < (1− si)I ′(si). (B.11)
Therefore we have the same relation between si and si+1 as (2.27). The later analyses are
the same as in the section ”Investing in multiple defences or in a single defence?”.
Chapter 3
The evolution of variance in
sequential defences
3.1 Introduction
Protective defences against organisms’ enemies, such as predators, parasites and pathogens,
are ubiquitous [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] and the study of adaptations for defence is consequently a
major theme in adaptive evolutionary biology.
Evolutionary studies of defences often focus on one or more perspectives, including: the
evolutionary history of defence mechanisms [3, 7, 8], their roles in macroevolutionary pat-
terns [9, 10, 11], the variety of forms of defences used in taxonomic groups [1, 12], the
influence of life-history variation on defence [13, 14, 15, 16, 17], coevolution [18, 19] and
strategies for optimal investment in defences [20, 21].
Despite the extensive research in the biology of defence, an area that has received relatively
little attention is the nature of defensive variation between individuals and between species.
Thus, many studies which seek to understand the function and mode of action of defensive
phenotypes focus (rightly) on species typical defences, rather than variation within species.
The notable exception to this is seen when frequency dependent evolution causes stable
polymorphisms in defences, for example those that give the greatest net benefit when rare,
such as parasitic Batesian mimicry [4]. Some classes of defence are however, very variable
55
56 Lingzi Wang
within populations. Chemical defences of plants [22] and animals [23] are, for example,
notoriously variable, both in terms of the concentrations of compounds that can repel
and deter predatory enemies, and even in the mixtures of compounds that are present in
different individuals [23]. Arguably, less is known about variation in other forms of defence
in animals such as camouflage or warning signals, because of an emphasis on species-typical
traits. However, the recent onset of methods for measuring colour patterns is enabling some
evaluation of levels of variation in animal colouration, but overall conclusions cannot be
made at present. Similarly, chemical ecologists have for a long period been able to evaluate
(and demonstrate) variation in secondary metabolites in plants [24]. In addition variation
in physical defences (density of protective trichome hairs, thickness of cuticles and waxes
etc), can be measured, and reveal the level of variation there is within populations [25].
One reason for the interest in the variation of defences is, as described above, that they can
be very variable indeed. There is an apparent paradox here; traits that are viewed as vital
to survival of individuals are none the less highly variable, suggesting that some individuals
are poorly protected in populations. Several explanations have been proposed including
frequency dependence (rare toxins work best) because of predator-counter adaptation and
coevolution [26]. A second compelling explanation is that the effectiveness of some forms
of defence saturate at levels that are phenotypically cheap to achieve by organisms, hence
a lot of observed variation is above a threshold of effectiveness-saturation, of little effect on
survival and with little variation in costs between individuals [23]. It might be for example
that some defensive chemicals are cheaply synthesised and stored, and the observed levels
of variation in concentration imply nothing about variation in survival from attack.
Here we propose an additional and potentially predictive explanation for different levels of
variation in different kinds of defence.
We reason that many defences often work in what Frank [27] calls “sequential layers”.
Defences are in effect ordered as a set of barriers surrounding the organism: each one must
be crossed in turn by an enemy before it can reach the valuable core tissues of the victim.
As Endler [28] and Broom et al. [20] point out, those components of sequential defence
suites which are met first will be challenged by enemies more frequently than those that
are met only later in a sequence. A general conclusion is then that those defences met
or deployed early in an encounter with an enemy will have a larger contribution to the
protection of a victim than those met later. Suppose we have two defences that act in
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sequence, and the probability that an enemy successfully crosses each is 0.5. For each time
the first defence is challenged, the second defence is challenged only half as often, and its
contribution to survival is half that of the first.
Put simply then, selection is likely to be weaker on later acting, than on earlier acting
defences. We may then predict that the mutation-selection equilibrium for a defensive
trait is different depending at what stage in encounters with an enemy it is deployed. For
example, an organism whose only defence is chemical in nature relies very strongly on that
defence and selection to keep it at an optimal value will be very strong. Should however
the organism evolve an effective physical defence that acts before the chemical defence,
then the chemical defence is used less often and makes a smaller contribution to survival
from an encounter. The “corrupting” effects of mutation will make more headway against
the unifying force of selection toward the optimal value of the trait.
Though it is easy to argue this verbally, here we seek a quantitative analysis to evaluate
the effects of order of deployment on mutation. We present a model that is simple in struc-
ture (with only two stages) and investigates the dynamical evolution of paired, sequential
defences, seeking out the conditions in which there will be inequalities in variation between
them arising from mutation-selection balance. A key point is that while we do confirm that
the later acting defence may often evolve to be more variable, we can identify conditions
in which the later-acting defences are the least variable.
Several other theoretical papers look at sequential defences, and though none focus on the
question we ask here about variability, we will briefly comment on their relevance to our
model here.
Broom et al’s sequential defence model [20] gave different benefit and cost values to both de-
fences, and found the optimal strategies (none/preattack defence/post attack defence/both
defences) in regards to these different benefit and cost values. In the model due to the
order in defence, the relation of benefits and costs of the first defence can influence the
condition when the second defence is used or not; but the relation of benefits and costs of
the second defence can not influence the condition when the first defence is used or not.
So the first defence might be relatively more influential in the optimal decision making.
Speed et al [23], Gilman et al [19] and Sasaki [29] gave coevolutionary models to explore
the investments in different defences. In Speed et al [23], victims could invest in one or
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more defences, and coevolution could be the reason for more than one defence, since when
there is not coevolution, plants evolve to invest in only one toxin trait. Gilman et al [19]
’s paper showed that increasing the number of defence traits, and the correlation between
traits could help the victims to win the evolutionary contest, so different defence traits
functioning interactively might be the reason why more than one defence is profitable.
Sasaki [29] found that when the effects of defence genes acts multiplicatively, different
resistant defences exist in either coevolutionary cycle or static equilibria depending on the
cost of resistance and virulence values. These models gave reasons for the existence of more
than one defences, although these models did not show the defence variance evolution of
each defences as we did.
3.2 The Model
We consider a prey species that mounts two sequential defences against predation. We
assume that each individual has a phenotype x describing its first-level defense and a phe-
notype y characterising its second-level defense. These phenotypes determine the success
of each defense repelling predation, so not breached by enemies, and we denote by p1(x)
the probability that the first defense holds and by p2(y) the probability that the second
defense holds. We assume that there are ideal values a and b for these phenotypes, so that
p1(x) is maximal at x = a, and p2(y) is maximal when y = b, and that the defense will
be less likely to hold when the phenotypic values are further away from these ideal values.
Specifically, we assume functional forms
p1(x) = e
−1− (x−a)
2
α , (B.1)
p2(y) = e
−2− (y−b)
2
β , (B.2)
so that the first (respectively, second) defense will hold with probability e−1 (respectively,
e−2) when the corresponding phenotype is at its ideal value x = a (respectively, y = b), and
that the tolerance of phenotypic deviations from the ideal will be wide when α (respectively,
β) is large.
Since these defenses are met sequentially, there are three mutually exclusive scenarios:
(1) defense 1 holds, which occurs with probability p1(x); (2) defense 1 fails, but defense
2 holds, which occurs with probability (1 − p1(x))p2(y); (3) defenses 1 and 2 both fail,
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which occurs with probability (1− p1(x))(1− p2(y)). We assume that the prey’s fitnesses
under these three scenarios are f1, f2 and f3 respectively, and note that these represent
increasingly adverse outcomes for the prey so that f1 ≥ f2 ≥ f3 ≥ 0. The average fitness
of an individual with phenotype (x, y) is then given by
Φ(x, y) = f1p1(x) + f2(1− p1(x))p2(y) + f3(1− p1(x))(1− p2(y)) (B.3)
We now consider how the population distribution of the phenotypes evolves in time. We
assume non-overlapping generations, and let Nt(xt, yt) represent the density of individu-
als with vector of phenotypes (xt, yt) at generation t. We first consider the case where
the phenotype is completely heritable with no mutation. In that case, the abundance of
individuals with phenotypes (xt, yt) simply changes by Φ(xt, yt) at each generation:
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) = Nt(xt, yt)Φ(xt, yt). (B.4)
Secondly, we consider the case where phenotype mutates between generations. IfM(xt, yt, xt+1, yt+1)
is the mutation kernel, i.e. the probability density that a parent with phenotype (xt, yt)
has offspring of phenotype (xt+1, yt+1), then
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
Nt(xt, yt)Φ(xt, yt)M(xt, yt, xt+1, yt+1)dxt dyt. (B.5)
We assume that the phenotypes mutate independently with a Gaussian mutation kernel of
the form
M(xt, yt;xt+1, yt+1) =
1
piµ
e
− (xt−xt+1)
2−(yt−yt+1)2
µ , (B.6)
so that µ/2 is the variance in the mutation per generation in either phenotype.
We assume that, at the first generation, the phenotypes are independently normally dis-
tributed with variances v1/2 and w1/2 and means x¯1 and y¯1 for the first and second defenses
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respectively, and n1 the total population number.
N1(x1, y1) = n1
1
pi
√
v1w1
e
−( (x1−x¯1)2
v1
+
(y1−y¯1)2
w1
)
. (B.7)
The evolution of the distribution of phenotypes in the population is therefore obtained by
starting with the initial distribution given in eqn. (B.7) and iterating eqns (B.4) or (B.5),
substituting for Φ from eqn. (B.3), p1 and p2 from eqns. (B.1) and (B.2), and M from eqn.
(B.6). We characterise the population distribution by the means xt and yt and variances
vt
2 and
wt
2 of the phenotypic values, defined as
xt = Et(xt)
yt = Et(yt)
vt
2
= Et((x− xt)2)
wt
2
= Et((y − yt)2),
where Et(·) represents the expectation value at time t, defined as
Et(f(xt, yt)) =
∫∞
−∞
∫∞
−∞ f(xt, yt)Nt(xt, yt)dxtdyt∫∞
−∞
∫∞
−∞Nt(xt, yt)dxtdyt
for any function f(x, y). Note that the total number of population at t,
nt =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
Nt(xt, yt)dxtdyt.
Also note that the scale of the variance in defence phenotypes is set by the parameters µ, α,
and β. That is, if we increase these three parameters by a common factor, the equilibrium
value of vt and wt will change by the same factor (Appendix B).
To summarise, the parameters, variables and functions are shown in the tables 4.2,4.1,3.3.
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Parameters
µ mutation strength
a, b ideal phenotypes
1, 2 effectiveness
α, β Tolerance of phenotypic deviations from the ideal
f1, f2, f3 conditional fitness
Table 3.1: Parameter table
Variables
xt, yt defence phenotype values at time t
x¯t, y¯t means of defence phenotype values at time t
vt
2 ,
wt
2 variances of defence phenotype values at time t
nt total population numbers at time t
Table 3.2: Variable table
Functions
p1(x), p2(y) probability each defence holds
Φ(x, y) average fitness
M(xt, yt;xt+1, yt+1) Gaussian Mutation Kernal from (xt, yt) to (xt+1, yt+1)
Nt(xt, yt) population density function about (xt, yt)
Table 3.3: Function table
Note that the idea of dealing with selection and mutation in this model is similar to the
quasispecies model [30], except that the model here deals with continuous transitions across
time in comparison with the discrete transitions across time in quasispecies model.
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3.3 Methods
We use both numerical and analytical approaches to explore how different factors affect
the variances of both defences. The section 3.1 is the numerical approach and the section
3.2 is the analytical approach.
3.3.1 Numerical integration
We are not able to find exact closed-form analytical expressions for the mean or variance
of the phenotypes at generation t, so we approximate the continuous distribution of phe-
notypic values by a discrete set and iterate (B.4) or (B.5) numerically. A each t we replace
(xt, yt) by the grid of pairs of values {(xti, ytj); i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}}, where
xti = xt1 + (i− 1)∆x, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
ytj = yt1 + (j − 1)∆y, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
In all cases we start with a population with means (x¯1, y¯1) = (1, 1) and variances (v1/2, w1/2) =
(2, 2), and total population number n1 = 10000. The fitnesses are set to (f1, f2, f3) =
(2, 1, 0.2), the ideal phenotypes to (a, b) = (0, 0), the selection forces are (α, β) = (5, 5),
and the grid is defined by ∆x = ∆y = 0.2, n = 101. All integrals are approximated as
follows: ∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
F (xt, yt)dxt dyt ≈
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
F (xti, ytj)∆x∆y,
for any function F . The grid of values extends over a range of (n−1)∆x = (n−1)∆y = 20
units, which (for the variance values under consideration) is sufficient for this finite sum
to approximate the infinite range of integration. To avoid numerical overflow, after each
iteration we replace Nt by
Nt(xti, ytj)→ N ′t(xti, ytj) = n1
Nt(xti, ytj)∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1Nt(xti, ytj)∆x∆y
,
so that the population is always normalised to contain n1 = 10000 individuals; this does
not affect our results, as we are only interested in the relative abundance of different
phenotypes.
For the case where there is no mutation, we use xi1 = yi1 = −9 (so that x extends over the
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range x1 ± 10 and y over the range y1 ± 10), and iterate eqn. (B.4) at this grid of values
for 1000 generations.
For the case where there is mutation, we allow the range of integration to vary as the mean
phenotypic values change to ensure that the range of phenotypic values in the population
does not stray too close to (or beyond) the edges of the range of integration. To do this,
at each generation we calculate xt and yt, and then set
xt+1,1 = xt − (n− 1)
2
∆x
yt+1,1 = yt −
(n− 1)
2
∆y,
so that the ranges of x and y grid values at the next generation are centred on xt and
yt respectively. Since the grid of (x, y) values changes between generations, we need to
determine the density of phenotypes evaluated on the current generation’s grid from the
density evaluated on the previous generation’s grid. We do this by assuming that the
density is constant within a range (±∆x2 ,±∆y2 ) from the points on the previous generation’s
grid. We set µ = 0.02 and iterate eqn. (B.5) for 1000 generations.
3.3.2 Normal approximation
An alternative method for calculating approximately the evolution in time of the popu-
lation is to use a moment closure assumption, which is a well established approximation
method for stochastic systems that cannot be solved exactly. Moment closure assumes
that the distribution of a random variable is well approximated by a particular parametric
form (Whittle [31], and then derives (approximate) equations for the parameters of the
distribution. Here, we perform a normal moment closure by assuming that the traits are
normally distributed at a generation t, and then calculate the mean and covariance matrix
at generation t+ 1 in terms of the mean and covariance at time t. While the trait will not
in general be normally distributed (except at the first generation, where this is assumed),
it is reasonable to assume that the iteration equations for the mean and covariance provide
a good enough approximation to the true time evolution of the system for the purposes of
understanding the general behaviour of the model. This is an uncontrolled approximation,
by contrast with the direct numerical solution described in the previous section (which
will describe the dynamics exactly in the limit where the integrals are approximated by
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sums over a very large and very fine grid), but has the advantage of being much quicker
to evaluate and therefore permits a much wider exploration of parameter space. We have
tested our approximation scheme against simulation results, and find that it reproduces
the patterns in the result well for a wide range of parameters.
We begin by assuming that the traits are normally distributed at time t, and write the
distribution of traits as
Nt(xt, yt) = nt
√|Wt|
pi
exp
(
− (zt − z¯t)TWt(zt − z¯t)
)
, (B.8)
where zt =
(
xt
yt
)
is the vector of defence phenotypes, z¯t =
(
x¯t
y¯t
)
is the mean vector
of defence phenotypes, and Wt = (2Σt)
−1, where
Σt = Et
(
x2t xtyt
xtyt y
2
t
)
− Et
(
xt
y
)
Et
(
xt yt
)
is the covariance matrix for the trait.
We can find the population distribution at the next generation by applying the iteration
equation (B.5), where Φ is defined by equations (B.1–B.3) and M from eqn. (B.6). After
performing the integrals over (xt, yt) (the details are shown in Appendix A), this leads to
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) = nt
√
|Wt|Θt
4∑
j=1
θt,j
1
2pi
√|Σt+1,j | exp
(
− 1
2
(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)TΣ−1t+1,j(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)
)
,
(B.9)
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where
z′t+1,j = (Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
Σt+1,j =
1
2
(
U−1 + (Σ−1t + Fj)
−1
)
γ1 = f3
γ2 = (f1 − f3)e−1
γ3 = (f2 − f3)e−2
γ4 = (f3 − f2)e−(1+2)
F1 =
(
0 0
0 0
)
F2 =
(
1
α 0
0 0
)
F3 =
(
0 0
0 1β
)
F4 = F2 + F3
U =
(
1
µ 0
0 1µ
)
θt,j =
γjst,j
Θt
√|Wt + Fj |
Θt =
4∑
j=1
γjst,j√|Wt + Fj |
st,j = exp
( 1
µ
(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
T
(
(Wt + Fj)
−1 + µI
)
K−1t,j (Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)− z¯Tt Wtz¯t − aˆTFj aˆ
)
aˆ =
(
a
b
)
This shows that Nt+1 is the sum of four normal distributions with different means and co-
variance matrices, so cannot be expressed as a single normal distribution. We can, however,
use this expression to compute the mean and covariance of the traits at generation t + 1
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(also see equations (A.9), (A.11) in Appendix A):
z¯t+1 = Et+1(zt+1)
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ) (B.10)
Σt+1 = Et+1
(
x2t+1 xt+1yt+1
xt+1yt+1 y
2
t+1
)
− Et
(
xt
y
)
Et
(
xt yt
)
=
1
2
U−1 +
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Σ
−1
t + 2Fj)
−1 +
4∑
j=1
θt,j · z′t+1,jz′Tt+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1. (B.11)
From the expression of Fj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4), we can tell from eqn. (B.10) that the mean
will evolve over time towards the ideal phenotype aˆ. Also z′t+1,j = (Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t +
Fj aˆ) (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) approaches to the ideal phenotype aˆ, therefore the term
∑4
j=1 θt,j ·
z′t+1,jz
′T
t+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1 in (B.11) approaches to zero, and the covariance matrix approaches
to the following equation (also see in equation (A.12) in Appendix A),
Σt+1 =
1
2
U−1 +
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Σ
−1
t + 2Fj)
−1. (B.12)
These equations can be iterated rapidly over time to give an approximation to the time
evolution and equilibrium values of zt and Σt (We can use (B.11) to do the iteration for
the evolution of zt and Σt, and both (B.11) and (B.12) can be used to generate equilibrium
value of Σt).
In the limit µ→ 0, Equation (B.12) approaches the limit
Σt+1 =
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Σ
−1
t + 2Fj)
−1 (B.13)
from which it can be shown that variance of both the first and second defence evolve
towards zero as time t grows (details in Appendix C). If U 6= 0, however, it can be shown
from (B.12) that the covariance matrix evolves to a non-zero equilibrium. This shows that
mutation is necessary in order for the traits to be variable.
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3.4 Results
Because of selection, the means of both defences evolve towards the ideal phenotype (this
can be shown analytically for the normal approximation— see the iteration equation for
the mean (B.10) — and also see numerical results in Figure 3.2 (a), (b)). We are interested
in the evolution of the distribution of phenotypes within the population, but in particular
in the variance of the phenotypic values. There are five factors that will influence these
variances.
1. Mutation
In this model, mutation must be present for phenotypic variance to be maintained —
when there is no mutation, the variances of both traits evolve to be zero. This is visible
in the numerical results Figure 3.1 (a), (b), and can be shown analytically for the Normal
approximation (see Appendix C).
A special case is that when mutation is zero and the first defence is perfectly effective
(1 = 0), i.e. when the defence will succeed with probability 1 if the trait is at its ideal
value x = a. As the first defence evolves close to the ideal phenotype, and first defence
variance evolves to be zero, the first defence protects all the victims from the enemies so
that the second defence is hardly ever tested and evolves very slowly (Figures 3.1 (c)(d),
3.2 (c)(d), 3.3 (b)).
When there is mutation, the variance of both traits evolve to have positive values (Figures
3.1, 3.3). This is proved for the moment closure approximation in Appendix A. Stronger
mutation leads to higher variances (Figure 3.3).
2. Order of defence in the sequence
When the first and second defence have the same effectiveness (1 = 2) and the tolerance
range is the same for both defences (α = β), then the first defence variance is always
lower than the second defence variance (i.e., the first defence clusters more closely than
the second around its ideal phenotype), no matter what the conditional fitness values are.
This is shown in figure 3.6, where var1/var2< 1 (in which var1 stands for the first defence
variance, and var2 stands for the second defence variance) along the line 1 = 2; even
in figure 3.6 (a), where f1 is only a little higher than f2 so that it makes little difference
whether the first defence holds or does not, the first defence variance is still a little smaller
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Figure 3.1: The evolution of phenotypic variances, obtained using numerical integration.
Dashed lines indicate the case of no mutation, solid lines the case when µ = 0.02. Red lines
indicate the variance in the first defense, black lines the variance in the second defense.
(a) 1 = 0.1, 2 = 0, (b) 1 = 0.1, 2 = 0.9, (c) 1 = 0, 2 = 0, (d) 1 = 0, 2 = 0.9. Other
parameters: α = 5, β = 5, (f1, f2, f3) = (2, 1, 0.2), (a, b) = (0, 0).
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Figure 3.2: The evolution of phenotypic means, obtained from numerical integration.
Dashed lines indicate the case of no mutation, solid lines the case when µ = 0.02. Red
lines indicate the mean in the first defence, black lines the mean in the second defense.
(a) 1 = 0.1, 2 = 0, (b) 1 = 0.1, 2 = 0.9, (c) 1 = 0, 2 = 0, (d) 1 = 0, 2 = 0.9. Other
parameters: α = 5, β = 5, (f1, f2, f3) = (2, 1, 0.2), (a, b) = (0, 0).
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Figure 3.3: The equilibrium values of the variances, obtained from numerical integration.
Red lines: first defence; black lines: second defence. Dotted lines: µ = 0; dashed lines:
µ = 0.01; solid lines: µ = 0.02. (a) 1 = 0.1, (b) 1 = 0. Other parameters: α = 5, β = 5,
(f1, f2, f3) = 2, 1, 0.2, (a, b) = (0, 0).
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than the second defence when 1 = 2.
3. Effectiveness of defences
(1) If the first defence is less effective than the second defence (1 > 2), then the first
defence variance can be larger than the second defence variance (in Figure 3.6, var1/var2> 1
when 1 > 2). The threshold value for the ineffectiveness 1 of the first defence, above
which the first defence has higher variance than the second, depends also on the conditional
fitness values (see the contour lines above the red contour line given different fitness values
in Figure 3.6 (a-c) described also in “Conditional fitness” below).
(2) When the effectiveness of the first defence increases, the first defence variance decreases
and the second defence variances increases. When the effectiveness of the second defence
increases, the opposite occurs (see Figure 3.4).
4. Tolerance of phenotypic deviations from the ideal
We refer to the quantities α and β as the “tolerance of phenotypic deviations from the
ideal” on the two defensive traits, because they quantify how sensitive the fitness is to
deviations from the ideal trait value. However, the variances of the traits do not depend
on these quantities in a straightforward way. When the tolerance of deviation from the
ideal on a trait is wide, the variance in that trait has a positive relationship with the
tolerance as would usually be expected in a mutation-selection balance (Figure 3.5 (a), (e),
large values of α or β). However, when the tolerance is narrowed beyond a threshold value,
the variance in that trait starts to increase. This is because mutation limits how small
the variance in a trait can become, so that as α (for example) decreases more individuals
have a maladapted first defence, which as a result is increasingly likely to fail. Since this
defence is very likely to fail anyway, its importance in determining the animal’s relative
fitness actually decreases, and the variance of that trait increases, as α decreases further.
(Figure 3.5 (a), (e), small values of α or β). Increasing the ineffectiveness of a defence
(1 or 2) makes this effect stronger, so that the positive relationship starts at a smaller
value of the tolerance. Since narrowing one defence’s tolerance makes it more likely to fail,
and therefore makes the other defence more important, the variance in the other defence
consequentially decreases (Figure 3.5 (b), (d)). Because the first defence variance and
second defence variance can either increase or decrease as the tolerance values change, the
ratio of these variances can either increase or decrease (Figure 3.5 (c), (f)).
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Figure 3.4: The effect of effectiveness on equilibrium variance. Red lines: first defence;
black lines: second defence. Dotted lines: 1 = 1.1; dashed lines: 1 = 1.3; solid lines:
1 = 1.5. Other parameters: α = 5, β = 5, (f1, f2, f3) = (2, 1, 0.2), µ = 0.02, (a, b) = (0, 0).
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Figure 3.5: The effect of tolerance of phenotypic deviations from the ideal on equilibrium
variances. Red line: 1 = 0, 2 = 0; yellow line: 1 = 0, 2 = 0.9; green line: 1 = 5, 2 = 0;
black line: 1 = 5, 2 = 0.9; In (a,b,c) β = 5, and in (d,e,f) α = 5. Other parameters:
(f1, f2, f3) = (2, 1, 0.2), µ = 0.02, (a, b) = (0, 0). These results were obtained by the the
Normal Approximation (B.12), which is much faster than the numerical iteration.
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5. Conditional fitness
We change the relative values of f1f2 (the ratio between the conditional fitness f1 while the
first defence holds and the conditional fitness f2 while the first defence fails) and
f2
f3
(the
ratio between the conditional fitness f2 while the second defence holds and the conditional
fitness f3 while the second defence fails) to see the relative importance of the first and
second defences. When the relative fitness value f1f2 increases and
f2
f3
decreases, meaning
that the first defence becomes more important, then var1/var2 decreases (given the same
1 and 2). This can be seen in Figure 3.6(a), where
f1
f2
is lowest and f2f3 is highest, the value
of var1/var2 (keeping the same values of (1, 2))is highest; and in Figure 3.6(c) where
f1
f2
is highest and f2f3 is lowest, the value of var1/var2 is lowest. As seen in Figure 3.6, the
second defence must be much more effective than the first defence (2  1, the upper-left
side of red solid lines) for the first defence variance to be larger than the second defence
variance. Note that here only three typical cases of fitness values are showed (in Figure
3.6(a)(b)(c) respectively) because for the other values (e.g. f2 = 0 which may correspond
to that a victim animal is killed when the second defence is breached, or the other values of
f2 > 0 which may correspond to that a victim plant is still alive when the second defence
is breached), the figures are similar and the relation showed above keep the same.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter we aimed to predict and explain patterns in the variation of anti-predator
defences, when those defences are deployed in a predictable sequence. It is well known that
defences can be variable in a population, but there is relatively little systematic evalua-
tion of patterns of variation, even though diversifying evolutionary mechanisms are easily
identified [22, 23, 32, 33, 34]. It is our contention that the sequential nature of defence
may often cause predictable patterns of diversity, allowing testable hypotheses about de-
fence variation. Hence, we built and interrogated a model representing both the selection
and mutation mechanisms on the evolution of population distribution of two sequential
defences. By using both analytical and numerical methods, we get the evolution processes
and equilibrium evolution values of the variances in both defences. We first briefly account
for the major determinants of defence variation in our model and subsequently relate its
general findings to a wider set of defences and to other theoretical treatments of defence
evolution.
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Figure 3.6: Contours of var1/var2 in the (1, 2) plane, for different conditional fitness
values. Red solid line: the contour line var1/var2=1 (above which var1/var2> 1, below
which var1/var2< 1) (red line is not visible in (c) as it occurs only when 1 > 2, which is out
off the range of 1-axis); green dashed line: the line 1 = 2. (a) (f1, f2, f3) = (2, 1.9, 0.2),
(b) (f1, f2, f3) = (2, 1, 0.2), (c) (f1, f2, f3) = (2, 0.3, 0.2). Other parameters: α = 5, β = 5,
µ = 0.02, (a, b) = (0, 0). These results were obtained by the the Normal Approximation
(B.12), which is much faster than the numerical iteration.
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3.5.1 Factors predicted to be influential in defence variance
(1) Mutation. Mutation is the reason of why there are defence variances in our model. In
the absence of mutation, both defence variances will evolve toward zero, whereas if there
is mutation, equilibria of mutation and selection that give variances > 0. Unsurprisingly,
the stronger the mutation is, the larger the two defence variances evolve to be.
(2) Order of defence in the sequence. If the first defence and the second defence are as
effective as each other, and the tolerance range is the same for both defences, then the first
defence distribution evolves to have smaller variance than the second defence distribution
(see Results, Figure 3.6). That means the first defence is more closely gathered around
the ideal phenotype and therefore has more influence in protecting the victims from being
attacked. Hence, the model demonstrates our verbal argument in the introduction: that
earlier acting defences can often evolve to lower levels of variation than later acting defences.
(3) Effectiveness of defences. Whether the defences are effective enough in the environment
(in the sense of successfully repelling an enemy) is also important to the evolution of
population variance. If the first defence in a sequence is not as effective in repelling
predators as the second defence, then the force of selection can be felt most strongly on
the second defence, with the consequence that it has a lower equilibrium variance than the
first defence. This is counter to the intuition in our Introduction, that defences deployed
earlier are less variable than those deployed later in sequence, and shows the value of a
formal model.
(4) Tolerance of phenotypic deviations from the ideal. We consider that effectiveness of
a defence in repelling enemies becomes weaker as the phenotype diverges from the ideal
value for the relevant trait. A key measure in this model is therefore how much defensive
effectiveness is lost for an incremental deviation from the ideal phenotypic value: in effect
the tolerance of the phenotype in relation to its defensive function (α, β). If tolerance
of phenotypic deviation is narrow, then even when the phenotype is similar to the ideal
phenotype, the defence is likely to fail and be breached. On the contrary, if the tolerance is
very wide and permissive, even the phenotype is quite dissimilar to the ideal phenotype, the
defence is likely to hold. Both the first and second defence variances will evolve to be high
when the tolerance is very narrow or wide. When the tolerance is very wide, the phenotypes
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quite different from the ideal phenotypes are effective to protect the victims, then the
population variance could evolve to be very large. When the tolerance is very narrow,
even the phenotypes are quite similar as the ideal phenotypes are useless in protecting the
victims, then it will not be profitable for the phenotypes to evolve to be similar to the
ideal phenotypes, so the population variance will also be very wide. An interesting result
pertains now if the first defence is subject to narrow tolerance and the second defence to
wider tolerance. Here the first defence can be of little use, and contributes little to prey
survival, hence mutation accumulates and the phenotype becomes variable. Variation in
the second defence however is fundamental to prey survival, hence the model predicts a
lower equilibrium value for mutation (Figure 3.5). This gives us an additional scenario in
which the first defence may evolve to a higher level of variation than the second.
(5) Conditional Fitness. In our model, the relative importance of whether the first defence
holds to whether the second defence holds are described by the relative conditional fitness
values. When the relative conditional fitness value f1f2 increases (which means that the
importance of holding the first defence increases) and the relative conditional fitness value
f2
f3
decreases (which means that the importance of holding the second defence increases),
then the ratio between the first defence variance and the second defence variance decreases.
The contrary is true when the conditions are reversed.
3.5.2 Application to biological and other contexts
Sequentially-layered defences are very common in biological and other contexts. Many
plants and animals present their enemies with layered defences. John Endler for example
[28] argued that an attack by a predator on its (animal) prey is typically composed of a
sequence of six stages: (i) encounter (spatial proximity), (ii) detection, (iii) identification,
(iv) approach, (v) subjugation and ultimately (vi) consumption. At each stage in this
sequence the prey organism can put up one or more lines of defence with the aim of
preventing, interrupting and stopping the attack. An animal prey may for example hide
(to prevent encounter, i, and detection, ii), use masquerade and cryptic colouration (to
prevent detection and identification, ii, iii), perhaps form aggressive defensive groups (to
prevent approach, iv). They may alternatively have a startle display or use vigilance
and rapid escape behaviours (to prevent approach, iv). They may violently retaliate (to
prevent subjugation, v.) perhaps using stings, spines or bites and/or deploy irritating or
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toxic chemicals (to prevent subjugation and consumption, v, vi). At each stage in the
sequence Endler identified, one or more defences could be deployed by a prey animal, and
they could often operate sequentially, some defences typically used only if earlier-acting
defences have failed to stop the predation event. Here we have simplified to two layers, but
the model could be extended to larger set of defences. An important point is, however, that
we expect sequentially acting defences to be very common in organismal defence, hence
our model has generality.
One very general result is greater variation in later-acting defences. There is some evi-
dence supportive of a key feature of the model, that later-acting defences are used less
often than earlier defences, and thus contribute less to fitness. A meta-analysis of studies
of plant-herbivore interactions shows that variation in earlier-acting defences (physical,
morphological, physiology, chemical defences) in plants is better in predicting herbivores’
damage than later defences (toxic secondary metabolites; [35, 36]). A number of authors
have remarked on the high levels of variability in defensive toxins (see review in ref. [23]),
but we do not know of studies that measure the variability of sets of defences and relate
these to their use in a sequence. We suggest that this is an interesting area for valuable
empirical research.
We note that anti-pathogen systems (skin, immune responses) are also usually layered in
their organisation, hence the model could be elaborated to consider these kinds of defen-
sive systems. There are also interesting parallels between the organisation of biological
and human military defences. Both concern protection of valuable yet vulnerable tar-
gets, seeking optimal deployment of costly defensive “assets”. A relevant military tactic is
“layered defence” in which sets of defensive resources, such as inter-ballistic missiles, are
deployed in sequence; when a first line of defence fails against an incoming threat a second
line of defence activates to minimise further risk, and after that perhaps a third or fourth
defence, and so on. In the military theory literature, layered defence has been described
and modelled by Wilkening [37]. We suggest that it might be an interesting question to
determine whether, in military contexts and perhaps cyber-security, later-acting defences
are more variable in their form and effectiveness than earlier-acting defences.
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3.5.3 Developments of the model
We would draw the reader’s attention to some key assumptions in the model. First, we
assume that there is an optimal value for each defence, and any deviation from that is
punished by reduced efficiency in repelling enemies. This assumption does simplify imple-
mentation, giving us a clear set of results, but it does bring some limitations. On the one
hand, this assumption may fit morphological defences well - for example defensive spines
may need to be the right size to repel certain enemies. It does not represent some kinds
of chemical defence as well however. Here concentrations that are too low may lead to
reduced efficiency, but higher and higher values probably become more effective at anti-
predator defence, albeit in a saturating manner, not less. In this case the model would
have to be modified to incorporate this asymmetry in defensive benefit. An interesting
question is whether the distribution of naturally occurring defensive toxins is asymmetric
in this manner. Secondly, we assumed that once each defence is breached, it cannot be
healed (e.g. the spines of golden barrel cactus Echinocactus grusonii once moved from are-
ole cannot grow back), in comparison to that for some organisms, defences can replenish
when damaged (e.g. the claw of Florida stone crab, Menippe mercenaria can grow back
when broken with the diaphragm at the claw joint intact). Also for the case such as differ-
ent parts of plants maybe attacked independently, defences can be breached several times
in these different parts. Since our model is based on an average fitness, it can describe
qualitatively the dependence of the relative variances on fitness costs and tolerances in the
above cases, but it would be good to be further modified in the case of multiple successive
breaches of each defence (where the organism heals between each attack) and may also for
the case when different parts of plants are breached independently. Finally, we have delib-
erately excluded costs of defences in the model, in part to keep the structure simple and
predictions tractable, but there is profitable scope for including costs in a more complex
development. We note that studies of prey defence can not always identify measurable
costs to defence in any case (Zvereva & Kozlov [38]).
3.6 Conclusion
We aimed to explore the patterns of the defence variations when defences are deployed
in sequence. We built a model with two sequential defences, and use both selection and
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mutation as the evolutionary mechanisms on the evolution of population distribution of
the two defences. Through both analytical and numerical methods, we found that typically
the earlier defence has lower variance than the later defence, which means that the earlier
defence phenotypes are more closely accumulated around the ideal phenotype than the
later defence phenotypes. This matches with intuition and some research that the earlier
defences have higher probability in use and therefore probably have higher anti-predator
effect. Besides, our formal model also gives a broader explanation that when the first
defence is less effective in repelling the predators, or the first defence is less tolerant of
phenotypic deviations from the ideal, then the first defence could evolve to have higher
variance than the second defence. Sequential defences are widely seen in different defence
systems, therefore our model might be predictive in a wide range of areas. Since the
empirical research of sequential defence variances is rare, related research could be valuable.
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3.7 Appendices
3.7.1 Appendix A
To get the population distribution at the next generation Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) (equation (B.9))
we first write the fitness function in matrix form. From (B.1) and (B.2), the fitness function
(B.3) can be written as
Φ(xt, yt) = f3+(f1−f3)e−1−
(xt−a)2
α +(f2−f3)e−2−
(yt−b)2
β +(f3−f2)e−1−
(xt−a)2
α e
−2− (yt−b)
2
β
=
4∑
j=1
γj exp
(
− (zt − aˆ)TFj(zt − aˆ)
)
(A.1)
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where,
γ1 = f3, γ2 = (f1 − f3)e−1 , γ3 = (f2 − f3)e−2 , γ4 = (f3 − f2)e−(1+2),
F1 =
(
0 0
0 0
)
, F2 =
(
1
α 0
0 0
)
, F3 =
(
0 0
0 1β
)
, F4 =
(
1
α 0
0 1β
)
zt − aˆ =
(
xt − a
yt − b
)
, aˆ =
(
a
b
)
The mutation function (B.6) can be written as
M(xt, yt;xt+1, yt+1) =
1
piµ
exp
(
− (zt − zt+1)TU(zt − zt+1)
)
(A.2)
where zt − zt+1 =
(
xt − xt+1
yt − yt+1
)
, U =
(
1
µ 0
0 1µ
)
.
Then from (B.8), (A.1) and (A.2), the population distribution density iteration function
(B.5) is as follows.
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
√|Wt|
pi2µ
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
4∑
j=1
γj exp
(
−(zt−z¯t)TWt(zt−z¯t)−(zt−aˆ)TFj(zt−aˆ)
−(zt − zt+1)TU(zt − zt+1)
)
dxtdyt (A.3)
Since zt is a normal distributed vector, we collect terms for zt, let Kt,j = Wt +Fj +U , and
complete the square for zt:
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
√|Wt|
pi2µ
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
4∑
j=1
γj exp
(
−zTt Kt,jzt+2(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ+Uzt+1)T zt
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−(z¯Tt Wtz¯t + aˆTFj aˆ+ zTt+1Uzt+1)
)
dxtdyt
=
nt
√|Wt|
pi2µ
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
4∑
j=1
γj exp
(
−(zt−K−1t,j (Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ+Uzt+1))TKt,j(zt−K−1t,j (Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ+Uzt+1))
+(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ+Uzt+1)
TK−1t,j (Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ+Uzt+1)− (z¯Tt Wtz¯t+ aˆTFj aˆ+ zTt+1Uzt+1)
)
dxtdyt
From the fact that the integral of normal density function equals 1, the above is equivalent
to
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
√|Wt|
pi2µ
4∑
j=1
γj
pi√|Kt,j | exp
(
(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ+Uzt+1)
TK−1t,j (Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ+Uzt+1)
−(z¯Tt Wtz¯t + aˆTFj aˆ+ zTt+1Uzt+1)
)
(A.4)
Since zt+1 is the next generation defence phenotype vector, if we collect terms for zt+1,
given that U =
(
1
µ 0
0 1µ
)
, we have
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
piµ
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γj√|Kt,j | exp
(
− 1
µ
zTt+1(I − (µKt,j)−1)zt+1
+2
1
µ
(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
TK−1t,j zt+1 + (Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
TK−1t,j (Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)− z¯Tt Wtz¯t − aˆTFj aˆ
)
To complete a square, the above is equivalent to
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
piµ
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γj√|Kt,j | exp
(
− 1
µ
(zt+1−z′t+1,j)T (I−(µKt,j)−1)(zt+1−z′t+1,j)
+
1
µ
z′Tt+1,j(I − (µKt,j)−1)z′t+1,j + (Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)TK−1t,j (Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)− z¯Tt Wtz¯t − aˆTFj aˆ
)
where z′t+1,j = (I − (µKt,j)−1)−1K−1t,j (Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ) = (Kt,j − 1µI)−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ) = (Wt +
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Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ). If we put the expression of z′t+1,j into the second term in the exponential
bracket, and combine the second term with the third term, we have
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
piµ
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γj√|Kt,j | exp
(
− 1
µ
(zt+1−z′t+1,j)T (I−(µKt,j)−1)(zt+1−z′t+1,j)
+
1
µ
(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
T
(
(Kt,j − 1
µ
I)−1K−1t,j + µK
−1
t,j
)
(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)− z¯Tt Wtz¯t − aˆTFj aˆ
)
Since Kt,j = Wt + Fj + U , we have
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
piµ
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γj√|Kt,j | exp
(
− 1
µ
(zt+1−z′t+1,j)T (I−(µKt,j)−1)(zt+1−z′t+1,j)
+
1
µ
(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
T
(
(Wt + Fj)
−1K−1t,j + µK
−1
t,j
)
(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)− z¯Tt Wtz¯t − aˆTFj aˆ
)
If we let st,j = exp
(
1
µ(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ)
T
(
(Wt+Fj)
−1+µI
)
K−1t,j (Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ)−z¯Tt Wtz¯t−aˆTFj aˆ
)
,
then
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
piµ
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γj√|Kt,j |st,j exp
(
− 1
µ
(zt+1−z′t+1,j)T (I−(µKt,j)−1)(zt+1−z′t+1,j)
)
Then we can write it into the normal distribution form:
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) = nt
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γjst,j√|Wt + Fj |
√|(I − (µKt,j)−1)|
piµ
exp
(
− 1
µ
(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)T (I − (µKt,j)−1)(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)
)
This is a combination of four normal distribution functions, with mean z′t+1,j = (Wt +
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Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ), and variance
Σt+1,j =
µ
2
(I − (µKt,j)−1)−1 = µ
2
(Kt,j − 1
µ
I)−1Kt,j =
µ
2
(Wt + Fj)
−1(Wt + Fj + U)
=
µ
2
I +
1
2
(Wt + Fj)
−1 =
1
2
(
U−1 + (Wt + Fj)−1
)
=
1
2
(
U−1 + (
1
2
Σ−1t + Fj)
−1
)
=
1
2
U−1 + (Σ−1t + 2Fj)
−1 j = 1, 2, 3, 4 (A.5)
So the next generation population function can be written as
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) = nt
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γjst,j√|Wt + Fj | 12pi√|Σt+1,j | exp
(
−1
2
(zt+1−z′t+1,j)TΣ−1t+1,j(zt+1−z′t+1,j)
)
Let Θt =
∑4
j=1
γjst,j√
|Wt+Fj |
, and θt,j =
γjst,j
Θt
√
|Wt+Fj |
(j = 1, 2, 3, 4) then
∑4
j=1 θt,j = 1. Then
the above is equivalent to
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) = nt
√
|Wt|Θt
4∑
j=1
θt,j
1
2pi
√|Σt+1,j | exp
(
−1
2
(zt+1−z′t+1,j)TΣ−1t+1,j(zt+1−z′t+1,j)
)
Therefore, the probability density function in the next generation can be written as
f(xt+1, yt+1) = Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1)/
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1)dzt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j
1
2pi
√|Σt+1,j | exp
(
− 1
2
(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)TΣ−1t+1,j(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)
)
(A.6)
=
4∑
j=1
θt,jfj(xt+1, yt+1)
88 Lingzi Wang
Therefore the population distribution probability density function in the (t+ 1)-th gener-
ation is written as a combination of four normal probability density functions
z′t+1,j = (Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ) (A.7)
and covariance matrix
Σt+1,j =
1
2
U−1 + (Σ−1t + 2Fj)
−1 j = 1, 2, 3, 4 (A.8)
Note that the integral of f(xt+1, yt+1) in respect of (xt+1, yt+1) equals 1, which is the
property of the probability density function. We use ENj (·) to denote the expectation of
each of the four corresponding normal population distribution function.
Therefore the mean in the next generation is
z¯t+1 = E(zt+1) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
zt+1f(xt+1, yt+1)dzt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
zt+1fi(xt+1, yt+1)dzt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,jENj (zt+1)
=
4∑
j=1
θt,jz
′
t+1,j
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ) (A.9)
This is the iteration equations for the mean between generations.
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The above also equals
z¯t+1 =
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1Wtz¯t +
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1Fj aˆ (A.10)
The above is a first-order difference equation. Since∑4
j=1 θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1Wt +
∑4
j=1 θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1Fj = I, the mean z¯t+1 will gradually
approach to the equilibrium –the ideal phenotype aˆ as t increases. This equilibrium value
can be got by letting both z¯t+1 and z¯t in the above equation equal zT and solve the equation,
we will have that zT = aˆ.
For variance, we have the covariance matrix in the next generation
Σt+1 = E
(
x2t+1 xt+1yt+1
xt+1yt+1 y
2
t+1
)
− E
(
xt+1
yt+1
)
E
(
xt+1 yt+1
)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
(
x2t+1 xt+1yt+1
xt+1yt+1 y
2
t+1
)
·
4∑
j=1
θt,jfi(xt+1, yt+1)dzt+1 − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j ·
(
ENj (x
2
t+1) ENj (xt+1yt+1)
ENj (xt+1yt+1) ENj (y
2
t+1)
)
− z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j ·
(
V arNj (xt+1) + ENj (xt+1)
2 CovNj (xt+1, yt+1) + ENj (xt+1)ENj (yt+1)
CovNj (xt+1, yt+1) + ENj (xt+1)ENj (yt+1) V arNj (yt+1) + ENj (yt+1)
2
)
−z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j · Σt+1,j +
4∑
j=1
θt,j · z′t+1,jz′Tt+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j
(1
2
U−1 + (Σ−1t + 2Fj)
−1
)
+
4∑
j=1
θt,j · z′t+1,jz′Tt+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
=
1
2
U−1 +
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Σ
−1
t + 2Fj)
−1 +
4∑
j=1
θt,j · z′t+1,jz′Tt+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1 (A.11)
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where z′t+1,j is the j-th mean shown in (A.7).
Now we can use the variance iteration equations from (A.11) to get the evolution of variance
across generations. As z¯t approaches to the ideal phenotype aˆ as t → +∞, so does z¯t+1
and z′t+1,j = (Wt+Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ) (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) also approaches to the ideal phenotype
aˆ. Therefore the term
∑4
j=1 θt,j · z′t+1,jz′Tt+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1 in (A.11) approaches to zero, so
covariance matrix (A.11) approaches to the following equation as time grows.
Σt+1 =
1
2
U−1 +
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Σ
−1
t + 2Fj)
−1 (A.12)
which is larger than 12U
−1, since 12
∑4
j=1 θt,j(Σ
−1
t + Fj)
−1 is larger than zero, so as t goes
to infinity, the equilibrium value of Σt will be larger than
1
2U
−1. Therefore, if there is
mutation (U > 0), variances of both defences will be positive (larger than µ2 ).
3.7.2 Appendix B
The scale of the variance in defence phenotypes is set by the parameters µ, α, and β. In
this appendix, we show that if we increase these three parameters by a common factor, the
equilibrium value of vt and wt will change by the same factor.
Let Pt(x, y) denote the probability distribution of traits at time t, where
Pt(x, y) =
Nt(x, y)∫ ∫
Nt(x, y)dx dy
.
The integration limits are from −∞ to ∞, and are suppressed throughout this section for
brevity. From eqn. (B.5), the dynamics of Pt is determined by
Pt+1(x, y) =
Nt+1(x, y)∫ ∫
Nt+1(x, y)dx dy
=
∫ ∫
Pt(x
′, y′)Φ(x′, y′)M(x′, y′, x, y)dx′ dy′∫ ∫
Pt(x′, y′)Φ(x′, y′)dx′ dy′
,
where we have used the fact that
∫ ∫
M(x′, y′, x, y)dx dy = 1. Over time, Pt will approach
Bibliography 91
an equilibrium P∗(x, t) = limt→∞ Pt(x, t), where
P∗(x, y) =
∫ ∫
P∗(x′, y′)Φ(x′, y′)M(x′, y′, x, y)dx′ dy′∫ ∫
P∗(x′, y′)Φ(x′, y′)dx′ dy′
. (B.1)
From Eqns. (B.1–B.3) and (B.6), Φ and M can be written in the form
Φ(x, y) = Φ˜
(
x− a
α1/2
,
y − b
β1/2
)
(B.2)
M(x′, y′, x, y) =
1
µ
M˜
(
x− x′
µ1/2
,
y − y′
µ1/2
)
, (B.3)
where
Φ˜(u, v) = f1e
−1−u2 +
(
1− e−1−u2
)(
(f2 − f3) e−2−v2 + f3
)
(B.4)
M˜(u, v) =
1
pi
e−u
2−v2 . (B.5)
We now substitute eqns. (B.2) and (B.3) into Eqn. (B.1), make the change of variables
ξ =
x− a
µ1/2
ξ′ =
x′ − a
µ1/2
η =
y − b
µ1/2
η′ =
y′ − b
µ1/2
,
and further define (without loss of generality)
P∗(x, y) =
1
µ
P˜∗(ξ, η), (B.6)
to give
P˜∗(ξ, η) =
∫ ∫
P˜∗(ξ′, η′)Φ˜
((µ
α
)1/2
ξ′,
(
µ
β
)1/2
η′
)
M˜(ξ − ξ′, η − η′)dξ′ dη′
∫ ∫
P˜∗(ξ′, η′)Φ˜
((µ
α
)1/2
ξ′,
(
µ
β
)1/2
η′
)
dξ′ dη′
. (B.7)
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Note that, from eqns. (B.4,B.5), neither Φ˜ nor M˜ have any explicit dependence on µ, α,
or β so these parameters only enter into eqn. (B.7) through the ratios µα and
µ
β in the
arguments to Φ˜. This means that the solution P˜∗(ξ, η) to eqn. (B.7) can be written in the
form
P˜∗(ξ, η) = p
(
ξ, η,
µ
α
,
µ
β
)
,
where p does not depend explicity on µ, α, or β except through its third and fourth
arguments. This means that P∗ takes the form
P∗(x, y) =
1
µ
p
(
x− a
µ1/2
,
y − b
µ1/2
,
µ
α
,
µ
β
)
.
In other words, when traits are measured as a difference from their optimum in units of
µ1/2, their distribution depends only on the ratios of α and β to µ.
We note that P∗ is a probability density so we have
∫ ∫
P∗ (x, y) dx dy = 1. Also, we
can show that
∫ ∫
(x − a)P∗(x, y)dx dy =
∫ ∫
ξP˜∗ (ξ, η) dξ dη = 0. This follows because
M˜and Φ˜ are even functions of their arguments, so from eqn (B.7) if P∗(ξ, η) = Pˆ (ξ, η)
is a solution then so is P∗(ξ, η) = Pˆ (−ξ, η). Since this solution is unique we must have
P∗(ξ, η) = P∗(−ξ, η), which implies
∫ ∫
ξP˜∗ (ξ, η) dξ dη = 0. Therefore, the mean of the
first defensive trait at equilibrium is
x∗ =
∫ ∫
xP∗(x, y)dx dy
= a
∫ ∫
P∗(x, y)dx dy +
∫ ∫
(x− a)P∗(x, y)dx dy
= a.
The equilibrium variance of the first defensive trait is then
v∗ =
∫ ∫
(x− x∗)2 P∗(x, y)dx dy
=
1
µ
∫ ∫
(x− a)2 p
(
x− a
µ1/2
,
y − b
µ1/2
,
µ
α
,
µ
β
)
dx dy
= µ
∫ ∫
ξ2p
(
ξ, η,
µ
α
,
µ
β
)
dξ dη.
Therefore, v∗µ depends on µ, α, or β through the ratios
µ
α and
µ
β only. This means that, if
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µ, α, and β are increased by a common factor λ, which means that µα and
µ
β are unchanged,
then v∗ increases by the same factor λ. A similar argument can be made for the variance
of the second trait.
3.7.3 Appendix C
This appendix will show that when there is no mutation force, the variances of both the
first and second defences approaches to zero.
When there is no mutation, the population distribution function in the (t+1)-th generation
is the density iteration equations (B.4):
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) = Nt(xt, yt)Φ(xt, yt)
From (B.8) and (A.1),
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
√|Wt|
pi
4∑
j=1
γj exp
(
− (zt − z¯t)TWt(zt − z¯t)− (zt − aˆ)TFj(zt − aˆ)
)
Collecting the terms for zt,
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
√|Wt|
pi
4∑
j=1
γj exp
(
−zTt (Wt+Fj)zt+2(z¯Tt Wt+aˆTFj)zt−(z¯Tt Wtz¯t+aˆTFj aˆ)
)
If we complete a square for zt, the above is equivalent to
Nt+1(xt+1, yt+1) =
nt
√|Wt|
pi
4∑
j=1
γj exp
(
− (zt − z′t+1,j)T (Wt + Fj)(zt − z′t+1,j)
+(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
T (Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)− (z¯Tt Wtz¯t + aˆTFj aˆ)
)
where
z′t+1,j = (Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
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If we let st,j = exp
(
(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ)
T (Wt+Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ)− (z¯Tt Wtz¯t+ aˆTFj aˆ)
)
, then the
above is equivalent to
=
nt
pi
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γjst,j exp
(
− (zt − z′t+1,j)T (Wt + Fj)(zt − z′t+1,j)
)
If we make it in a normal distribution form,
= nt
√
|Wt|
4∑
j=1
γjst,j√|Wt + Fj |
√|Wt + Fj |
pi
exp
(
− (zt+1 − z′t+1,j)T (Wt + Fj)(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)
)
which is equivalent to
= nt
√
|Wt|Θt
4∑
j=1
θt,j
√|Wt + Fj |
pi
exp
(
− (zt+1 − z′t+1,j)T (Wt + Fj)(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)
)
t = 1, 2, 3, ... (C.1)
where Θt =
∑4
j=1
γjst,j√
|Wt+Fj |
, and θt,j =
γjst,j
Θt
√
|Wt+Fj |
(j = 1, 2, 3, 4). Note that
∑4
j=1 θt,j = 1
From the above population distribution function, the probability density function in
the next generation can be written as
f(xt+1, yt+1) = N(xt+1, yt+1)/
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
N(xt+1, yt+1)
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j
√|Wt + Fj |
pi
exp
(
− (zt+1 − z′t+1,j)T (Wt + Fj)(zt+1 − z′t+1,j)
)
dzt+1 (C.2)
=
4∑
j=1
θt,jfj(xt+1, yt+1)
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where
θt,j =
γjst,j
Θt
√|Wt + Fj |
Θt =
4∑
j=1
γjst,j√|Wt + Fj |
st,j = exp
(
(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)
T (Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ)− (z¯Tt Wtz¯t + aˆTFj aˆ)
)
Therefore the population distribution probability density function in the (t+ 1)-th gener-
ation is written as a combination of four normal probability density functions (each has
mean z′t+1,j = (Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ), covariance matirx Σt+1,j = 12(Wt + Fj)
−1 =
1
2(
1
2Σ
−1
t + Fj)
−1 = (Σ−1t + 2Fj)−1, j = 1, 2, 3, 4). Note that the integral of f(xt+1, yt+1) in
respect of (xt+1, yt+1) equals 1, which is the property of the probability density function.
Let ENj (·) denote the expectation of each of the four corresponding normal population
distribution function. Then the mean in the next generation is
z¯t+1 = E(zt+1) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
zt+1f(xt+1, yt+1)dzt+1 =
4∑
j=1
θt,j
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
zt+1fi(xt+1, yt+1)dzt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,jENj (zt+1) =
4∑
j=1
θt,jz
′
t+1,j =
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t + Fj aˆ) (C.3)
The above also equals to
z¯t+1 =
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1Wtz¯t +
4∑
j=1
θt,j(Wt + Fj)
−1Fj aˆ
As mentioned in Appendix A, since
∑4
j=1 θt,j(Wt+Fj)
−1Wt+
∑4
j=1 θt,j(Wt+Fj)
−1Fj = I,
the mean z¯t+1 will gradually approach to the ideal phenotype as t increases.
Now for variance, we have the covariance matrix in the next generation is
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Σt+1 = E
(
x2t+1 xt+1yt+1
xt+1yt+1 y
2
t+1
)
− E
(
xt+1
yt+1
)
E
(
xt+1 yt+1
)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
(
x2t+1 xt+1yt+1
xt+1yt+1 y
2
t+1
)
·
4∑
j=1
θt,jfi(xt+1, yt+1)dzt+1 − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j ·
(
ENj (x
2
t+1) ENj (xt+1yt+1)
ENj (xt+1yt+1) ENj (y
2
t+1)
)
− z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j ·
(
V arNj (xt+1) + ENj (xt+1)
2 CovNj (xt+1, yt+1) + ENj (xt+1)ENj (yt+1)
CovNj (xt+1, yt+1) + ENj (xt+1)ENj (yt+1) V arNj (yt+1) + ENj (yt+1)
2
)
−z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j · Σt+1,j +
4∑
j=1
θt,j · z′t+1,jz′Tt+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1
where Σt+1,j is the jth covariance matrix from the jth integral, z
′
t+1,j is jth mean from the
jth integral. So the above is equivalent to
=
4∑
j=1
θt,j · (Σ−1t + 2Fj)−1 +
4∑
j=1
θt,j · z′t+1,jz′Tt+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1 (C.4)
Now we can use the variance iteration equations from (C.4) to get the evolution of variance
across generations. As z¯t approaches to the ideal phenotype aˆ as t → +∞, so does z¯t+1
and z′t+1,j = (Wt+Fj)
−1(Wtz¯t+Fj aˆ) (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) also approaches to the ideal phenotype
aˆ. Therefore the term
∑4
j=1 θt,j · z′t+1,jz′Tt+1,j − z¯t+1z¯Tt+1 in (A.11) approaches to zero, so
covariance matrix (A.11) approaches to the following equation as time grows.
Σt+1 =
4∑
j=1
θt,j · (Σ−1t + 2Fj)−1 (C.5)
If there is an equilibrium, as time t grows as large as T (a very large number), the above
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equation (C.5) approaches to
ΣT =
4∑
j=1
θT,j · (Σ−1T + 2Fj)−1 (C.6)
If we write Σ−1T =
(
a c
c b
)
, then the equation (C.6) can be written as
(
a c
c b
)−1
= θT,1
(
a c
c b
)−1
+ θT,2
(
a+ 2α c
c b
)−1
+ θT,3
(
a c
c b+ 2β
)−1
+ θT,4
(
a+ 2α c
c b+ 2β
)−1
which is equivalent to
(2− θT,1) 1
ab− c2
(
b −c
−c a
)
= θT,2
1
(a+ 2α)b− c2
(
b −c
−c a+ 2α
)
+ θT,3
1
a(b+ 2β )− c2
(
b+ 2β −c
−c a
)
+ θT,4
1
(a+ 2α)(b+
2
β )− c2
(
b+ 2β −c
−c a+ 2α
)
(C.7)
Since α > 0 and β > 0 and the determinant of the covariance matrix ab− c2 > 0, so
(a+
2
α
)b− c2 > ab− c2 > 0, a(b+ 2
β
)−c2 > ab− c2 > 0, (a+ 2
α
)(b+
2
β
)−c2 > ab− c2 > 0
Comparing the coefficient of term −c in the matrix for both side of the equation, the
coefficient in the left-hand side is larger than the coefficient in the right-hand side, so we
have c = 0, and the equation (C.7) is equivalent to
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(θT,2 + θT,3 + θT,4)
1
ab
(
b 0
0 a
)
= θT,2
1
(a+ 2α)b
(
b 0
0 a+ 2α
)
+ θT,3
1
a(b+ 2β )
(
b+ 2β 0
0 a
)
+ θT,4
1
(a+ 2α)(b+
2
β )
(
b+ 2β 0
0 a+ 2α
)
(C.8)
which is equivalent to
(θT,2 + θT,3 + θT,4)
(
1
a 0
0 1b
)
= θT,2
(
1
a+ 2
α
0
0 1b
)
+ θT,3
 1a 0
0 1
b+ 2
β

+ θT,4
 1a+ 2α 0
0 1
b+ 2
β
 (C.9)
Since α > 0 and β > 0, the above equation cannot hold unless a and b approaches to +∞
as t grows, so the matrix Σt grows to zero matrix as t grows. Therefore the variances of
both the first and second defences approaches to zero.
Chapter 4
Coevolution of group-living and
aposematism in caterpillars:
warning colouration may facilitate
the evolution from group-living
ancestor to solitary habits.
4.1 Introduction
Animals use a rich variety of defences to protect themselves from predators. A common
form of antipredator defence is protective colouration, such as camouflage or aposematic
warning colouration (distinctive and often conspicuous colour patterns which advertise
repellent secondary defences). For example, many dart frogs (Dendrobatidae) use bright
aposematic colours to warn predators of toxic chemical defence and so avoid the costs of
an attack [1]. Alternatively, many species have cryptic colour patterns which reduce their
detectability, for instance, the green colouration of many arboreal snakes which blend in
with surrounding foliage [5].
Living in aggregated groups can also enable many antipredator strategies, such as the ‘di-
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lution effect’ in which individual risk of predation decreases with increasing group size,
assuming that a predator selects prey in a group randomly and can’t consume the whole
group [13]-[15][17]. Moreover, aggregation can interact with protective colouration to influ-
ence the costs and benefits of a given strategy. For instance, when aposematic individuals
gather in a group, the combined signal may be magnified and more conspicuous (signal
augmentation), so the predators are less likely to attack the prey group [31]. Indeed, the
evolution of aposematism has been linked to group-living for many years [2], but the di-
rectional nature of the relationship remains debated. On the one hand, according to the
signal augmentation hypothesis above, aposematism should evolve first and subsequently
provide selection pressure to evolve grouping to enhance the warning signal [2]-[7]. On the
other hand, kin selection [8]-[11] or synergistic selection (Mu¨llerian mimicry) [10]-[12] may
be important in overcoming constraints in the initial evolution of aposematism, whereby
rare (new) conspicuous individuals are eaten but their kin may survive and carry genes
for aposematism. Under this scenario, grouping should evolve first (for example via the
presence of local kin) and subsequently facilitate the evolution of aposematism. Hence,
although a link between grouping and aposematism is established, understanding the di-
rection of this relationship can provide insights into the underlying mechanisms.
In a well-known study of caterpillars, Tullberg and Hunter [3] attempted to answer this
question using early phylogenetic comparative methods and concluded that the transition
to group living is more frequent in aposematic lineages than cryptic ones. This suggests
that grouping is more beneficial for aposematic than cryptic species, but their study was
unable to simultaneously account for the evolutionary dynamics of both aposematism and
grouping, impairing our understanding of the relationship between these traits.
The current study revisits and expands the work of Tullberg and Hunter [3], taking advan-
tage of developments in comparative biology over the last two decades to address several
limitations of that study. First, we explicitly model transitions between both colour pat-
terns and grouping habits simultaneously using evolutionary pathway models. Second, we
use the estimated transition rates from our pathway models to estimate ancestral states
accounting for unequal transition rates. An inherent assumption in previous work is that
the ancestral state for caterpillars was solitary and cryptic, but since the larvae of many
closely related insect clades, such as Trichoptera (caddisflies), Antliophora (e.g. scorpi-
onflies and true flies), Hymenoptera (e.g. sawflies, wasps, ants, bees) are group-living, as
are some more basal lepidopteran clades, we used our ancestral state estimates to test this
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assumption.
Third, Tullberg and Hunter [3] use “independent contrasts” in their analysis, however,
their application of independent contracts differs from the classical independent contrasts
approach described by Felsenstein [33] and neglects many branches entirely by not including
them in their defined contrasts. Here by adopting Pagel’s [32] approach of modelling
transition rates we are able to make greater use of the information in the full tree, including
branch lengths.
Fourth, phylogenetic datasets are now much more comprehensive than in the 1990s. The
phylogenetic trees used by Tullberg and Hunter [3] are necessarily smaller than that used
here (analysed separately for each superfamily), originate from disparate data sources
(including taxonomic classification as a proxy), and do not use informative branch lengths
(related to time). In contrast, here we are now able to reconstruct a single phylogeny for
the whole sample using a standard set of molecular data with branch lengths related to
time to provide a more powerful basis for our analyses.
Here we make use of advances in comparative biology and data availability to revisit the
study in the coevolution of aposematism and grouping. Our approach enables us to more
robustly test conclusions, examine potentially important assumptions made, and expand
the questions asked to gain a better understanding of the system. Specifically, we aim
to 1) investigate evolutionary transitions between combinations of grouping (vs solitary
habits) and aposematic (vs cryptic) colouration to better understand their coevolution,
2) estimate ancestral states to infer where these transitions occurred and in what order,
3) calculate the probabilities of different states across time, the equilibrium probabilities,
and the expected time that the evolutionary transition cycle around all the states, so as
to predict the potential future dynamics of the system.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Trait data
We used data on colour pattern and grouping from Tullberg and Hunter’s [3] original
dataset. Colour pattern was classified as either aposematic or cryptic. Caterpillars which
are strikingly marked with combinations of black and yellow, red and/or white were con-
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sidered aposematic, whereas other colour patterns (such as plain green or counter-shaded)
were considered to be cryptic. Grouping was classified as either group-living, where cater-
pillars aggregate during the whole or part of their development, or solitary if they do not
aggregate. Species which lay eggs in clusters but disperse upon hatching are also treated
as solitary.
The dataset we used for analyses consists of 676 species, of which 541 (80.0%) are solitary-
cryptic, 82(12.1%) are solitary-aposematic, 21 (3.1%) are group-cryptic, 32 (4.7%) are
group-aposematic. Note that all data used for this paper are available at
https://figshare.com/s/359ff8f6c15beb68fab8.
4.2.2 Phylogenetic tree
There are five superfamilies present in our dataset: Papilionoidea, Bombycoidea, Drepanoidea,
Geometroidea and Noctuoidea. Two DNA sequences, CO1 and EF-1α, were obtained for
the species in our dataset from the website GenBank [26] by 1 July 2018. We were able
to obtain CO1 for 667 species (98.7%), EF-1α for 227 species (33.6%), and both CO1 and
EF-1α sequences for 218 species (32.2%). The accession numbers for the sequences are
also available at https://figshare.com/s/359ff8f6c15beb68fab8.
For each of the five superfamilies, we aligned CO1 and EF-1α nucleotide sequences us-
ing MUSCLE [21] with default settings in the software MEGA7 [30], and concatenated
the aligned sequences together using the software SequenceMatrix [20]. We use BEAST
v1.10.4 [16] to estimate Bayesian trees separately for the five superfamilies. We use the
generalised time-reversible model [34] as the substitution model with gamma-distributed
rate variation and an estimated proportion of invariant sites [35], and we use the strict
clock model [29] as the molecular clock model. The five maximum clade credibility su-
perfamily trees were subsequently grafted together based on the higher-level topology and
divergence times from the TimeTree database [22]-[25]. The divergence date for the to-
tal tree (after combining superfamily trees) was 114 million years ago and so the branch
lengths were scaled to give a total tree height of this age. Note that we generate the
five trees separately as a combined analysis failed to achieve convergence and (unlike our
divided approach) estimated topologies which conflicted with our current understanding
of lepidopteran phylogeny, for instance placing some species within superfamilies other
than their own. In contrast, our ‘divide and conquer’ strategy estimated trees that were
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generally consistent with our existing phylogenetic understanding of Lepidoptera.
4.2.3 Analysis of the coevolution of colour and grouping
We estimated evolutionary pathway models between each of the four states combining the
two binary traits of aposematism and grouping following Pagel’s [32] method for estimating
transition rates. The transition in each state follows continuous-time Markov process, and
the four states constitute eight parameters in eight pathways to estimate [32]. The dual
transition in both of the binary traits is assumed to be not possible [32] (Figure 4.1), which
is plausible since the simultaneous transitions in both binary states are very unlikely to
happen either in the continuous-time Markov process. Pathway models were estimated
via maximum likelihood using the function corDISC in the package corHMM 1.22 [19]
implemented in R 3.5.1 [18].
We first estimated transition rates for a general model which has no constraints (Figure
4.1). To explicitly test for alternative evolutionary pathways we also fitted a series of
restricted models in which different combinations of the transition rates were constrained
to equal 0. Figure 4.1 shows one example of the restricted models in which the transition
rate ‘csg’ (cryptic solitary→cryptic group) is set to 0 and so not possible. We have named
our models such that the unconstrained model is called ‘general’ and constrained models are
named after the rates which are constrained; for instance, we use ‘(csg)’ for the constrained
model with the transition ‘csg’ not possible, shown in Figure 4.1. Similarly, a model with
rates ‘csg’ and ‘gca’ set to 0 is referred to as ‘(csg, gca)’. We have exhausted all the possible
models, and overall we have 28−1 = 255 models including the general model. We compare
the evidence for each of our pathway models using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC).
We estimated the ancestral state combinations using the best fitting pathway model in
a maximum likelihood framework, implemented using the plotRECON function in the R
package corHMM. Incorporating our results from our pathway modelling into this analysis
should lead to improved estimates by accouting for any inferred constraints on the evolution
of the traits.
subsectionThe state probability dynamics across time and the equilibrium The probabilities
for the four binary states (solitary cryptic- sc, solitary aposematic- sa, group cryptic-
gc, and group aposematic- ga) across time can be calculated using the transition rates
estimated in subsection 4.2.3 (shown in Figure 4.2). Suppose Pi(t) (i ∈ {sc, sa, gc, ga}) is
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(sca)
(sac)
(gca)
(gac)
(csg) (cgs) (asg) (ags)
general model
(sca)
(sac)
(gca)
(gac)
(cgs) (asg) (ags)
restricted model
Figure 4.1: Diagrammatic representations of the general model (left) with no constrained
transition rates and an example of a restricted model (csg) with some transition rates (in
this case rate ‘csg’, cryptic solitary to cryptic group) constrained to 0. (grey, red)=(cryptic,
aposematic); (one triangle, four triangles)=(solitary, group).
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the probability of being in state i at time t, and Mi,j (i, j ∈ {sc, sa, gc, ga}) is the transition
rate from state i to state j [32], then the rate of change of probability of being in each of
the four binary states across time satisfies the Kolmogorov forward equations:
dPi(t)
dt
=
∑
j 6=i
Mj,iPj(t)−
∑
j 6=i
Mi,jPi(t), i, j ∈ {sc, sa, gc, ga}. (C.1)
Equation (C.1) can also be written in a matrix form as follows:
dP (t)
dt
= MP (t). (C.2)
where,
M =

−∑j 6=scMsc,j Msa,sc Mgc,sc Mga,sc
Msc,sa −
∑
j 6=saMsa,j Mgc,sa Mga,sa
Msc,gc Msa,gc −
∑
j 6=gcMgc,j Mga,gc
Msc,ga Msa,ga Mgc,ga −
∑
j 6=gaMga,j
 , (C.3)
P (t) =

Psc(t)
Psa(t)
Pgc(t)
Pga(t)
 . (C.4)
The probabilities for the four states across time can also be solved from eq. (C.2). Since
the initial state at the root of the tree can be either of the four states (sc, sa, gc, ga), we
will solve (C.2) separately for the four possible initial probabilities: (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0),
(0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1). The solution will have the form as follows,

Psc(t)
Psa(t)
Pgc(t)
Pga(t)
 =
(
c1 ~v1 c2 ~v2 c3 ~v3 c4 ~v4
)

eλ1t
eλ2t
eλ3t
eλ4t
 = C

eλ1t
eλ2t
eλ3t
eλ4t
 . (C.5)
Where λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4 are the eigenvalues of M , ~v1, ~v2, ~v3, ~v4 are the right eigenvectors of M ,
c1, c2, c3, c4 are the coefficients solved from (C.5) given the initial probabilities at time
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t = 0, and C is the 4× 4 dimensional matrix representing
(
c1 ~v1 c2 ~v2 c3 ~v3 c4 ~v4
)
.
The equilibrium probabilities can be solved using linear algebra by assuming that each of
the probabilities in (C.5) does not change:
dPi(t)
dt
= 0, i ∈ {sc, sa, gc, ga}, (C.6)
with the constraint that
∑
i Pi(t) = 1.
4.2.4 The mean first passage time
The transition between the four binary states form a cycle (Figure 4.2). It is possible that
after a certain time, the transition from one state (e.g. gc) goes around a whole cycle and
back to the same state (e.g. gc) again. We can formulate a first passage time problem
to calculate the mean duration of such a cycle, using the transition rates defined above.
We consider the transition in the clockwise cycle, as it turns out that counter-clockwise
cycles are not possible because the estimated transition rate from gc to sc is zero. If the
transition travels from the state, e.g. gc, clockwise back to the same state, gc, then the
whole transition is like gc → ga → sa → sc → gc′, where gc′ represents the state gc
accessed directly from sc. If Ti denotes the mean time to reach the state gc
′, starting from
the state (= gc, ga, sa, sc, gc′), then considering the transitions that can take place during
an infinitesimal time interval. We have,
Ti = dt+ dt
∑
j 6=i
Mi,jTj + Ti(1− dt
∑
j 6=i
Mi,j) (C.7)
⇒ −1 =
∑
j 6=i
Mi,jTj − Ti
∑
j 6=i
Mi,j , i, j ∈ {sc, sa, gc, ga}, (C.8)
which is to be solved under the condition Tgc′ = 0. Note that the mean first passage time
for a whole cycle starting from any the states (gc, ga, sa, sc) will be the same.
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K logLik AIC ∆AIC LikRatio AkaikeWeight
(cgs) 7 -363.835 741.671 0.000 1.000 0.725
general 8 -363.835 743.671 2.000 0.368 0.267
(cgs,asg) 6 -369.900 751.800 10.129 0.006 0.005
(cgs,csg) 6 -370.794 753.587 11.916 0.003 0.002
(asg) 7 -369.900 753.800 12.129 0.002 0.002
Table 4.1: The five best models according to Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC). ∆AIC=
difference in AIC between each model and the best model (AIC-AICmin); LikRatio =
likelihood ratio between each model and the best model (exp((AICmin-AIC)/2)), sometimes
called the ’evidence ratio’ and gives the strength of evidence for each model as a proportion
of the best model; AkaikeWeight = model probabilities (probablility of each model being
the best model in the set) [27][28].
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Transition rate model comparison
The best five models chosen by the AIC method are shown in Table 1, whereby the ‘best’
model is that with the lowest AIC value. Model (cgs) is the best and equivalent support
exists for the ‘general’ model since the log-likelihoods are identical and AIC values differ
by exactly 2 (attributable solely to the penalty of the extra parameter which adds no
more information). In keeping with the model selection statistics, these two models are
actually identical since they only differ structurally by the general model having one extra
parameter, but this parameter is estimated as 0 (Figure 4.2). Other models receive much
weaker, in fact negligible, support. Hence we find strong support for one particular pathway
model (illustrated in Figure 4.2) in which cryptic caterpillars are unable to shift from group
to solitary.
4.3.2 Ancestral state estimation
The ancestral state estimation suggests that, contrary to previous assumptions, the ances-
tor at the root of our tree was group, although it is ambiguous whether this ancestor was
cryptic or aposematic (Figure 4.3). The subsequent evolutionary history of this clade has
been characterised by several transitions to the solitary and cryptic state which charac-
terises 80% of the species in our dataset. Several of these transitions occurred in species-rich
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Figure 4.2: The two lowest AIC models and their estimated transition rates. The restricted
model (cgs) with the pathway ‘cgs’ not possible is the lowest AIC model. The general model
with all the possible pathways is the second lowest AIC model. Colours: (grey, red) =
(cryptic, aposematic); (one triangle, four triangles)=(solitary, group). The numbers in the
brackets are the indices for transition pathways corresponding to the ones in Figure 4.1.
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Initial probabilities C
(1, 0, 0, 0)

0.000 0.042 0.104 0.854
−0.001 −0.049 −0.034 0.084
−0.003 0.003 −0.021 0.021
0.003 0.004 −0.048 0.041

.
(0, 1, 0, 0)

0.000 −0.761 −0.092 0.854
0.002 0.883 0.030 0.084
0.011 −0.051 0.019 0.021
−0.013 −0.071 0.043 0.041

(0, 0, 1, 0)

−0.027 0.588 −1.415 0.854
0.131 −0.683 0.468 0.084
0.649 0.040 0.290 0.021
−0.754 0.055 0.657 0.041

(0, 0, 0, 1)

0.012 0.372 −1.238 0.854
−0.061 −0.432 0.409 0.084
−0.300 0.025 0.254 0.021
0.349 0.035 0.575 0.041

Table 4.2: Matrix C for four initial probabilities
subclades which accounts for the commonness of the strategy.
4.3.3 The state probabilities across time, the equilibrium, and the first
passage time
Probabilities of different states
The equilibrium probabilities, solved from eqn. (C.6), are 85.3% for the solitary cryptic
state (sc); 8.4% for the solitary aposematic state (sa), 2.2% for the group cryptic state
(gc), and 4.1% for the group aposematic state (ga). The time-dependent probabilities of
the four binary states across time have the form eqn. (C.5), which can be solved from eqn.
(C.2). The eigenvalues λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 are -0.209, -0.052, -0.018, 0. The matrix C in eqn.
(C.5) for the four initial probabilities are shown in Table 4.2.
Eq. (C.5) together with Table 4.2 show that, over time, the probabilities approach the
equilibrium probabilities (85.3%, 8.4%, 2.2%, 4.1%). The dominant eigenvalue (-0.018)
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(Cryptic,Solitary)
(Cryptic,Group)
(Aposematic,Solitary)
(Aposematic,Group)
Figure 4.3: Ancestral state estimation for combinations of colour pattern and grouping.
Pie charts at nodes display the relative likelihood of being in each of the four states. Note
that the very common case of solitary and cryptic species arises from several transitions
to this state from a group-living ancestor at the root of the tree (95% to be group-living
at the root).
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determines how quickly the state probabilities approach the equilibrium (since compared
to -0.018, the other two eigenvalues -0.209 and -0.052 make the exponential terms more
quickly go to zero as time grows). Therefore, when t = 114 million years, the deviations
from the four state (sc, sa, gc, ga) equilibrium values are about e−0.018×114cT3 = 12.85%cT3
and when t = 300 million years, the deviations from the four state equilibrium values are
about e−0.018×300cT3 = 0.45%cT3 (almost no deviation), where c3 is the third column in
the matrix C (e.g. (0.104,−0.034,−0.021,−0.048)T when the initial probabilities for the
four states are (1, 0, 0, 0)). The probabilities across time given the four different initial
probabilities are shown in Figure 4.4.
The first passage time
The transition rates in the clockwise direction are all higher than transition rates in the
corresponding counter-clockwise direction (e.g. route gca vs. gac in Figure 4.2), and a
full transition cycle can only be fulfilled in the clockwise direction, since the transition
rate from grouping to solitary in cryptic caterpillars (route cgs in the counter-clockwise
direction) is estimated to be zero. The mean first passage time circling clockwise, i.e. the
mean time taken to evolve in a cycle from one state back to the same state, is 1465.7
million years. The mean first passage time is much longer than the time length of the
phylogenetic tree we used (114 million years old) and also the time by which the state
probabilities are close to the equilibrium (e.g. 300 million years, Figure 4.4). This means
that the probabilities are close to the equilibrium some time before each state is expected
to evolve through a full cycle. This is because the transition rate from solitary cryptic
back to the group lineage (0.0008) is relatively very low, so the waiting time from solitary
cryptic to group cryptic has mean of 1377 million years (which can be calculated from
eq. C.8). So it is more likely to stay in the solitary cryptic state, or go counter-clockwise
direction to solitary aposematic state, rather than transit to the group cryptic state.
The transient dynamics towards equilibrium
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.2 show the dynamics of the four states. Just as can be seen in eq.
(C.5), whatever the initial state is, the probabilities of the four states will approach the
equilibrium.
When the initial state is either gc or ga (as estimated in Figure 4.3), the probabilities of
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Figure 4.4: The probabilities of four binary states are approaching the equilibrium prob-
abilities across time. Solitary-cryptic: dashed grey; solitary-aposematic: dashed orange;
group-cryptic: solid grey; group-aposematic: solid red.
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the other state and the state sa will first increase quickly from 0 to one point (the time for
which can be calculated from eq.C.5), and then gradually decrease towards the equilibrium
values. This is because the transition rates between gc and ga is relatively high (0.1431
and 0.0599), and there is also a moderate transition rate from ga to sa (0.0281).
Furthermore, since the transition rates away from sc to gc (0.0008) and to sa (0.0033) are
very low, all the other states are more easily go in clockwise direction (as the clockwise
transitions are all higher than the corresponding counter-clockwise transitions) towards
the state sc, but will less easily leave the state sc, so the equilibrium probability for the
state sc is the highest.
Comparing model and empirical state probabilities
The phylogenetic tree is 114 million years, so the data in our dataset are at t=114 million
years. The frequency of sc in our dataset is 80.0%, which is lower than the equilibrium
probability, and the probabilities of sa, gc and ga are 12.1%, 3.1%, and 4.7% respectively,
which are all higher than the corresponding equilibrium probabilities. Therefore, we can
predict that the probability of state sc is likely to increase further, and the probabilities
of states sa, gc and ga are likely to decrease over future evolutionary time. This trend is
closer to the above two graphs “gc root ancestor” and “ga root ancestor”, consistent with
our ancestral state estimation showing that the initial state is more likely to be state gc
or ga (Figure 4.3).
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Group-living is likely to be the ancestral state for caterpillars
This research was initiated from the debate about whether the evolution from crypsis
to aposematism is typically before or after the evolution form solitary-living to group-
living. The hypothesised pathway via kin (or synergistic selection [8]-[12]) predicts that
a transition from solitary to group-living comes first, and then facilitates the evolution of
conspicuous warning colouration. An alternative pathway, via signal augmentation [2]-[7]
predicts that the evolution of aposematism precedes the evolution of group-living since
group enhances the effect of aposematism. Our results challenge the underlying premise
of both of these hypotheses and instead find strong evidence for a group-living ancestral
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state (leaving the evolution of solitary-living as requiring explanation). This contradicts
the assumptions of previous analyses [2]-[12], and (because the ancestral colour state is so
uncertain) limits our ability to answer the initial question of ’did grouping or aposematism
evolve first’. Specifically, the ancestor at the root of our tree (Figure 4.3) was estimated as
group living with the relative likelihood ∼0.95 (with the ancestral colour pattern is highly
ambiguous). The analysis in the probability dynamics (Figure 4.4) also shows that the ini-
tial state is likely to be a group state (either group cryptic or group aposematic state) and
solitary cryptic state is more stable than the other states and has the highest abundence
in the equilibrium (as will be mentioned below).
4.4.2 Aposematism might facilitate the transition from group-living to
solitary-living
The transition rates estimated in Figure 4.2 show that the transition is very likely to go in
a clockwise direction from a grouping state to the solitary cryptic state (as the transition
rates are all higher in clockwise direction compared to the counter-clockwise direction).
In the two possible ancestral group states (group cryptic- gc and group aposematic -ga),
it is more likely to transit from cryptic lineage (gc) to aposematic linage (ga) (rate ‘gca’)
than the other way around (rate ’gac’). That the transition rate from gc to ga is relatively
quite high supports the kin selection hypothesis [8]-[12] to some extend, since it assumes
that aposematism is evolved in kin groups. This high rate probably also explains the
tight relationship between the group-living and aposematism since group-living relatively
rapidly leads to aposematism and hence limits the opportunity to observe cryptic group-
living caterpillars, the rarest state in our dataset (3.1% of species). This is probably one
of the reasons that previous research ([2]-[12]) barely connects group-living with crypsis,
but rather with aposematism.
The following clockwise transition from group aposematic (ga) to solitary aposematic state
(sa) (rate ‘ags’) is more likely to happen compared to the corresponding counter-clockwise
transition from sa to ga (rate ‘asg’), which may indicate costs to this strategy such as in-
creased predation by toxin-resistant predators due to the greater conspicuousness of groups
[17]. Notably, transitions from group-living to solitary-living can only happen in apose-
matic species (rate ‘ags’), not cryptic species (rate ‘cgs’). In fact, almost all transitions
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between group-living and solitary caterpillars occur in aposematic lineages which suggests
that aposematism may facilitate shifts in grouping vs solitary-living in both directions.
Perhaps this operates by providing an additional level of protection above that conferred
by group benefits, hence loosening evolutionary constraints against changes in aggregation
status. Importantly, our finding that the transition rate from solitary to grouping is higher
in aposematic species (rate ‘asg’) than in cryptic species (rate ‘csg’) agrees with Tullberg
and Hunter’s [3] finding, which is used to support signal augmentation hypothesis in their
research. Our ability to recover the results of Tullberg and Hunter’s original work using
appropriate comparisons in our study demonstrates a congruence that adds weight to our
more powerful approach and the insights provided.
The later clockwise transition rate from sa to sc (rate ‘sac’) is also higher than the corre-
sponding counter-clockwise transition rate from sc to sa (rate ‘sca’), which may indicate
that staying cryptic is more beneficial than warning predators for solitary individuals. This
perhaps because of the increased chance of being spotted and consumed (without group
benefits) in conspicuous singletons, an explanation which is consistent with a kin selected
(or similar) origin of aposematism since it suggests costs to being aposematic when solitary.
The net result of all these transition rates are that colour pattern (horizontal see transitions
in Figure 4.2) is far more evolutionarily labile than aggregation propensity grouping pattern
(see vertical transitions in Figure 4.2), and the transitions are more likely to go from the
possible ancestral group state to the later relatively stable solitary cryptic state in clockwise
direction, and so the loss of group-living trait might be facilitated by the protection of
warning colours. Furthermore, the transition rates between group states (group/solitary)
is higher in the aposematic species than in the cryptic species, and the transition rate
between two colour states (aposematism/crypsis) is higher in group states than in solitary
states. This is probably driven by the synergistic effects of aposematism and group-living
in terms of increasing conspicuousness, and vice versa for crypsis and solitary-living. This
agrees with Tullberg, Leimar and Gamberale-Stille [4] who found no difference in attack
rates on cryptic and aposematic prey in groups, but the attack rate on the aposematic prey
is significantly lower than on the cryptic prey in solitary individuals. This also agrees with
Alatalo and Mappes [10] who showed that the relative mortality caused by predators was
more similar between group aposematic and group cryptic unpalatable prey than between
solitary aposematic and solitary unpalatable prey.
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4.4.3 Solitary cryptic caterpillar will be the most abundant at the equi-
librium
The equilibrium probabilities for the four states – sc, sa, gc, ga – are 85.3%, 8.4%, 2.2%,
4.1%, respectively, and over time, the probabilities of the four states will go towards the
equilibrium values no matter what the ancestral state is. As mentioned above, the solitary
cryptic species is unlikely to be the ancestral state, but this state will become more common
and then gradually approach the equilibrium abundance (85.3%) since transitions are more
likely to go from the group state towards and then stay in the solitary cryptic state. The
frequencies of the other states will grow at first, since the transition rates between the
three conspicuous states (gc, ga, sa) are relatively high, and then after certain points, the
probabilities of all the states will fall towards their corresponding equilibrium values.
The transition of a full clockwise cycle is expected to last 1465.7 million years, which is
much longer than the time of the tree (114 million years), and the time that the state
probabilities take to approach equilibrium (e.g. 300 million years in Figure 4.4). This
means that the state probabilities will be close to equilibrium a long time before the
evolutionary transitions have run a full clockwise cycle. This is because the transition rate
from sc to gc is very low (rate 3), so it is more likely to stay at the state sc for long or even
transit counter-clockwise to the sa state rather than finish the full clockwise cycle back to
the group states. Since both the transition rates away from sc (rate 3 and 5) are lower
than the other positive rates, it will typically stay longest in the state sc compared to the
other states.
4.4.4 Implications, limitations and future work
The pattern of highly observed frequencies of solitary cryptic states (combined with less
informative comparative methods) may be why previous research focused on understanding
the evolution of aposematic group-living animals from a solitary cryptic ancestor ([2]-[12]).
Hence, future work to understand the loss of group-living and so the evolution of solitary
life may prove fruitful. Since we find solitary-living only originates in aposematic species,
not directly from cryptic lineages, we specifically encourage future work to understand how
aposematism might facilitate the loss of group-living. We suggest one possibility is that
being solitary is relatively risky and so reducing predation risk with warning signals facil-
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itates the loss of group-living by compensating the added risk with another defence which
deters attacks. Alternatively group-living may not increase conspicuousness by as great
a magnitude in cryptic species than aposematic species, such that selection for switch-
ing grouping strategies is lower in cryptic lineages. Under this scenario, other benefits
of group-living may prevent its loss in cryptic species, whereas the balance of costs and
benefits of group-living in aposematic species may be more similar to those of solitary life.
In any case, our results provide new insights into the coevolution of protective colouration
and grouping tendencies in a long-standing model system and in doing so show the ben-
efit of revisiting classic studies in ecology and evolution using newer and more powerful
methodological approaches.
Caterpillars have many advantages for studies such as ours, hence they established as model
systems for antipredator mechanisms. However, Macrolepidoptera is a very large clade
containing over 90,000 described species, so one limit in our research is that our analysis
is based on the dataset of Tullberg and Hunter [3] and we assumed that the dataset
is reasonably unbiased in sampling species with respect to their traits, and sufficiently
informative to draw general conclusions about the coevolutionary dynamics of the group
and colour states. However, it is possible that the dataset is strongly biased and the results
that we find does not tell the real underlying patterns. Nevertheless, the datasets in some
other studies [36, 37, 38, 39] have also shown the similar pattern of colour and gregarious
states of caterpillar as Tullberg and Hunter’s [3]. Moreover, Tullberg and Hunter’s dataset
[3] contains five different superfamilies, and we think that data are unlikely to be biased
in a consistent way across the five superfamilies can be less likely given their different
lifestyles and general ecology.
4.5 Conclusion
This research revisits the classical debate about the evolutionary order between aposema-
tism and group-living. Our results challenge the earlier assumption that aposematism and
group-living are derived states from ancestral cryptic and solitary-living caterpillars. Based
on analyses of transition rates of colour and grouping states, we proposed that aposema-
tism might act as a facilitator to the solitary habits from grouping habits, perhaps by
offsetting the risk incurred by losing the protective benefits of grouping. Solitary crypsis
is the most stable state and has the highest abundance in the equilibrium compared to
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the other states. Our results also provide new avenues for future research focused on how
aposematism colours and perhaps other secondary defences, might facilitate the evolution
from group-living to solitary-living in animals.
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Chapter 5
Comparing the diversification rates
of defence and non-defence species
5.1 Introduction
Speciation (the formation of new species) might happen for many different reasons. It
might happen when an interbreeding population is separated by some ecological barriers
into several populations. Here, subpopulations may not have enough chances to interbreed,
so gradually evolve to become two different species [1]. It might also start even if there is
no distinct ecological barrier, but a population is living in a large area, so the individuals
living in one part of the area can have less chance to interbreed with individuals living
in another part of the area. The gene flow between these two groups will be less, which
gradually causes reproduction isolation [2]. It could also happen when the inhabited eco-
logical environment is different for certain groups in the population, and they experience
different selection pressure, so evolve to become different species [1]. Furthermore, the new
evolution of new traits in certain groups might change the selection pressure to them, and
so they might evolve to become unable to interbreed with the rest of the population [3, 4].
On the other hand, extinction (the termination of existing species) might be caused by
the change of environment (e.g. climate change, loss of food, pollution) [5], loss of habitat
[6], natural enemies (e.g. predators, parasites, pathogens), competition from other species
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(e.g. species with better traits, invasive species) [7], loss of food [8], and so on.
The terms “speciation rate” and “extinction rate” are usually used by biologists to describe
the increasing or the decreasing rates of change in a number of species [9], and the term
“diversification rate” is used to measure the net rate of change (i.e. the net difference
between speciation and extinction rates) [10, 11]. It is important but also can be chal-
lenging, to determine what influences diversification rates. Like the causes of speciation
and extinction, researchers often focus on the patterns of diversification variation with the
ecological niches and characteristics of organisms. Broader ecological niches are consid-
ered to be associated with larger populations, which have higher chances to speciate into
new species [12], and lower chances of becoming extinct than smaller populations [13]. In
addition, broader ecological environments can facilitate allopatric speciation (which hap-
pens when the gene flow is blocked by certain barriers, such as rivers or mountain ranges)
[1]. Related factors with expended niches, such as a larger geographical range size [2], or
disparate ecological environments [1], are found to be influential. Characters such as self-
incompatibility –which is related to increased genetic diversity [14, 15]–or floral asymmetry,
which is associated with the chance of character displacement, are factors that increase
diversification rates [16]. Other traits, such as defences [17], biotic dispersal growth [18],
pollination systems, and life forms (e.g. herbs, shrubs or trees)[19] are also found to be
influential.
Defence is one of the traits that is found to be associated with variations in diversification
rates. The idea comes from Ehrlich and Raven [17], who predicted that a new defence can
help the organisms enter a new adaptive zone, in which they are protected from predators’
attacks, so evolutionary radiation might follow (“escape and radiate” [20]). The population
with new defences can grow not only because the defence traits protect the population in
the same ecological area, which might be followed by sympatric speciation [3, 4], but also
because the population with the defence traits can expend their ecological habitats [21, 22],
which might lead to allopatric speciation [1]. At the same time, due to the protection by
defences, the extinction risk could be lower. Therefore, the net diversification rates (the
difference between speciation and extinction rates) increase.
Ehrlich and Raven [17] have been cited many times (more than 4490 times) by other re-
searchers. However, the evidence for their “escape and radiate” theory is comparatively
small. One way to test the theory is, as was proposed in [17], to see whether there is a
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significant increase in the diversification rate of the clade where a new defence evolves (com-
pared to the sister-clade without the corresponding new defence)in the ancestral estimated
phylogenetic tree (sister-clade analysis). For example, increases in the diversification rates
are found in the insect lineages that have new chemical defenced host plants [23, 24, 25];
on the other hand, plant lineages that have new mutualisms with chemical defenced insects
are also found to have higher diversification rates [10, 20]. Compared to chemical defences
in mutualised plants and insects, the evidence about chemical defences in non-mutualised
organisms is less consistent. For example, in the study of plant diversification in Farrell
[3], it was found, that the lineages with the defence resin canal have higher diversification
rates than the lineages without the defence, but Vamosi [26] found no significant relation
between resin canal and diversification rates. Arbuckle and Speed [11] found that both
the speciation rates and extinction rates increase in the amphibian lineages with chemi-
cal defences, but that the net diversification rates decrease in the lineages with chemical
defences. Agrawal et al. [27] also found a negative relation between the investment in
milkweed chemical defence and diversification rates.
Another way to test the theory is not just to focus on the sister-clades, but to calculate
both the speciation rates and extinction rates for traits in the full phylogenetic tree (Binary
State Speciation and Extinction –BiSSE [28]). Using this method, the relation between
diversification rates and chemical defences is similar to using the above methods. Pen˜a and
Espeland [29] found higher diversification rates in butterflies which feed on toxic plants
compared to those which do not. Increased diversification rates are also found in plants
mutualised with chemical defenced insects [10, 20]. Armbruster et al. [30] however, found
no evidence between diversification and chemical defences in vines.
Compared to the chemical defences, the association between aposematic defences and faster
diversification rates is more consistent, although the evidence is also scarce. Unlike apose-
matic species, cryptic species may be constrained behaviourally. For example, they may
have narrow foraging niches because they can match relatively few backgrounds, or they
may be constrained to feed nocturnally. Aposematic species may lose these constraints
and be able to use expended and diverse ecological opportunities. Przeczek et al. [31]
compared 14 sister clade pairs of amphibians, spiders, and insects and found evidence for
increased diversification in aposematic clades. Arbuckle and Speed [11] used BiSSE and
found that diversification rates are higher in the amphibians with conspicuous colours.
Also, increased acoustic diversification is found in poison frogs with aposematic defences
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using BiSSE (Santos et al., [32]).
Living in groups can benefit organisms with regard to their foraging, survival, or defence
behaviours [33]. The reason why group-living behaviour can persist could be that indi-
viduals can have higher fitness by living in group since their genes can be passed on to
the next generation not only from the individuals themselves but also from their nearby
relatives, so they might choose to be altruistic to enhance the genetic fitness of both the
recipient of the act and the altruists themselves (“inclusive fitness”). [33]. For caterpillars,
the group-living behaviour can be associated with cooperative living and foraging (e.g.
Malacosoma americanum) [34], and can also function as a defence. Since caterpillars are
soft and vulnerable, and they move slowly relative to many other animals, a group can
help to protect them from their natural enemies [35]. The yellowneck caterpillar (Datana
ministra)makes a U-shaped posture to make ovipositor more difficult for some parasitoids
(braconid wasps, or tachinid flies) [36]. This defence behaviour can be simultaneously
displayed by other caterpillars in the group, even if they are not attacked by parasitoids.
The sharing of danger signals can not only inform the nearby caterpillars that are not
attacked to start to defend themselves but also the group can form a large menacing de-
fence together, which can frighten parasitoids or even predators away [36]. Besides group
displays, caterpillars can also stay together to form a large defence (e.g. a shelter, or a
pattern) for their protection [35]. Also, group-living is also found to enhance the effect of
some defences, such as aposematic defences [37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42] or chemical defences
[43]. In addition, the individuals’ fitness can also be affected by the risk-dilution effect in
the group (because per capita risk decreases with group size). For example, although a
larger group size can increase the detection risk from parasites in leaf miner caterpillars
(Antispila nysaefoliella), it also decreases the post-detection risk while individuals are hid-
ing in groups [44, 45, 46]. Therefore, like the other defences mentioned above, group-living
defences might also be associated with diversification rates, although we do not find any
literature that tests this.
In this chapter, the BiSSE method is used to test whether the two defences, aposematism
and group-living, can influence the diversification rates, to provide further evidence for
Ehrlich and Raven’s “escape and radiate” theory [17, 20]. We will show whether aposema-
tism can increase diversification rates, as suggested by previous research [11, 31, 32], and
whether group-living can increase diversification rates, which is a new evidence area for the
“escape and radiate” theory. We will however not pool one defence trait while analysing
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the other one as the dataset we used is not large enough to do this.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 The tree and the traits
The phylogenetic tree and the traits are the same as those in the previous chapter. We
used the genes CO1 and EF-1α from Genbank to make the Bayesian phylogenetic tree and
used the trait dataset from the research by Tullberg and Hunter [38].
5.2.2 Net diversification rate
We use the method proposed by Maddison, Midford and Otto [9], which introduces the
”BiSSE” model (Binary State Speciation and extinction). In our case, we use the model to
solve the speciation and extinction rates for the state “aposematism” and “crypsis” and the
state “group-living” and “solitary-living” respectively of the Macrolepidoptera order. The
net diversification rate is the difference between speciation rate and extinction rate. The
functions “make.bisse” and “find.mle” in [47, 48, 49] in the package “diversitree” [50, 51]
in R 3.5.1 [52] are used to obtain the maximum likelihood (ML) values for all of the rates.
For the “BiSSE” analysis, we also need to know the smallest single clade which contains all
of the species we used; in particular, the fraction of this clade that covers our dataset. The
smallest clade which covers all of our species has 92,100 species, with the five superfam-
ilies, Papilionoidea, Bombycoidea, Drepanoidea, Geometroidea, Noctuoidea each having
approximately 14,000, 3,400, 700, 22,000, 52,000 species, respectively [53]. Therefore the
proportion of our sample to this full single clade is 0.7% (=676/92,100).
Since the total numbers of the five superfamilies are only known approximately, as the
Lepidoptera Order is still unsolved, we are unsure of the exact proportion value of our
dataset. We, therefore, obtained the results for a range of different assumed proportion
values above and below 0.7%, to see if the different proportion values make any difference
to the result. We conducted the analysis for the proportion range from 0.1% to 1.5% (0.1,
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, specifically). Then we compared whether the diversification
rates for the aposematism state were consistently higher than the diversification rates for
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the crypsis state; and whether the diversification for the group-living state was consistently
higher than the diversification rates for the solitary-living state for this proportion range
0.1%-1.5%.
When we obtain the ML values for the rates for different proportion values between 0.1%
and 1.5%, we use these values as the initial values and conduct the mcmc analysis [54] for
those proportion values to obtain the diversification rate posterior density distributions
for the aposematism/crypsis states and group/solitary-living states. Then, we use the
posterior distributions to see whether the two rates are different.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Aposematism and crypsis
Diversification rates of aposematism and crypsis for different assumed propor-
tion values
Both the speciation rates and extinction rates with the defence aposematism are consis-
tently higher than without the defence aposematism for all of the assumed proportion
values from 0.1% to 1.5% (Figure 1 left). Equivalently, the net diversification rates with
the defence aposematism are consistently higher than without the defence aposematism
for all of the assumed proportion values from 0.1% to 1.5% (Figure 1 right).
The speciation and extinction rates are higher when the proportion values of the species
that are covered in the samples are lower since, in this case, the actual number of species
in the real world is higher, so the corresponding speciation rates and extinction rates will
be higher. The net diversification rates are relatively stable and do not change much with
the proportion values.
MCMC posterior density distribution of diversification rates of aposematism
and crypsis for different assumed proportion values
The mcmc posterior density distributions show that the diversification rates with apose-
matism are distributed much higher and with larger variance than the diversification rates
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Figure 5.1: The speciation and extinction rates (left), and net diversification rates (right)
of cryptic and aposematic lineages with different values for the assumed proportions of
species that are covered in the samples.
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without aposematism, with a smaller variance for all of the proportion values (Figure 2).
5.3.2 Group-living and solitary-living
Diversification rates of group-living and solitary-living for different assumed
proportion values
Like the results above for aposematism and crypsis, both the speciation rates and extinc-
tion rates with the defence group-living are consistently higher than without the defence
group-living for all of the proportion rates from 0.1% to 1.5% (Figure 3 left). The net
diversification rates with the defence group-living are consistently higher than without the
defence group-living for all the proportion rates from 0.1% to 1.5% (Figure 3 right).
The speciation and extinction rates are higher when the proportion values of the species
that are covered in the samples are lower. The net diversification rates are relatively stable.
MCMC posterior density distributions of diversification rates of group-living
and solitary-living for different assumed proportion values
The mcmc posterior density distributions show that the diversification rates with group-
living are distributed much higher and with a larger variance than the diversification rates
without group-living with a smaller variance for different proportion rates (Figure 4).
5.4 Discussion
Diversification rates with and without the defence aposematism and the defence group-
living are compared in this research. Diversification rates with the defence aposematism
/group-living are consistently higher than the diversification rates without the defence
aposematism/group-living. This agrees with Ehrlich and Raven’s“escape and radiate”
theory [17], that defences can be associated with higher diversification rates. Specifically,
the results about the aposematism agree with the previous research in its positive asso-
ciation with the diversification [11, 31, 32]. The association between diversification rates
and group-living is to my knowledge a new finding, and here we find that group-living also
helps to increase the diversification rates.
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Figure 5.2: The posterior probability density functions for the diversification rates of both
cryptic and aposematic lineages with different values for the assumed proportions of species
that are covered in the samples.
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of species that are covered in the samples.
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Figure 5.4: The posterior probability density functions for the diversification rates of both
solitary-living and group-living lineages with different values for the assumed proportions
of species that are covered in the samples.
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The association between group-living and diversification rates has been barely studied
before. We hypothesised that group-living can function as a defence, in the sense that it
can dilute the risks each individual faces and therefore increase individuals’ survival rates
[44, 45, 46], and also a group itself can function as a huge defence [36, 35]. The findings
here about the association between group-living and diversification rates also agree with
Ehrlich and Raven’s “escape and radiate” theory, as we expected [17]. However, since
group-living has many functions other than defences, it is possible that it is the other roles
of group-living that influence diversification rates more than its defence role. For example,
some caterpillars might gather together mainly for cooperative living and foraging [34]
and, compared to defending against enemies, diseases are more likely to be transmitted in
their groups which brings more risks to the group [55, 56]. The overall effect of these roles
of group-living might still help to increase the species’ survival and reproduction rates,
and therefore the population size grows, which might be followed by higher diversification
rates. So here we have a positive relation between group-living and diversification rates
but, since group-living has many other functions, we are unsure whether it is its defence
function that helps to increase diversification rates.
Compared to the consistent findings of the association between aposematic defences and
diversification rates in this and previous research, the findings of the relation between
chemical defences and diversification rates, however, were ambiguous in the previous re-
search. The reason for this might be that the chemical defences are variable, and there-
fore their relation with diversification rates can be complicated. Chemical defences, as
secondary defences, can be more variable compared to first defences(e.g. physical, mor-
phological defences, etc), either in their quantities, and their components [57, 58, 59, 60];
therefore, treating chemical defences using binary traits (chemical defences vs no chemical
defences)might have simplified their influence on diversification rates; whereas the first de-
fences can be less variable [59], so treating them as binary traits (defences vs no defences)
is relatively plausible. Since the current evidence is limited, we are unsure whether the
“escape and radiate” theory [17] is true for some defences, or if it is a questionable theory.
It will be helpful for future researchers to offer more evidence in this area.
The species’ mutualistic defence relationship with another species might further help to
explain the “escape and radiate” theory [17]. As mentioned in the introduction to this
chapter, the chemical defences obtained from other mutualised species are found to have a
consistent association with faster diversification rates—those insects with chemical defences
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gained from the host plants have higher diversification rates than those that lack these
[23, 24, 25]. At the same time, the plants that have insects in a mutualistic defence
relationship are also found to have faster diversification rates [10]. It is possible that the
defences that function more effectively might have a closer relationship with diversification
rates (e.g.the defences that mutualise with the traits of other species;or first defences, such
as aposematism, that are predicted to be more effective since they are more often used
than the secondary defences [59, 60, 61, 62]).
One of the limit of this study has been mentioned in subsection 4.4.4. We have assumed
the dataset from Tullberg and Hunter [38] is reasonably unbiased with respect to their
traits, however, certain bias of the dataset compared to the large Macrolepidoptera clade
might be unavoidable. Nevertheless, we find that studies such as [35, 63, 64, 65] have
shown the similar trait patterns as Tullberg and Hunter [38], also Tullberg and Hunter [38]
includes five different superfamilies which can be less likely to be biased in a consistent
way given their different lifestyles and general ecology. Another limit is that the dataset
covers about 0.7% of the species of the species in the smallest clade that contains all of
the species in our dataset, which is a small proportion value and and might influence
the results associated with diversification rates. However, we have tested a wide range of
proportions from 0.1% to 1.5% which covers 0.7%, which have shown consistent results
for both aposematism (which is also consistent with other studies [11, 31, 32]) and group-
living in two separate studies here (Figure 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4). Therefore the data has certain
consistence in explaining these corresponding defence traits associated with diversification.
If one defence such as aposematism or group-living is able to increase diversification rates,
we can expect that species with both defences will be more likely to increase their di-
versification rates than those with only one defence. In this case, it would be helpful to
test whether species with two defences (both aposematism and group-living) have higher
diversification rates than species with one defence (either aposematism or group-living).
However, in our research, the species with aposematic defences account for (82+31)/676 =
16.7% and the species with group-living defences account for (21 + 32)/676 = 7.8% of the
total dataset used, which means that the sample size will be much smaller than what
was used above (0.7%). We suspect the new sample sizes will be relatively small for this
research. Therefore, the same research could be better carried out with species whose
phylogenetic trees are smaller and more fully solved than the Macrolepidoptera Order (e.g.
fish families).
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Ehrlich and Raven’s “escape and radiate” hypothesis [17], that defences are associated with
faster diversification rates, is logical and has consistent evidence for some defences, such
as aposematism. However, the evidence for some other defences is less consistent, such as
chemical defences. Which factors can influence diversification rates is quite a complicated
question. Not only defences, but other factors such as other traits and niches might also
influence diversification rates. It can be difficult when these factors are interacting with
each other so the effect of defences on diversification rates might be less obvious. It is
especially the case when the defences are less effective for the species in their defending
functions. For example, chemical defences, as secondary defences, have fewer chances of
being used compared with other earlier defences since they are deployed later, so they
appear to be more variable and the selection force on them is lower [59]. Therefore,
their effect on the diversification rate could be less than the other earlier defences, such as
aposematic defences. Also, how to deal with the effect of variable defences on diversification
rates is another question to consider, which could be more complicated than dealing with
the effect of fewer variable defences.
5.5 Conclusion
Here we have revisited Ehrlich & Raven’s [17] “escape and radiate” hypothesis regarding the
association between diversification rates and two defence traits aposematism and group-
living. Our results agree with their hypothesis that both of these traits are associated
with faster diversification rates. The results about aposematism is consistent with several
previous studies [11, 31, 32], and the results about group-living is new to our knowledge.
Further studies are suggested in using certain smaller and more fully solved clades to test
the same hypothesis and can also test whether the diversification rates is even faster with
multiple defence traits than one single defence trait.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Conclusions and Implications
The current literature about multiple defences usually focuses on cases in which each de-
fence is-deployed individually in different circumstances (e.g. towards different enemies
[1, 2], in disparate environments [3, 4, 5], or during different periods of individuals’ lifetime
[6, 7]). However, the connections between defences are much less studied. Defences can
work synergistically with each other, so the function of at least one defence is enhanced by
other defences [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. It is found that the synergistic effect of multiple defences
can help victims to survive better in the victim-exploit competition [13]. Besides syner-
gistically operating defences, multiple defences are also connected when they are deployed
sequentially since they act one after another. Predators can launch a sequence of attacks
against victims; e.g. detection, identification, approach, subjugation, and consumption
[14]. Victims could have better a chance of survival when they can respond effectively and
correspondingly towards each level of attack [15]. This thesis focus on the connections
between defences. Chapters 2 and 3 study the sequentially-deployed multiple defences,
while Chapters 4 and 5 study the synergistically working multiple defences. In this thesis,
the evolutionary reason, the distribution variances, the coevolution between defences, and
the association between defences and diversification were explored. Here I reflect on each.
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6.1.1 Sequential defences
Chapter 2 studies the evolutionary reason for multiple defences and the trade-off between
defences in the sequential deployment scenario. Some organisms use only one defence very
often, whereas other organisms tend to apply a sequence of several defences. The question
is why do organisms invest in multiple defences rather than in one single “super-defence”?
One reason for this might be that sequential multiple defences could be better than one
“super-defence” in protecting victims in response to sequential enemy attacks. Another
reason could lie in the effect of the sequence deployment of defences; when the earlier
defences are breached, the victims can still escape the enemies when the later defences
hold.
In Chapter 2, I used a mathematical model to explore the evolutionary reason for the
sequential deployment of defences. The mathematical model is used to find the optimal
investment allocation strategy in each defence. I find that whether the optimal strategy
is to invest in multiple defences, or to invest in only one single defence is dependent on
the investment function that converts victims’ fitness into defences. So it can be expected
that the reason why some organisms tend to use only one defence, but other organisms
tend to use multiple defences, might be that the investment functions between defences
are different.
I also find the trade-off between the investment in defences. The investment in early
defences is typically more than the investment in later ones. This happens because the
earlier defences have a higher chance of being used than later defences since they are
deployed earlier. This result agrees with Endler [14], who also argues that prey should
generally invest preferentially in earlier deployed defences than later ones.
The model improves the model in Broom [16] as a general form of investment function
rather than a specific linear investment function is used, which might not be exactly what
the victims perform. I generalise the number of defences to n rather than only two, as
used in Broom [16], since some organisms in the real world have more than two levels
of sequential defences. So the findings here can be applied to understand the defence
investment allocation strategies in a wider range of organisms.
Chapter 3 focuses on the defence phenotype distributions in sequential defences. Defences
are observed as having variable phenotypic appearances [17, 18]. I used a mathematical
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model to explore the evolution of variance across time under the forces of both selection
and mutation. Both mathematical analyses and numerical simulations are used to find the
equilibrium variances in the mutation-selection balance in earlier and later defences. The
results show that the position of the defence in the sequence influences the variance, and
typically the earlier defence evolves to have less variance than the later defence. These
results can help to explain why the secondary defences (e.g. chemical defences) are found
to be very variable both in quantity of toxin and in the chemical constituents [17] whereas
many earlier-acting physical defences such as aposematic colours, thick epidermises, and
thorns appear almost identical in the same organisms. In addition, the defence effectiveness
for protection can influence the equilibrium variance in such a way that a more effective
defence decreases the equilibrium variance, and higher tolerance of deviation from the ideal
phenotype in defences can increase the equilibrium variances.
These results agree with the results in the empirical meta-analysis [19] and field-work [20]
studies. Both found the correlation between variations in later defences (e.g. chemical
defences) and variations in plants’ damage from herbivores are not significant, but varia-
tions in earlier defences (e.g. plant or leaf size, trichomes) are significantly related with
the variation in plants’ damage. This might be because the deployed position of earlier
and later defences plays an important role in protection as Endler [14] proposed and also
as our model suggests, so the earlier defences have higher chances so higher influence on
fitness values. This might also be because the effectiveness is higher and the tolerance of
deviation from the ideal is lower in earlier defence than in later defence, so the effect of
resistance in the earlier defences is better than that in the later defences also indicated in
our model.
6.1.2 Synergistically-acting defences
Sequential defences can be connected by acting one after another. Synergistically-acting
defences have another way of connection since defences can enhance the effect of each
other. For example, chemical defences and aposematic defences can enhance the effect
of each other, since aposematic colours constitute further visual cues of unseen chemical
defences, so their communal effect is better than the effect of each one of them individually
[8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
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Since the evolution of new traits is usually instantaneous compared to the persistence of
existing traits, the simultaneous evolution of two traits can be rare. It is therefore worth
considering which of the two synergistic defences evolved earlier than the other. For the
above example, chemical defences in caterpillars might have evolved before aposematism
because chemical defences themselves can protect victims, but aposematic defences them-
selves might attract the attention of predators, which then results in predator attack.
For the two traits considered (aposematism and group-living), previous research has differ-
ent predictions about the evolutionary order of the two traits. The kin selection hypothesis
suggests that the evolution of aposematism happens before group-living since aposematism
is likely to evolve in kin groups. The signal enhancement hypothesis suggests that since
group-living enhances the effect of aposematism, the evolution of group-living evolved af-
ter aposematism. Even so, I suspect that there could be dynamic coevolution between
the two. Since the larvae of many closely-related insect clades of Lepidoptera (e.g. Tri-
choptera, Antliophora, Hymenoptera) and some basal Lepidoptera clades are group-living,
group-living could be the ancestral state and the evolution from group-living to solitary-
living is likely. Also, the possibility that the evolution from aposematism to crypsis might
happen cannot be excluded. It may also be possible that derived states can evolve back to
the primitive states (backward evolution).
In Chapter 4, the coevolution of the binary states (solitary-living/group-living and cryp-
tic/aposematic) is explored. Here I find that backwards evolution can happen (both from
group-living to solitary-living and from aposematic to cryptic). The initial ancestral state
is more likely to be the group-living state rather than the solitary-living state, although
whether it is aposematic or cryptic is less certain. I also find that the evolution from
group-living to solitary-living is more likely to happen in an aposematic lineage compared
to a cryptic lineage and then followed by the transition from aposematism to crypsis. The
reason for this could be that directly losing the group protection is risky for cryptic individ-
uals, but initial evolution to aposematism could facilitate the transition from group-living
to solitary-living so that the individuals are still protected by the aposematic defences in
the process. Also, the aposematic state is still riskier than the cryptic state in a solitary
lineage, so the evolution from an aposematic state to cryptic states is more likely to happen
than the reverse.
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In addition, I find that the transition rates from the solitary cryptic state to the two
neighbouring states (group cryptic state and solitary aposematic state) is relatively low,
so the solitary cryptic state is relatively more stable compared to the other states. After
calculating the probability dynamics of the four binary states, I find that the solitary
cryptic state has the highest probability value in the equilibrium regardless of ancestral
state.
The findings in Chapter 4 are a little against intuition in at least two aspects. First, the
ancestral state might not be solitary-living but is more likely to be group-living, so the
previous studies about the evolutionary order of group-living and aposematism might be
problematic. Second, there are coevolutionary dynamics in all the four binary states so,
during the evolution, each of the four binary states has a certain probability of existing.
Although the solitary cryptic state has the highest probability in the equilibrium, it is still
possible to transit to other states at some point and then possibly evolve back later.
Chapter 5 studies the role of defences in macroevolution. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and
3, more effective defences can change the survival rates, and also change the selection force
on the population, both of which are found to be associated with diversification rates. For
one thing, higher survival rates can help the population to grow, and so a higher chance of
diversification might follow [21, 22]. For another thing, different selection forces can make
populations evolve in different directions, which is then followed by reproduction isolation
and the generation of new species [23, 24, 25]. Ehrlich and Raven [26] have been cited many
times for their hypothesis regarding the association between defences and diversification.
There have been a few empirical tests for their hypothesis, although the number is still
relatively limited. In Chapter 5, I used the same defence traits aposematism and group-
living as used in Chapter 4, in order to add some new evidence to Ehrlich and Raven’s [26]
hypothesis.
I found that both aposematism and group-living are associated with faster diversification
rates, which agrees with Ehrlich and Raven’s [26] hypothesis, and especially, the association
between aposematism and diversification rates is consistent with other empirical evidence
[27, 22, 28]. However, the previous literature shows that the associations between chemical
defences and diversification rates are less consistent, as the relations between the two can
be either positive [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34], negative [35, 36], or non-existent [37]. This agrees
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with our previous findings from Chapters 2 and 3, which show that earlier defences (e.g.
aposematism) are more likely to be used and to be more effective at providing protection,
therefore, earlier defences might be more likely to associate with higher diversification rates
than later defences (e.g. chemical defences). Also, since the later defences (e.g. chemical
defences) typically have higher variances than earlier defences, treating chemical defences
using binary traits might have simplified their influence on diversification compared to the
less variable earlier defences (e.g. aposematism). The association between group-living
and diversification rates to my knowledge is new. Since group-living can either function as
defence [38, 39, 40, 41, 42], or cooperative living and foraging [43, 44], and both of which
can increase diversification rates, the association between group-living and diversification
could be an extended area linked to Ehrlich and Raven’s [20] hypothesis.
6.2 Limitations and future work
Both Chapters 2 and 3 use mathematical models to analyse the relationship between earlier
and later defences in the sequential defence scenario. When using mathematical models, it
is inevitable to use some assumptions either to simplify the questions or to focus on the key
points or scenarios that are of interest. The model developed in Chapter 2 assumed that the
whole population faces the same predation pressure, so the population evolves to have the
same optimal defence strategy. I do this in order to find the optimal investment strategies
for the populations in which defence strategies are found to be similar in individuals.
Therefore, this model cannot be used to analyse a population which has a variation in the
defence phenotypes, or in which the individuals have different defence strategies. However,
I have tried to make the question as general as possible. As mentioned above, I have used
the investment function in the most general form f(x) compared to a linear form, and the
defence numbers are a general n compared to two. In these ways, we do not need to think
about whether a linear form function as well as whether two levels of defences will influence
our results.
Compared to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 explores the variance in the mutation-selection balance
in the population, so the predation pressures on defences are not assumed to be the same
but stronger when the defences are further away from the ideal defence phenotype. In
order to give the model a wide use, a normal form of mutation function and an exponential
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form of selection function are used. I use a normal mutation function because, according to
the central limit theorem, when a large number of independent, and identically-distributed
events are observed, their mean tends to distribute normally. I use an exponential selection
function because the cumulative distribution function of evenly-distributed events (Poisson
Process) — that is defences are breached—not happening satisfies exponential distribution.
Therefore, the model has wide uses in the real world when the event size is large.
The model I used to consider the mutation-selection balance in defence variances in Chapter
3 can also be applied to traits other than defences either to theoretically analyse the
properties in trait variances or to empirically calculate the equilibrium variance values
given the mutation and selection parameters.
There are two ways in which this research could be extended. First, we could include
the competition or invasion of a second population with different characteristics (e.g. a
different investment function, different damage costs caused by predators, or no defence
investment at all but with a mimicry strategy). Second, we could include the coevolution
between victims and their predators. So we can consider the interaction inside victims by
their own and each other’s population densities or abundances [45], their fitness values,
their mimicry strategies [46], the character mutation rates in themselves or even to the
other population, and so on; and we can consider the interaction between victims and
their predators by each other’s population density or abundance [47, 45], the mutation of
defence characters and predation characters [13], and so on. In these ways, we could see
the patterns of evolution of the defence strategies and distributions in the dynamics of the
coevolution between victim populations and also between victims and predators.
Chapter 4 explores the coevolution of two defence traits (aposematic traits and group-
living). It will be helpful to carry out the same study in other species, which would provide
results for comparison with the present study in caterpillars, in order to see whether the
similar pattern of dynamics can be observed in those species. Our method can be used to
explore any other coevolved two or more than two categorical traits (e.g. defences traits
or other traits) or genes (e.g. genetic network in genetic sequences [48]), and find out their
possible ancestors, their future equilibrium and the dynamics across time. It can also be
applied to predict the dynamics of populations’ migration behaviour in several habitats.
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In Chapter 5, I study the association between defences and diversification rates. Since the
sample species in our dataset is relatively small compared to the number of species in the
smallest clade that covers our dataset, I am not able to compare the diversification rates in
the species with two defences (a) to the diversification rates in the species with one defence
(b). If Ehrlich and Raven’s [26] ’s hypothesis holds, (a) could be larger than (b). This
research can be carried out using clades that are more phylogenetically solved and whose
dataset is more accessible than the Macrolepidoptera clade (e.g. fish clades).
In summary, this thesis aims to study the connection between defences in two important
multiple defence scenarios— sequentially-deployed multiple defences and synergistically
acting multiple defences. Different topics were explored: the evolutionary reason for mul-
tiple defences, the trade-off between defences, the distribution variances in defences, the
coevolution between defences, and the association between defences and macroevolutionary
diversification rates. Here the connections between earlier and later defences and between
two synergistically acting defences are found to play important roles in the evolution of
multiple defences, apart from the protective effect each defence has. Multiple defences
are widely found in nature and also have applications in certain human practical areas
(e.g. computer network defences), so understanding how they evolve interactively can be
meaningful.
Bibliography
[1] Gilman, R. T., Nuismer, S. L., & Jhwueng, D. C. (2012). Coevolution in multidi-
mensional trait space favours escape from parasites and pathogens. Nature, 483(7389),
328-330.
[2] Poitrineau, K., Brown, S. P., & Hochberg, M. E. (2003). Defence against multiple
enemies. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 16(6), 1319-1327.
[3] Poulton, E. B. (1890). The colours of animals: their meaning and use, especially con-
sidered in the case of insects. D. Appleton.
[4] Caro, T., Sherratt, T. N., & Stevens, M. (2016). The ecology of multiple colour defences.
EvolEcol, 30, 797-809.
[5] Kishida, O., & Nishimura, K. (2005). Multiple inducible defences against multiple
150 Lingzi Wang
predators in the anuran tadpole, Rana pirica. Evolutionary Ecology Research, 7(4),
619-631.
[6] Lotts, K., & Naberhaus, T. (2017). ”Spiny Looper Phigalia
titea (Cramer, 1782)”. Butterflies and Moths of North America.
https://www.butterfliesandmoths.org/species/Phigalia-titea. Retrieved 7 July, 2019.
[7] Williams, K. S., & Simon, C. (1995). The ecology, behavior, and evolution of periodical
cicadas. Annual review of entomology, 40(1), 269-295.
[8] Santos, J. C., Coloma, L. A., & Cannatella, D. C. (2003). Multiple, recurring origins
of aposematism and diet specialization in poison frogs. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 100(22), 12792-12797.
[9] Maan, M. E., & Cummings, M. E. (2011). Poison frog colors are honest signals of
toxicity, particularly for bird predators. The American Naturalist, 179(1), E1-E14.
[10] Bowers, M. D. (1993). Aposematic caterpillars: life-styles of the warningly colored
and unpalatable. Pages 331–371 in N. E. Stamp And T. M. Casey, editors. Caterpillars:
ecological and evolutionary constraints on foraging. New York: Chapman & Hall.
[11] Roper, T. J., & Redston, S. (1987). Conspicuousness of distasteful prey affects the
strength and durability of one-trial avoidance learning. Animal Behaviour, 35(3), 739-
747.
[12] Gohli, J., & Ho¨gstedt, G. (2009). Explaining the evolution of warning coloration:
Secreted secondary defence chemicals may facilitate the evolution of visual aposematic
signals. PLoS One, 4(6).
[13] Gilman, R. T., Nuismer, S. L., & Jhwueng, D. C. (2012). Coevolution in multidi-
mensional trait space favours escape from parasites and pathogens. Nature, 483(7389),
328-330.
[14] Endler, J. A. (1986). Defence against predators. In Predator-prey relationships, ed. M
Feder, G Lauder, pp. 109-34. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press.
[15] Low, C. (2012). Variable Risk and the Evolution of the Defense Repertoire of the
Tupelo Leafminer. In Evolutionary Biology: Mechanisms and Trends (pp. 155-168).
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Bibliography 151
[16] Broom, M., Higginson, A. D., & Ruxton, G. D. (2010). Optimal investment across
different aspects of anti-predator defences. Journal of theoretical biology, 263(4), 579-
586.
[17] Speed, M. P., Ruxton, G. D., Mappes, J., & Sherratt, T. N. (2012). Why are defensive
toxins so variable? An evolutionary perspective. Biological Reviews, 87(4), 874-884.
[18] Mauricio, R. & Rausher, M.D. (1997) Experimental manipulation of putative selective
agents provides evidence for the role of natural enemies in the evolution of plant defense.
Evolution, 51, 1435–1444.
[19] Carmona, D., Lajeunesse, M. J., & Johnson, M. T. (2011). Plant traits that predict
resistance to herbivores. Functional Ecology, 25(2), 358-367.
[20] Cardenas, R. E., Valencia, R., Kraft, N. J., Argoti, A., & Dangles, O. (2014). Plant
traits predict inter and intraspecific variation in susceptibility to herbivory in a hyper-
diverse Neotropical rain forest tree community. Journal of Ecology, 102(4), 939-952.
[21] Farrell, B. D., Dussourd, D. E., & Mitter, C. (1991). Escalation of plant defense: do
latex and resin canals spur plant diversification? The American Naturalist, 138(4),
881-900.
[22] Przeczek, K., Mueller, C., & Vamosi, S. M. (2008). The evolution of aposematism is
accompanied by increased diversification. Integrative zoology, 3(3), 149-156.
[23] Speed, M. P., Brockhurst, M. A., & Ruxton, G. D. (2010). The dual benefits of apose-
matism: predator avoidance and enhanced resource collection. Evolution: International
Journal of Organic Evolution, 64(6), 1622-1633.
[24] Arbuckle, K., Brockhurst, M., & Speed, M. P. (2013). Does chemical defence increase
niche space? A phylogenetic comparative analysis of the Musteloidea. Evolutionary
ecology, 27(5), 863-881.
[25] Orr, M. R., & Smith, T. B. (1998). Ecology and speciation. Trends in Ecology &
Evolution, 13(12), 502-506.
[26] Ehrlich, P. R., & Raven, P. H. (1964). Butterflies and plants: a study in coevolution.
Evolution, 18(4), 586-608.
152 Lingzi Wang
[27] Arbuckle, K., & Speed, M. P. (2015). Antipredator defenses predict diversification
rates. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(44), 13597-13602.
[28] Santos, J. C., Baquero, M., Barrio-Amoro´s, C., Coloma, L. A., Erdtmann, L. K., Lima,
A. P., & Cannatella, D. C. (2014). Aposematism increases acoustic diversification and
speciation in poison frogs. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
281(1796), 20141761.
[29] Nylin, S., & Wahlberg, N. (2008). Does plasticity drive speciation? Host-plant shifts
and diversification in nymphaline butterflies (Lepidoptera: Nymphalidae) during the
tertiary. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 94(1), 115-130.
[30] Ebel, E. R., DaCosta, J. M., Sorenson, M. D., Hill, R. I., Briscoe, A. D., Willmott,
K. R., & Mullen, S. P. (2015). Rapid diversification associated with ecological special-
ization in Neotropical Adelpha butterflies. Molecular ecology, 24(10), 2392-2405.
[31] Fordyce, J. A. (2010). Host shifts and evolutionary radiations of butterflies. Proceed-
ings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 277(1701), 3735-3743.
[32] Weber, M. G., & Agrawal, A. A. (2014). Defense mutualisms enhance plant diversifi-
cation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(46), 16442-16447.
[33] Farrell, B. D., Dussourd, D. E., & Mitter, C. (1991). Escalation of plant defense: do
latex and resin canals spur plant diversification?. The American Naturalist, 138(4),
881-900.
[34] Janzen, D. H. (1966). Coevolution of mutualism between ants and acacias in Central
America. Evolution, 20(3), 249-275.
[35] Arbuckle, K., & Speed, M. P. (2015). Antipredator defenses predict diversification
rates. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(44), 13597-13602.
[36] Agrawal, A. A., Fishbein, M., Halitschke, R., Hastings, A. P., Rabosky, D. L., &
Rasmann, S. (2009). Evidence for adaptive radiation from a phylogenetic study of plant
defenses. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(43), 18067-18072.
[37] Vamosi, S. M. (2005). On the role of enemies in divergence and diversification of prey:
a review and synthesis. Canadian Journal of Zoology, 83(7), 894-910.
Bibliography 153
[38] Low, C. (2008). Grouping increases visual detection risk by specialist parasitoids.
Behavioral Ecology, 19(3), 532-538.
[39] Hu, L., Ye, M., & Erb, M. (2019). Integration of two herbivore-induced plant volatiles
results in synergistic effects on plant defence and resistance. Plant, cell & environment,
42(3), 959-971.
[40] Costa, J. T. (1997). Caterpillars as social insects: largely unrecognized, the gregarious
behavior of caterpillars is changing the way entomologists think about social insects.
American scientist, 85(2), 150-159.
[41] Choe, J. C., & Crespi, B. J. (Eds.). (1997). The evolution of social behaviour in insects
and arachnids. Cambridge University Press.
[42] Low, C., Scheffer, S. J., Lewis, M. L., & Gates, M. W. (2012). The relationship
between variable host grouping and functional responses among parasitoids of A ntispila
nysaefoliella (L epidoptera: H eliozelidae). Molecular ecology, 21(23), 5892-5904.
[43] Krause, J., & Ruxton, I. G. (2002). Living in groups. Oxford University Press.
[44] Stamp, N. E., & Casey, T. M. (1993). Caterpillars: ecological and evolutionary con-
straints on foraging.
[45] Britton, N. F., Planque´, R., & Franks, N. R. (2007). Evolution of defence portfolios
in exploiter–victim systems. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 69(3), 957-988.
[46] Gavrilets, S., & Hastings, A. (1998). Coevolutionary chase in two-species systems with
applications to mimicry. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 191(4), 415-427.
[47] Abrams, P. A. (2000). The evolution of predator-prey interactions: theory and evi-
dence. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 31(1), 79-105.
[48] Ching, W. K., Ng, M. M., Fung, E. S., & Akutsu, T. (2005). On construction of
stochastic genetic networks based on gene expression sequences. International Journal
of Neural Systems, 15(04), 297-310.
